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Abstract

Though the nineteenth-century Victorian belief that science alone could provide utopia
for man weakened in the epistemological uncertainty of the postmodern era, this belief still
continues today. In order to understand our current scientific milieu—and the dangers of
propagating scientism—we must first trace the rise of scientism in the nineteenth-century.
Though removed, Fyodor Dostoevsky, in Notes From Underground (1864), and C.S. Lewis, in
That Hideous Strength (1965), are united in their critiques of scientism as a conceptual
framework for human residency. For Dostoevsky, the Crystal Palace of London’s Great
Exhibition (1862) embodied the nineteenth-century goal to found utopia through the means of
scientific progress. Though the Crystal Palace offers this hope for man, Dostoevsky shows that
palace’s monological design is ultimately uninhabitable for humans, who are dialogical beings.
Writing a century later, Lewis explores the implications of scientism within the National Institute
for Coordinated Experiments (otherwise known as the N.I.C.E.), which offers the same
conceptual framework as the Crystal Palace. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis exposes the monological
myth of scientism and both present hearty critiques of scientism as a way of life for man. They
use satire, exaggeration, and wit to show the absurdity of a conceptual framework built on the
foundations of a naturalistic philosophy of science.
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Chapter One: Connecting Dostoevsky and Lewis

And New Philosophy calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th' earth, and no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for it.
And freely men confess that this world's spent,
When in the Planets and the Firmament
They seek so many new; then see that this
Is crumbled out again to his Atomies.
'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation.
John Donne [1611]

Upon first glance, Fyodor Dostoevsky and C.S. Lewis seem as dissimilar as two authors
can be. Apart from their shared Christian beliefs, their writings are a century removed from each
other; they wrote in distinct social milieus, and they had different literary motivations.
1

Dostoevsky worked in Russia as an editor for Epoch and Time and primarily published prose—

at times, to financially survive. Lewis held a professorship (first and for longer at Oxford) at
Cambridge as the chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature and wrote children’s fiction,
poetry, apologetics, and literary criticism with considerable market success but donated two
thirds of his income (Como 112). However, upon further investigation, it appears that these
authors, despite such differences, are united in fundamental ways: Both were exposed to
literature at a young age through fairy tales, folk tales, and mythology, and as a result, they

1

I am honored to finish this project on the 150 th anniversary of the release of Notes From Underground.
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affirm beauty as integral to the religious experience.2 They were repulsed by Western
individualism since it isolates the “self” and inhibits man from authentic engagement with others
and God.3 And most importantly, for the aims of this argument, Dostoevsky, in Notes from
Underground, and Lewis, in That Hideous Strength, expose the incompatibility of scientism4
with Christian eschatology revealing that scientism offers a place of residence—a conceptual
framework for human existence—that is ultimately uninhabitable and dehumanizing.
Before tracing the authors’ critique of scientism, one must contextualize their critique
using their Christian eschatological vision. Dostoevsky and Lewis are united in their
eschatological vision of the forthcoming New Jerusalem and the dangers of the scientistic goal to
immanentize the eschaton.5 They view the earth as a temporary residence, one that provides a
robust and meaningful existence but is ultimately a “stopping place” for the life to come.6
Dostoevsky explores this theme with Elder Zossima in The Brothers Karamazov when, in
conversation about the Kingdom of God, Zossima says, “And when will that come to pass? And
will it ever come to pass? Is it not simply a dream of ours?” (312). He eventually contrasts the
Christian eschatological vision with the utopian dream of scientific socialism:

2

Dostoevsky explores the importance of beauty for the religious experience in the characters of Sonya (Crime and
Punishment), Zossima (The Brothers Karamazov), and most notably with Prince Myshkin (The Idiot) where he
shows the crux of Christ’s sacrifice in Holbein’s “Christ in the Tomb.” For Lewis, beauty is foundational to the
religious experience since it creates sehnsucht, a state of longing for God through the beauty of nature.
3
Dostoevsky was repulsed with Western individualism, and Lewis believed that Hell is choosing the Self over
choosing God.
4
In a fairly standard definition, Huston Smith writes, “Scientism adds to science two corollaries: first, that the
scientific method is, if not the only reliable method of getting at the truth, then at least the most reliable method; and
second, that the things science deals with—material entities—are the most fundamental things that exist” (qtd. in
“Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy”).
5
A phrase Eric Voegelin develops in The New Science of Politics. Voegelin explains, “The attempt at
immanentizing the meaning of existence is fundamentally an attempt to bring our knowledge of transcendence into a
firmer grip than the cognition fidei” (124). Voegelin sees the movement away from faith and transcendence as a
corollary to the revolutionary aims, by such men as Comte, Marx, and Hitler, for the “redivination of society” (124).
Once society is bereft of God, it opens the door for a secular utopia.
6
Certainly, Dostoevsky and Lewis do not subscribe to Gnosticism; their shared, deep appreciation for beauty attests
to this.
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Believe me, this dream, as you call it, will come to pass without doubt; it will
come, but not now, for every process has its law. It’s a spiritual, psychological
process. To transform the world, to recreate it afresh, men must turn into another
path psychologically. Until you have really become in actual fact a brother to
everyone, brotherhood will not come to pass. No sort of scientific teaching…will
ever teach men to share property and privileges with equal considerations for all.
(313)
In this passage, the narrator writes in the future tense: “this dream, as you call it, will come to
pass without doubt” (313), revealing Dostoevsky’s belief that the true utopia is according to
God’s timing and when the New Jerusalem descends. Until this glorious transformation, man
man must undergo the spiritual process of repentance, which unites all men in the brotherhood of
the body of Christ.7 For Dostoevsky, this shared brotherhood is only possible in the body of
Christ and even in that body not until the end of all things by God’s decree. In contrast, science
offers the hope of utopia now, as Dostoevsky noted, but cannot provide the grounding for true
brotherhood. One of the strongest representatives of Christian love in Dostoevsky’s writings,
Zossima expresses a fundamental theme in Dostoevsky’s work, that of Christian eschatology.
His question, “Is it not simply a dream of ours?” attests to how seriously Dostoevsky himself
considered the question and should not be taken as a sign of empty doubt, but of the difficulty of
the eschatological question for Christians; it requires that man be both present here but also
patiently awaiting the future Age through a demonstration of faith.8
7

“Brotherhood” is a term Dostoevsky uses and should be seen as an exclusively male idea. Frank explains, that for
Dostoevsky, “True brotherhood, as in the obshchina, is an instinctive mutual relation between the individual and the
community in which each desires only the welfare of the other. The individual does not, as in the West, insist on his
exclusive rights as an isolated ego; he freely brings these rights to the community in sacrifice without even being
asked to do so” (380).
8
John Bennett, in Social Salvation, explains six commonly held eschatological views all united by the “hope that in
a mysterious way, beyond time and history as we know them not necessarily in a world in which there is no change
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Lewis, likewise, illustrates this difficulty in his book The Great Divorce where the
eschatological question is symbolized in the “journey” of several travelers with various earthly
ambitions, on a bus toward the afterlife.9 The destination of these travelers is also elucidated in
The Weight of Glory. Here, Lewis provides an eschatological vision where every encounter we
have with beauty and others is a gateway to transcendence and the coming age. This experience,
what Lewis calls sehnsucht, is "the scent of a flower we have not found, the echo of a tune we
have not heard, news from a country we have never yet visited" (31). Lewis argues that every
creaturely being has has this eschatological vision as a reflection of the Creator; it is the “secret
thread…the secret signature of each soul, the incommunicable and unappeasable want” (The
Problem of Pain 118). Christian eschatology affirms this desire in man, for, “While we are, this
is. If we lose this, we lose all” (119). Without this signature, man is trapped in the sphere of
immanence; his desires point to nothing beyond, only to his own absurd aloneness. This, boiled
down, is the Christian eschatological vision—man’s dual citizenship.
In contrast to Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s view of man is the view known as scientism.
Scientism replaces the New Jerusalem, a city that will come when God brings all things to
completion, with a modern Tower of Babel; the authors see the rise of scientism as a modern
Tower of Babel because it symbolizes man’s attempt to bring heaven to earth through scientific
progress.10 Since a naturalistic philosophy of science is scripted on natural phenomena, it
effectively equates physical satisfaction with utopia. Scientism offers man bread instead of

or duration, there will be a perfect consummation of the Kingdom of God. It need be no static perfection, but a
further process, a process in which there will be no compromise or defeat for the ideal, in which God will be all in
all” (qtd. in Purinton 49).
9
In Inklings of Heaven: C.S. Lewis and Eschatology, Sean Connolly provides a thorough analysis of Lewis’s
eschatological vision and the emphasis in Lewis’s work on eschatology; everything is aimed toward transcendence.
10
Lewis predicts and challenges a political system that is controlled by scientific thought; progress, for Lewis, is
simply an illusion unless it includes man’s “goodness and happiness” (“Is Progress Possible?”). Science alone is
incapable of providing this for man.
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spiritual nourishment.11 For Dostoevsky, the Crystal Palace of London’s Great Exhibition (1861)
embodied this utopian aim, and for Lewis, the National Institute for Coordinated Experiments,
otherwise known as the N.I.C.E., fulfills this vision on the dystopian level. The Crystal Palace, in
Dostoevsky’s opinion, could be catastrophic because it presented the false, future hope that
science could objectively understand man, and through that understanding calculate his behavior
towards a benevolent end, an earthly utopia.12 Hence, the rise of scientism parallels and
reinforces the drive to found an earthly utopia.13 Lewis’s contained dystopia is a world where
science is taken to an extreme and becomes hegemonic as well as ideological. At the height of its
power, the N.I.C.E. symbolizes a modern Tower of Babel; Lewis intentionally shows the
eventual demise of this Tower with a linguistic rupture. Instead of community, the Institute
begets chaos.
I will focus on the Crystal Palace and Institute as conceptual frameworks for human
residency—places men can inhabit. Dostoevsky’s vision of the Crystal Palace, an allencompassing symbol of scientism, is realized in Lewis’ vision of the N.I.C.E., albeit Lewis’
vision is more distorted than Dostoevsky’s since he is writing within the fairy-tale genre. Lewis’
N.I.C.E is fantastical; it possesses supernatural elements yet remains within reality, warranting
careful attention and substantive response. Though it would be misleading to assume that Lewis
is explicitly fulfilling Dostoevsky’s vision of a scientific utopia, the parallels between
Dostoevsky’s Crystal Palace, the “new man,” and Lewis’s N.I.C.E are close enough to warrant

11

A problem Dostoevsky develops with the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov.
This belief is at the core of scientism and has continued to today: “The tendency of science to imperiousness in
our intellectual and cultural life has been dubbed ‘scientism’— the attitude that the only kind of reliable knowledge
is that provided by science, coupled with a conviction that all our personal and social problems are ‘soluble’ by
enough science” (Peacocke 7–8).
13
Lewis explains that “[u]nder modern conditions an effective invitation to Hell will certainly appear in the guise of
scientific planning” (“A Reply to Professor Haldane” 74). Lewis is not equating science and evil; rather, he says that
any destructive institutions will arise out of scientific planning science has become the supreme ideological force.
12
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further examination as treatments of same phenomena.14 Viewed together, these places of
residence are united by their scientistic underpinnings, which purport to meet man’s physical
needs to the demise of his spiritual and existential needs.
I will identify and trace the sources of scientism, which culturally intersect and enlarge
during Dostoevsky’s to Lewis’s time, and how Dostoevsky, in Notes From Underground, and
C.S Lewis, in That Hideous Strength, use satire to expose the limits of this system. By satire, I
mean the literary use of humor and wit to criticize human problems for the purpose of change.
Both authors primarily use indirect satire, where characters, through narrative, are critiqued by
their own absurd behaviors. I accept Matthew Hodgart’s criteria for successful satire as both a
revelation of the absurdity of a belief and also a “warning to the future” (Satire: Origins and
Principles 248) to those who hold the belief. Lewis and Dostoevsky satirized with purpose—to
challenge, to warn, but also to reveal the innate value of human nature and man’s need for divine
intervention through Christ’s sacrificial, salvific act. According to Dostoevsky and Lewis, a
naturalistic philosophy of science is incapable of affirming a complete view of man because it
overlooks man’s human nature, which is sinful and in need of Christ—who exists outside man’s
material conditions.15
My argument will develop Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s view of the necessity of dialogue
with God and community for man’s existential fulfillment as a speaking, acting, and reasoning
being. Both authors share a dialogical view of truth, as founded in the Person of Christ—Logos,
the Word who spoke the world into existence and established dialogue with humanity through

14

The twentieth-century Pan-Slavic Totalitarian regimes speak to this fact.
I will use “a naturalistic philosophy of science” interchangeably with “scientism,” “naturalism,” and
“metaphysical naturalism” to avoid redundancy.
15
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the Incarnation and the living Word (John 1.1).16 Through the Incarnation, Christ immanently
revealed himself to man. However, important to Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s view is Christ’s
transcendent existence at the right hand of the Father. Logos exists “outside” a scientistic Total
System and provides the metaphysical and epistemological base for reason and communication.17
Dialogue, then, is only possible in the dual existence of the material and the spiritual, the
immanent and transcendent. Furthermore, the Christian conception of residency affirms the
innate value of dialogue with others in community. And this conception appears from the very
beginning—in the Garden, in the Burning Bush, in the cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night
(Exodus), in the tabernacle, and on and on to the very indwelling Holy Spirit in Dostoevsky and
Lewis’s own times. The metaphysical possibility of dialogue with God allows man to dialogue
with others, which, in turn, provides man with a more meaningful dialogical understanding of
God.18
Though dialogue is an existential need, I will argue that the conceptual framework of
scientism does not allow for dialogue. Hence, at the center of both the Crystal Palace and the
Institute is the symbol of the Tower of Babel, man’s attempt to reach divinity through a language
of his design. In the modern era, Dostoevsky and Lewis see scientism as this new language. As
Jacques Ellul explains, science, with its aim towards objectivity, enjoys the status of offering an
exclusive, ultimate pronouncement of “the way things are,” and admits no dialogue:

16

In “Obstinacy in Belief,” Lewis explains the difference between belief in a set of propositions and belief in a
Person who is trustworthy. Biblically, too, knowledge includes relational components and intimacy elements—more
than propositional.
17
As Lewis explains in Miracles, reason is not reliable within a naturalistic Total System; as such, without ability to
form reliable belief-forming mechanisms, man is rendered incomprehensible (313).
18
In order to differentiate my use of the word "dialogical" when referring to truth: I am maintaining that truth is
ontologically dialogical since it is founded in Logos, and that we epistemologically know truth through dialogue-special revelation, the communication of the holy spirit with the Father and Christ on our behalf, prayer, and
dialogical community with the body.
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To the degree, in fact, to which objectivity stems from pure methodology, then
becomes a state of consciousness, an attitude, an ethic, it becomes a value
judgment, an exclusion of every other mode of apprehending truth. That relation
to truth introduces us into the mythical. But more than that, objectivity presents
itself as a value which synthesizes all science... On those two profound motifs,
“belief-images” are constructed, one degree more superficial, in which are
interwoven the two major themes of “history-meaning” and “science-salvation.
(The New Demons 102,103)
Ellul shows that the scientistic goal toward objectivity presents itself as a totalizing view of the
world; by presupposing a naturalistic framework, scientism deconstructs the metaphysical realm
and, in in turn, gives man a monologic myth grounded in the sensual, the objective, and the
mathematic. With this breakdown, science replaces the role of the sacred; it becomes a meaningmaking, belief-forming, modern myth which, at its core, offers man a type of salvation.19 Though
the myth of scientism offers man a new language, it ironically cannot provide the rational
grounding for its own language. Further, it cannot adequately satiate human beings’ capacity and
desire for communication and understanding—tendencies that prompt and engage man in a
dialogue with scientism, though such dialogue demands from the human being an inescapable
submission.
For this reason, both authors, through satire, show the flaws of “science deified.”20

19

The scientism of the nineteenth-century—as embodied in the Crystal Palace—sustained the Victorian belief that
science would solve the “world’s problems ‘once and for all’, which is to say that the ‘complete truth’ of science is a
finite truth” (Thompson 190).
20
M. D. Aeschliman explains in “C. S. Lewis on Mere Science” that Lewis believed that there is, in scientism,
“radical empiricism, materialism, or naturalism, an implicit or explicit rejection of all nonquantifiable realities or
truths, including the truths of reason. Its logical terminus is determinism or ‘epiphenomenalism,’ Huxley's notion
that the brain and mind are fully determined by-products of irrational physical processes” (n.pag.).
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Science, taken to its extreme, becomes philosophy rather than inquiry.21 Since a naturalistic
philosophy of science presupposes only what can be sensed, all other ontological possibilities
outside of the Total System are necessarily discounted.22 This development marks the point when
science changes from a model of studying nature to a way of viewing the world and eventually
ruling men’s lives (“Dostoevskii & Science” 197)—a movement Jürgen Habermas describes as
“Science-as-Ideology” (Toward a Rational Society 81). The danger for Dostoevsky and Lewis is
not in the objective study of nature; rather, the danger lies in in the objective study of man as a
finite and material species. Necessarily, a scientistic understanding of man centers on immanent
physical laws. As Thompson explains, when scientism prevails Nature is no longer God’s
creation; rather it is structured solely on the deterministic physical laws at play.23 Consequently,
“Nature [becomes] thoroughly rationalized, and depersonalized” (194). Scientism by definition
precludes transcendence and must explain the human experience—morality, the mind, body, etc.,
according to a Total System hypothesis. An explicit consequence of this belief is that man is a
material being without a soul. Additionally, implicit in this view of nature is the absence of
personhood. If there is no God, then there is no infinity. If there is no infinity, then man is only
material. If he is material, then he can be understood holistically through scientific observation.
He essentially becomes a statistic, a mathematical principle, and an amalgamation of chemical

21

As Gregory R. Peterson explains, switching from science to philosophy is a categorical mistake. The problem lies
neither with philosophy or science as disciplines. Rather, the mistake is when a particular philosophy of science
operates under the guise of objectivity and unquestioned assumptions.
22
Here, an important distinction between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism must be made.
According to C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, methodological naturalism “is the view that all scientific
explanations, as such, must refer only to natural entities and their properties—in short, that an explanation qualifies
as ‘scientific’ only if it restricts itself to the natural world” (142). Metaphysical naturalism, however, posits the view
“that the only things that exist are ‘natural entities’—that is, whatever entities are posited by the natural sciences in
constructing theories which attempt to explain the natural world” (141). Metaphysical naturalism is in complete
contradiction with theism, whereas methodological naturalism allows for the existence of other ontological
possibilities.
23
Here we see the scientific desacralization of nature; we no longer fear nature because we have technological
control over it. Consequently, the descralization of nature has supported the sacralization of science.
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properties that can be quantified and predicted.24
Specifically, in my discussion of Dostoevsky, I will focus on the Underground Man
and his satire of the monologue of scientism.25 Through the interaction with key symbols of the
Crystal Palace, including the stone wall, the anthill, and “2 x 2 = 4,” the UG Man satirizes the
scientistic goal of the Crystal Palace. He stands as both a subject and an object, in that he
embodies the beliefs he satirizes. Hence, the UG Man is a “hyper-conscious” narrator whose
conflicting paradox affirms the uninhabitability of the conceptual framework of scientism for
man. Important to my discussion is a Bakhtinian reading of Dostoevsky’s aesthetic. Bakhtin
reveals that Dostoevsky operates according to a polyphonic aesthetic where all characters
contribute dialogically to the novel. Dialogue is of upmost importance to Dostoevsky’s
characterization, especially for the UG Man; even his monologue in the first half of Notes is a
dialogue with “Gentlemen” who represent scientistic beliefs. Moreover, dialogue flows out of
Dostoevsky’s belief in Christ as Logos, the Word. Since Dostoevsky’s dialogical discourse deals
with layers, voices rather, that all contribute toward truth, he affirms the existence of two
realities—the material and the spiritual; without transcendent dialogue, man is trapped in
immanent monologue. Accordingly, scientism deals with one layer, the material. For this reason,
Dostoevsky’s poetics cannot include science because he is dealing with personalities (Thompson
198). The UG Man’s extreme paradox attests to this incapability. His philosophical underground
is a place more befitting spiders and dust than persons.
Though Lewis does not write according to Dostoevsky’s polyphonic aesthetic, he further
affirms the necessity of dialogue for the understanding of truth. For Lewis, I will focus on his
critique of the scientistic residency of the N.I.C.E. and the new scientistic myth it offers through

24
25

It is no surprise that statistics as a formal discipline rose in the nineteenth century.
Heretofore referred to as the “UG Man.”
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its conceptual framework. My discussion will center on key leaders of the Institute, most
significantly, Professor Frost, Feverstone, and Deputy Director John Wither. Each of these
characters embodies a different scientistic approach, which Lewis takes to an extreme in order to
reveal its absurdity. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis affirms the importance of dialogue, and he
recognizes the Institute’s aims to create a “new” scientific language. The Institute is founded on
the modern “myth” of scientism, and it seeks to undo the linguistic breakdown enacted by God
on the Tower of Babel.26 However, Lewis shows the danger of this modern language; it
bifurcates reason and imagination, disenchanting the world of traditional truth and replacing it
with a modern myth of facts. Moreover, this new language, since it is founded on metaphysical
naturalism, locks man in his subjective “stimulations.” As a result, men lose their “soul” and
become what Lewis called “men without chests” (The Abolition of Man 26). Without the chest—
the heart and soul—men are trapped in the isolation of subjectivism; they cannot dialogue about
an objective reality.27 Consequently, man loses his language, reason, and moral capabilities.
Through satire, Lewis shows the absurdity of the Institute’s conceptual framework; it is a
residency that admits no residents.
Divided by their time periods and cultures, Dostoevsky and Lewis are united by their
Christian convictions regarding man’s relationship to man, God, and nature, and scientism’s
inability to provide a substantive conceptual or actual framework for this relationship. They both
view man as a desiring and free agent, one whose desires are realized only in the context of
Christian community. Whereas scientism objectifies and depersonalizes man, Christian
community offers a conceptual residency that affirms man’s existential needs, including his
26

The allusion is intentional: The novel’s title, “That Hideous Strength,” is based on Sir David Lyndsay’s Ane
Dialog, which describes the Tower of Babel.
27
Lewis would advocate a tripartite or dualistic soul. The “chest” or heart is one part of it; the mind another; and, if
tripartite, the belly or appetite is a third. Dualistically, a head without a heart (a “chest”) is a partial man or no man
at all. But a “chest” without a mind would be a beast.
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personhood and need for unity with other persons.28 As such, both Dostoevsky and Lewis show
that characters must return to a person before they can maintain their personhood. What
distinguishes their Christian community from a naturalistic, false community is its view of man
as a dialogical being.
Though the UG Man never reaches his conversion, his ancestor, Raskolnikov, finds his
conversion through Sonya, a manifestation of Christ’s self-sacrificial love and catalyst for
Raskolnikov’s conversion. For Dostoevsky, man must return to the soil and to Sonya—“ecstatic
love for all creation.” Love for Sonya, a clear allusion to Sophia, the Greek understanding of
wisdom, is founded in another equally substantive Greek concept, Koinonia. Wisdom
understands the need for community. Thus, love for Sonya requires an appropriate view of nature
where all elements, water, trees, and man, are inherently beautiful and infinitely valuable as
reflections of Christ. A proper view of nature, according to Dostoevsky, recognizes man’s innate
need to belong to nature and others sacrificially. Thus, his redemption is only possible within the
context of a dialogical relationship to nature and community made possible by Christ’s
Incarnation and sacrifice.
Lewis satirizes the Institute’s deficiency and offers mythological community of St.
Anne’s as the solution. His view of community is a gathering point where people can experience
the divine through nature. This experience is possible only when man affirms supernature and his
imagination is baptized by beauty. If man understands the supernatural, then the natural has its
fitting place. Hence, Jane and Mark Studdock find their redemption in the mythical community
of St. Anne’s, and more specifically in the marriage bed, a symbol of the sacrificial communion
the church has as the bride of Christ. Though Mark and Jane begin their marriage in broken
dialogue, Mark’s journey through the Institute assures him of the value of dialoguing in
28

As seen in the unity of the Jews and Gentiles in Ephesians 2 and elsewhere in the New Testament.
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community with others. Their marriage is healed once Mark enters the Christian community at
St. Anne’s. Here, people fellowship, are connected with nature, and dance in obedience to God—
a humble recognition of one’s place in the universe. Lewis brilliantly calls man back to an
anagogical vision of the medieval Christian mythological picture where Christ is the center of the
universe, not man, and not the empty abyss.
.

I have chosen to unite Dostoevsky and Lewis because I believe that, together, they offer a

complex critique of scientism. Though scholarship is abundant on both writers’ views of science,
few have composed a side-by-side comparison of these authors’ satire of scientism, and very
few, if any, have composed an analysis of the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. to the degree that I
intend to in this project.29 When studied together, we get a picture of Dostoevsky’s prophesy of
the rise of scientism and Lewis’s prophesy of the continual breakdown of dialogue, language,
reason, and morality as a result of scientism’s rise in the West. Both are prophetic. Though
Dostoevsky and Lewis are culturally removed and have different foci and solutions to the
problems of scientism their critiques, when read together, offer a robust challenge to the
conceptual framework of scientism, which continues today.30

Three Major Developments that Contributed to the Rise of Scientism:
Before embarking on a critique of scientism, one must trace the rise of this system. The word
first appears in 1870 in Fraser's as a reaction against religious dogmatism: “It’s dogmatism on
29

Though scarce research exists connecting Dostoevsky and Lewis, I am thankful to David Rozema for his research
in "Inside-out or Outside-in? Lewis and Dostoevsky on the 'New Man.'"
30
In August 2012, Stephen Hawking, award-winning physicist, caustically opined that “[t]here is no heaven; it’s a
fairy story” (The Guardian n.pag.) and scrapped nearly two millennia of Western religious belief into the rubbish
heap of obsolescence. For Hawking, our experience is a composite of neurological phenomena that operates much
like a computer processor and “will stop working when its components fail.” As such, “[t]here is no heaven or
afterlife for broken down computers” (n.pag.). Eternity is simply a fairy tale for those afraid of the dark, argues
Hawking, revealing his disregard for the historical belief in the land of the fairy and his belief that transcendence has
irrevocably collapsed. And he is not alone. The “New Atheist” movement supports this notion, as do more reputable
scholars (Churchland, Critchley), physicists, and neurologists.
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the one hand,. And it’s ‘scientism’ on the other” (qtd. in “Scientism” OED). To prevent devising
a straw man, one must note that “scientism” is viewed as a derogatory term applied to a system
of science that is taken to an extreme. Few, if any, openly embrace scientism. As such, in
discussing Dostoevsky and Lewis’ work, I will show that the widely advocated naturalistic
philosophy of science they critique is scientism. It is important to note that science, based on the
empirical model currently adhered to by the majority of scientists, is relatively new. Since the
seventeenth-century, the word “science” has undergone a significant semantic development
toward a specific and totalizing empirical model of acquiring and organizing knowledge. The
semantic development undoubtedly reflects a concurrent epistemological shift taking place in
metaphysics. Steven Shapin explains, “the word ‘science’ (from the Latin scientia, meaning
knowledge or wisdom) tended to designate any body of properly constituted knowledge (that is,
knowledge of necessary universal truths)” (Scientific Revolution 5). “Science” in the medieval
era was any study of the natural world, and this study was divided into natural history and natural
philosophy. When seventeenth-century thinkers studied what existed in the natural order, they
engaged in “natural history.” When they studied the cause and effect relationship within nature,
they engaged in “natural philosophy” (5). When someone spoke of science, they did not refer to
the universal empirical model we follow today or even to what Descartes had in mind.
However, when the “Scientific Revolution” challenged pre-existing natural philosophy,
science developed toward naturalistic methodology.31 During the sixteenth and seventeenth
century, “science,” as a congruous body of universal truth, was challenged and divided. In
cosmology specifically, scientists traditionally accepted the Aristotelian account of the universe
as a fixed, ordered, and perfect system. As Shapin explains, Galileo’s discovery of sun spots in
As Shapin explains, it is misleading to speak of a unified “essence” during the scientific revolution, and thus
many mistakenly assume that the revolution was unified as whole. Though many natural philosophers challenged
Aristotelian belief, they were by no means unified in their beliefs or intentions.
31
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1611 directly contradicted the medieval belief that celestial bodies, higher and separate from the
Earth, are perfect (16.) This belief can be traced back to Aristotle’s conception of the Unmoved
Mover. Aristotle maintained that each of the planets and star clusters exist in a sphere, all of
which rotate in harmony with one another by love and desire for the First Mover (Copleston,
History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy 315). What motivates the cyclical process are
immaterial beings within each of the spheres called Intelligences who strive to emulate the
spirituality of the First Mover, but incapable of true emulation, move in perfect spheres—the
closest idea to perfection in medieval thought. All of these spheres move in conjunction with one
another and create a heavenly dance of sorts. As bodies occupying a space higher in the universal
hierarchy, the planets, most notably the sun, were conceived to be without blemish as they
fulfilled their purpose of loving the first mover. When Galileo’s observation revealed the sun
was not in fact a “perfect,” or blemish-free celestial body, Aristotelian cosmology lost
explanatory power in different spheres of the emerging scientific community.
Galileo’s discovery continued to build on an already divided scientific community.
Copernicus’ debunking of Ptolemaic cosmology, nearly a century earlier, began a trajectory
toward a rational empirical model. Medievalists viewed the universe geocentrically and
hierarchically on the Ptolemaic construct. Lewis, in his capacity as Chair of Medieval and
Renaissance Studies at Cambridge, was enamored with the Ptolemaic system knowing full well it
was not empirically accurate but still, he thought, spiritually expressive of God’s ordering of the
cosmos. In his renowned work, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, Lewis explains
that when man looked into space, he was not looking into the unknown or into a vast,
immeasurable vacuum, but towards an ordering of the planets and spheres that begins with the
moon and lead to Primum Mobile, the Empyrean, and eventually to the true sphere of God
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(Lewis 45). Further, Lewis explains, "Because the medieval universe is finite, it has a shape, the
perfect spherical shape, containing within itself an ordered variety...."The spheres ... present us
with an object in which the mind can rest, overwhelming in its greatness but satisfying in its
harmony (Lewis The Discarded Image 99). The medieval man viewed the universe
harmoniously. Every substance, from the rocks on the earth to the constellations, fit
harmoniously in the Great Chain of Being. However, Copernicus challenged this notion,
showing the sun, not the earth, as the center of the universe, further disrupting the medieval
conception of cosmology. When the enlightened man looked into space he was now looking into
an eternal void, not the celestial dance he once viewed.
As a response, natural philosophers developed an alternative methodology to form
truthful observations of the world. Undoubtedly, this shift has allowed science and medicine to
become the powerful method we know today. However, not all was gained during this shift. The
most notable development during the sixteenth and seventeenth century was the rise of
mechanical philosophy. As Shapin explains, mechanical philosophers, i.e., Galileo, Descartes,
Boyle, Newton, and others, “attempted to discipline, if not in all cases to eliminate, teleological
accounts of the natural world” (Shapin 119). This is not to say that these thinkers rejected
supernatural reality out right; rather, their move towards mathematical certainty prompted a
mechanical methodology of science. For instance, Newton’s “crucial experiment” on the nature
of light (1670s) sought the demonstrative certainty afforded to the realm of mathematics;
however, Newton recognized the impossibility of philosophy reaching demonstrative certainty
and abandoned the previous notion of philosophy. Others followed suit, as mechanical
philosophers believed that “imperfections in sensory capacity, variations in "wit," and
divergences in theoretical or social interest might all be corrected by the mechanical action of

Smalt 22
right method” (122). Mechanical philosophy moved away from the truths once found in the
Scriptures and moved toward the “Book of Nature” (122). In this way, mechanical philosophy
moved the scientific enterprise toward method, and that method, over time, became the empirical
model that science currently holds. Although this method has successfully helped us make
accurate observations of the natural world, it is dangerous, in Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s eyes,
when it is used to discount other ontological possibilities beyond the natural world—when its
presuppositions limit man to his biological function and as one observing cause and effect
relationships as regards movement. Additionally, they criticize this approach when it
presupposes that man is a purely material phenomenon and subject to the laws of all matter: 2 x 2
= 4 absolutely.
Since this development encompasses a wide range of scholarship beyond the scope of
this project, my discussion will focus on Dostoevsky’s and Lewis’s critique of how this method
would change society’s view of man. Cognizant of this change, Dostoevsky prophesied that the
western conception of science would permeate and fundamentally shift how man is thought and
spoken of in Russian society. The confluence of a science’s view of man and nature is clear;
man, as species, is part of nature and thus our view of man will shift with our view of nature and
with the interpretive framework we use to understand both. Hence, the rise of mechanical
method not only applied to the natural world but also to man. In approximating an accurate,
scientific view of man, Descartes viewed the human body as a “statue, an earthen machine” (qtd.
in Shapin 158), and as such, sought to bring “the human body within the scope of a mechanical
philosophy” (158). Descartes viewed the body according to patterns of “reflex action” (158).
While this reduction is necessary to accurately understanding the various functions of the body,
it has the unfortunate tendency reduce man only to his function. Following Descartes, Hobbes’
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Leviathan (1651) opens by providing his account of mechanical philosophy, which, as Copleston
explains, “takes no account of anything but bodies” (History of Philosophy 5). His exclusion of
the supernatural arises from his method and from the view of the body as function.
As mechanical philosophy sought complete knowledge of man, that knowledge would be
developed as a means to take control over man towards a benevolent end. If man can be reduced
to his function, then he can function in a predictable way. Dostoevsky calls attention to this in
Notes when he satirizes the rational egoism of the 1860s Russian intelligentsia. The UG man
speaks of man as an organ key, a piece in a machine that serves a particular, pre-determined
function. Although this view rose out of a Christian view of science, it eventually became
naturalistic. Shapin explains, “When Bacon wrote The Great Instauration, he signaled his
(widely shared) conviction that humanity had, through the fall from grace in the Garden of Eden,
lost its original technological control over nature. It was also a religious duty to restore that
sovereignty, and the new natural philosophy was meant to be a powerful tool in that task” (139).
Bacon’s hope in science was, at the time, grounded in his Christian convictions. However, his
faith in the scientific enterprise would eventually shed the Christian conception and move toward
a completely naturalistic account. This ideal was fully realized in his scientific utopian work,
New Atlantis. In Bacon’s utopia, the Solomon House is a stratified institution where knowledge
and power coalesce to serve a poliscientific function—to order the society according to its
knowledge, and in turn to increase its knowledge from the well-ordered society. Bacon’s utopian
conception, like the ship pictured on the front cover of his famous Instauratio Magna, “a ship
sailing beyond the pillars of Hercules—the straits of Gibraltar that customarily symbolized the
limits of human knowledge” is a departure from earlier ways of knowing the world.
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As scientists continued to move toward universal knowledge, the discipline became
increasingly narrow in epistemological scope. The rise of positivism in the Victorian Era attests
to this extremist narrowing of the dominant philosophy of science. The challenging of
medievalism, rise of mechanical philosophy, and Darwinian evolution, all contributed to an
epistemology that sought to completely remove the metaphysical and replace it with method. The
consequence was Comte’s belief that, just as nature operates according to laws, so, too, does
society operate within the same mechanisms. As a result, the positivists’ methods to
appropriating truth became increasingly absurd as they reduced truth statements to analytical
tautologies. Naturally, then, the first record we have of “scientism” first emerged during this time
period. The first record of its use comes in 1877 when it is compared with religious dogmatism
(“Scientism” OED); this comparison is fitting as modern science took its own limits of
knowledge to an ideological extreme.
It is during this time that Dostoevsky lived and wrote. The life and times of Dostoevsky
are important because of his critique, as Parrinder explains, of the “Victorian belief in the
connection between scientific knowledge and social progress” (20). This connection presupposed
that science could correct man’s ill fate; it could help man progress individually and as a species.
Thus, this belief continued Bacon’s notion that science, through technology, could replace the
prelapsarian dominion man had over nature. In this way, Dostoevsky critiques the Palace’s claim
that man can reach a “god-like” control over nature through the creation of a modern Tower of
Babel. Parrinder recognizes that this belief came to a culmination toward the end of
Dostoevsky’s life and the beginning of Lewis’s: “In retrospect it might seem that there was a
clear connection between the Positivist aim of universal scientific knowledge and the political
vision of a single world-empire. Both, as we have seen, treat the world as a closed system” (25).
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Victorian ideals not only shaped the Western world, but also they spread into the Eastern world,
including Russia where Dostoevsky first faced them in the 1860s. Joseph Frank explains that
Dostoevsky, after spending ten years in exile, returned to Russia where he encountered a
synthesis of eighteenth-century French materialism—heavily influenced by the mechanical
philosophers—mixed with Bentham’s English Utilitarianism (xvi). As Frank explains, this
synthesis was grounded on the belief that emotions, values, and behaviors are a product of man’s
genetics and his environment. The implications of this view pervaded political ideology as well.
Politics became subservient to dominant scientific rational, and the Russian intelligentsia called
for progress in the name of nihilism; in Bazarovian fashion, all traditions, political systems, and
religion must be overthrown for political progress. As such, the nineteenth-century rise of
nihilism proposed that man’s behavior could be completely understood through science and
calculated toward utilitarian ends (Frank 603). Dostoevsky and Lewis both see this “progress” as
an absurd digression; this is not man’s positive evolution, but his devolution.
C.S. Lewis begins writing his Space Trilogy nearly a century later, ending with That
Hideous Strength in 1945. Lewis, aware of the rise and fall of pan-Slavic utopias—Dostoevsky’s
cruel prophecy—and of the rise and consequences of logical positivism, chose science fiction to
communicate his views of science, technology, and myth. As a genre centered on the potential of
scientific advancement into the unknown, science fiction was the ideal choice for Lewis to
present his critique of scientism. All three parts of the trilogy discuss the achievements and also
the limits of science. In That Hideous Strength, Lewis is criticizing the modern scientific
“materialist myth” (Downing 125) that man is only a cerebral being—that all of life is
neurological activity; man has no “soul.” Lewis’ definition of scientism is the “quasi-religious
hope of using technology to perpetuate the species on other worlds and to grope toward
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godhood” (322). This is the ideology the N.I.C.E. offers within its conceptual framework, and
perhaps one that still echoes into post-modernity.
Dostoevsky and Lewis critique the Palace’s and the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual frameworks
with the ultimate aim of offering a Christian alternative. Dostoevsky offers the prison—a place
of suffering where one accepts responsibility for his or her transgressions—as an alternative to
the Palace. The prison’s conceptual framework is founded on the freedom to choose suffering,
which stands in direct contrast to the scientific determinism of the Crystal Palace. Through
Raskolnikov’s relationship with Sonya, a parallel to the UG Man’s relationship with Liza, we see
Dostoevsky’s solution to the problem of scientism, which is the willing acceptance of one’s guilt
through suffering. Sonya, a sacrificial Christ-figure, offers Raskolnikov this solution through
constant dialogue and grace. By accepting this dialogical encounter, Raskolnikov willingly
enters prison where he develops an anagogical vision of nature—one where all man and beast
co-exist in harmony. Hence, Dostoevsky’s prison is paradoxical; by choosing suffering one is
liberated to a fuller understanding of reality.
Lewis offers St. Anne’s as the alternative framework to the N.I.C.E., which deconstructs
the Christian mythological picture and offers a scientistic myth in its place. Like Dostoevsky,
Lewis maintains that community is necessary for man to become existentially filled as a
speaking, reasoning, and moral agent. Therefore, Lewis calls man to return to Christian mythical
community, and St. Anne’s, a place of grace, symbolizes this community. Like the Ptolemaic
cosmological design, the community at St. Anne’s is hierarchical, with beasts and man in service
to one another and under the spiritual authority of Ransom and the Oyeresu. Though this
hierarchical picture has a clear authority, it is not a place of perverted or disproportionate power
like the Institute; rather, it operates on sacrifice and service between all members of the
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community. As such, the community functions like a dance, where all members exist in
proportion, harmony, and love, like the medieval Intelligences who circle around God—the
center and purpose of the universe. While man is in this dance—loving God and others in
sacrificial obedience—he is most existentially fulfilled.
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Chapter Two: Dostoevsky—Prophet and Satirist
Looking along the metal beams and glass panels of the Crystal Palace, Dostoevsky was
terrified. Here, stood the modern picture of man’s technological and scientific freedom; man
could finally undo the effects of the Fall and build the perfect earthly utopia—through science!
In the beams stood the hope of Russian revolution, of a better life, even the fulfillment of man’s
deepest existential needs. The weight of Dostoevsky’s terror grows clearer when contrasted
against Chernyshevsky’s sublimity over the same symbol. In Vera Pavlovna’s Fourth Dream,
from Cherynshevsky’s What is to be Done? (1863), she envisions a utopian society, a “New
Russia,” where men and women cohabitate in perfect harmony and brotherly love. This society
has echoes of the prelapsarian Garden of Eden where, instead of communion with God,
technological efficiency eases the burden and pain of work:32 Men and women “do all their
chores and enjoy their work very much…Why shouldn’t they be singing? Machines are doing
almost all the work for them—reaping, binding the sheaves, and carting them away” (115).
Technology gives humanity complete control over the environment, and in the center of this
Garden they build their Tower of Babel:
There stands a building, a large enormous structure such as can only be seen in a
few of the grandest capitals. No, now there’s no other building like it! It stands
amidst fields and meadows, orchards and groves. The fields grow grain, but they
aren’t like the ones we have now; rather, they’re rich and abundant…Great care…
has been lavished on them; there’s not a single diseased tree…But this building—
what on earth is it? What style of architecture? There’s nothing at all like it now.

32

Technology, in Vera’s dream, replaces the sacred communion between God and man. The citizens of “New
Russia” sing the praises of technology, “machinery.” Vera’s dream, however, in reality is more of a nightmare as
Friedrich Engels shows in The Condition of the Working Class in England (1844).
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No, there is one building that hints at it—the palace of Sydenham: cast iron and
crystal, crystal and cast iron—nothing else. (114)
Under the Crystal Palace, there will be no pain: “For everyone there will be eternal spring and
summer and joy everlasting” (115) because man will be united through scientific progress.
However, Chernyshevsky’s delight is Dostoevsky’s terror.
As we enter the dusk of modernity—even the night—Dostoevsky’s terror of the Crystal
Palace is strikingly prophetic. The modern belief in the objective value of science and
technology spurred the twentieth-century attempts to immanentize the eschaton, to use
Voegelin’s phrase again. In practice, however, we learned that this utopian drive is actually
dystopic, as the Pan-Slavic socialist attempts alone show us. Nonetheless, though Modern belief
in the objective value of science has been weakened, it has not been destroyed. The New Atheist
movement, modern Neurology, and Popular Science, still hold to the objective value of science
alone to give us accurate truths about reality. The Postmodern breakdown in metanarrative,
objectivity, and foundationalism cracked the glass of the Crystal Palace, but it did not shatter it.
We now value multiple narratives instead of just science, but basing epistemology on the
scientific method is effectively what led us to hold everyone’s limited perspective in tension
together with no one able to claim above the fray. Our present epistemological uncertainties,
though modified, still have roots in scientistic epistemology. In Notes from Underground,
Dostoevsky prophesies and satirizes such blind adherence to scientism.
Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky published Notes from Underground during one of the
most cataclysmic times in Russian history.33 Political tensions between the serfs, the Russian
intelligentsia, and Alexander II culminated in 1861 with the emancipation of the serfs. Two years
33

And also one his most trying times personally, as we see in a letter to his brother, Mikhail Dostoevsky on April
2nd, 1864: “My nerves are distraught and I still can’t gather my strength. My torments of all kinds are now so
onerous that I don’t even want to talk about them. My wife is dying, literally” (“Selected Letters” 96).
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before, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) began permeating Russian intellectual circles,
challenging Western religious views of nature. In light of this challenge, Darwin further
reinforced the scientific enterprise’s movement toward metaphysical naturalism. Westerners
speculated that if traditional Christian views of nature were inaccurate, then perhaps the
Christian view of truth and man would be equally dubious. As such, this challenge to religious
truth shifted society’s view of man, as the two are necessarily intertwined. Released while
Dostoevsky wrote Notes, T.H. Huxley’s “Man’s Place in Nature” marks this philosophical shift;
Huxley explicitly claimed that man had an evolutionary past contra the Christian belief in the
creation model. Darwin and Huxley’s evolutionary claims were reinforced by other seminal
Western writers, such as Hume, Feuerbach, Bentham, and J.S Mill.34 Like religion, economics,
and philosophy, these scientific developments permeated and shifted Russian culture; the
Russian intelligentsia, conspiring for political revolution, recognized the revolutionary goals of
these “new” beliefs. Science could now bring the means for “progress” and for a political
revolution.
Dostoevsky recognized that these “new” beliefs would radically shape the Russian
intelligentsia’s view of truth. The scientism of the nineteenth century—as embodied in the
Crystal Palace—sustained the Victorian belief that science would solve the “world’s problems
‘once and for all,’ which is to say that the ‘complete truth’ of science is a finite truth”
(Thompson 190). “Truth,” in this emerging system, is no longer found in the scriptures or
Christian revelation but in the “Book of Nature” (Shapin 122)—in what can be empirically

34

An empiricist, David Hume, in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) presented a criticism of
supernatural claims. Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity (1842), which will be explained further in this chapter,
inverts the traditional Creation / creator paradigm; Bentham and Mill offer a completely naturalistic ethical system
to the West grounded in scientific method. Though Mill tipped his hat word the possibility that God is the great
utilitarian, my focus is on the classical utilitarian claims minus a theistic foundation. Theism explains the particular
question, “why believe in the essential equality of persons?” whereas secularism cannot nearly as well.
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observed. We can trace Dostoevsky’s awareness of this philosophical shift in his writing
periods—pre-Siberia and post-Siberia. Though Dostoevsky wrote about political issues before
his time in Siberia—Poor Folk the most noteworthy—discussion of natural sciences before the
1860s is negligible (Thompson 192). However, after spending eight years in Siberian labor
camps, Dostoevsky emerged in a transforming Russia where the understanding of truth radically
changed to cohere with science.35 This transformation is clear when one examines all of the
emerging scientistic theories in the nineteenth century.36 Hence, the Westernization of Russia
brought with it a revolutionary conception of truth; science, as many “progressives” understood
it, became exclusively definitive of truth. Dostoevsky would spend the remainder of his career
exploring the “Authority” of this “new” science.
With this new, scientific view of truth came a radical shift in Russia’s view of man.
Though political revolution was the Russian intelligentsia’s primary concern, a philosophical
revolution resulted. The presuppositions one brings to nature—whether it is designed, accidental,
or other—will invariably shape one’s view of man as well. As Frank explains in his chapter “The
Portrait of a Nihilist,” even if the revolution never happened, the 1860s marked an explosion of
new ideas—especially in relation to Russia’s view of man (341). The philosophical revolution
was founded on the emerging scientific materialism of Feuerbach, and a synthesis of French
materialism and English utilitarianism (Frank xvi).37 In The Essence of Christianity, (1841)
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We can also trace this development through the use of the Russian word, nauka: “The Russian nauka means both
‘science’ and ‘scholarship’. The context determines which sense is meant. By Dostoevskii’s time it had come
increasingly to be used for the natural sciences, mathematics, statistics and economics” (192).
36
As Thompson explains, “Common to all these nineteenth-century theories—positivism, evolution, utopian
socialism, utilitarianism, empiricism, rational egoism, social Darwinism—is a philosophical grounding in
materialism and determinism, underpinned by scientific though and methodology” (194).
37
Friedrich Lange, in History of Materialism (1865), discusses "a purely atomistic conception of society in which all
motives ordinarily called moral drop out" (qtd. in Anderson n.pag.). Bentham and Mill are most important to
Dostoevsky’s critique of utilitarianism. In 1860, Chernyshevsky translated John Stuart Mill’s “Principles of
Political Economy,” two years before Dostoevsky visited London and four years before he wrote Notes From
Underground. In 1844, V.F. Odoevsky, in Russian Nights, explains Bentham’s ideas as they influenced
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Feuerbach makes a clear case against the Christian conception of man as a spiritual being
endowed with a soul, a bold revolt against the man-as-soul. As K.A. Lantz explains,
“Feuerbach’s writings could not be published in Russia; nonetheless they quickly spread through
intellectual circles there and had a profound effect on Westernizers in particular” (“Feuerbach”
141). For the Russian intelligentsia, Feuerbach’s materialism was “progressive” and
revolutionary. P.V. Annenkov, in reference to Nikolai Ogarev’s copy of The Essence of
Christianity, which he smuggled into Russia, writes, “It could be said that Feuerbach’s book had
nowhere produced so powerful an impression as it did in our ‘Western’ circle, and nowhere did it
so rapidly obliterate the remnants of all proceeding outlooks” (qtd. in Lantz 141). For revolution
to succeed, it must obliterate the past and make way for a new view of man. Feuerbach clearly
establishes this obliteration:
Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly
to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature). The divine thing is nothing else than
the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the
individual man, made objective—i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a
distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of
the human nature. (qtd. in Gardiner 239)
Contra Hegel, who maintained that the Absolute Geist, or rational spirit, comes to consciousness
through individuals acting dialectically, Feuerbach argues, “man is fundamental, God being only
a reified idea representing his own alienated human essence” (238).38 Therefore, it can be said

Chernyshevsky and the intelligentsia: “Yes, advantage is the essential motivator for all man’s actions. Whatever is
useless is harmful, whatever is useful is permitted. That is the only solid foundation for society…let advantage
replace the unstable foundations of so-called conscience, so-called innate feeling, all poetic nonsense, all
philanthropic schemes—and society will achieve lasting prosperity!” (qtd in Katz 102).
38
It is important to note that Hegel was extremely important to the 1840s intelligentsia. Here, we see that that the
1860s men wanted to completely abandon any acknowledgement of transcendence—even Hegel’s rational spirit.
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that Feuerbach “turned speculative philosophy on its head” (238) by arguing that God is a human
construct man uses in order to become self-conscious.
Accordingly, Feuerbach inverts the traditional creation paradigm so that man assumes the
creator role and God the creation role.39 As such, Feuerbach continued in the Hobbesian tradition
by further dethroning the prominence of the Christian conception of man as a spiritual being; this
challenge, viewed contextually, had at its core revolutionary aims. Dostoevsky saw the danger
implied in this revolution. Instead of his society maintaining belief in a God-man, the young
radicals, like Feuerbach, inverted this to the man-god.40 Chernyshevsky openly embraces this
revolutionary man-god. In Vera Pavlovna’s dream, he embodies this inversion in Vera’s selfcreation. When Vera communicates with the goddess—who “anticipates the contemporary
scientific concept of synergy” (Katz 112)—she, herself, becomes a goddess. The goddess in her
dream—a mixture of classical mythological gods—loses her divinity while Vera deifies herself.
Hence, “Drawing on both the doctrine of transfiguration and the ideas of the German philosopher
Feuerbach, Chernyshevsky deifies Vera Pavlovna while anthropomorphizing his goddess” (111).
Like Vera who deifies herself through the anthropomorphization of the gods, man could now
reach the status of self-created divinity—a sacred immanence.
Accordingly, Feuerbach’s man-god established the intellectual foundations for the
creation of a “new man.” As Dostoevsky saw, the “new man” will be created by radical men who
view humanity in terms of matter and chemistry, not spirituality. In The Brothers Karamazov,
Dmitri proclaims the rise of these new men: “It’s magnificent, Alyosha, this science! The new
man will come, I quite understand that…And yet, I’m sorry for God” (589). Dmitri’s remorse is
39

Feuerbach’s inversion pre-dates Freud’s twentieth-century atheist account of God as the patriarchal symbol of
man’s subconscious needs, and also stands as a significant influence for Marxist dialectical materialism.
40
In Demons Dostoevsky would most notably explore this criticize this idea through Kirillov’s perversion of
Christ’s salvific act. Kirillov affirms himself as a Christ figure, but in his final moments, his costly suicide amounts
to nothing. He will not rise again. His death is one of total isolation and strangely inspires no one.
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an affirmation of what the new man means—the death of God and of the human soul. Dmitri
continues to explain how the Russian intelligentsia will view the new man: “Imagine, in the brain
are these nerves . . . they have little tails. . . as soon as they begin to quiver, an image appears . .
.this is why I visualise, and then think . . . because of these little tails, and not at all because I
have a soul and am a kind of image and likeness (589). The new man will be nothing beyond
chemical structures and reactions. Accordingly, anything related to the “soul”—or spirituality—
will pass away with the old man.
Dmitri’s remorse for the loss of God—spirituality—directly contradicts Chernyshevsky
who affirms this new view of man and believes his rise will mark the beginning of a positive era:
"We did not see these men six years ago; three years ago we despised them: and now—but it
matters little what we think now; in a few years, we shall appeal to them: we shall say to them
'Save us!' and whatever they say then will be done by all” (qtd. in Barstow 25). Using the salvific
language of Christianity, Chernyshevsky reveals that the new man will replace Christ’s salvific
act. To men instead of Christ society will cry, “Save us!” Chernyshevsky develops his “new
man” in What is to be Done? wherein Rakhmetov, the novel’s protagonist, is an ascetic whose
primary motivation is to spur on social revolution through enlightened self-interest. Rakhmetov
is a clear embodiment of the nineteenth-century belief in the “new man,” a pre-Nietzschean
Übermensch who recreates himself as a man of power, social dominance, and who is not
delimited to traditional moral boundaries; he is free to transgress, to step over moral boundaries
according to his self-interest.41 His transgression is revolutionary. His aims are revolution.
Following through with Feuerbach’s man-god inversion, the “new man” can lead society to a
new utopia.
41

In Raskolnikov’s theory, Dostoevsky makes a clear connection between a scientistic view of man and the “new
man” objective of stepping over traditional moral boundaries. Raskolnikov’s theory is only possible when he views
man as an abstraction, a principle, a statistic.
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With the “new man” came the possibility of a new society built on the premises of
scientific progress. Rakhmetov is the fictional embodiment of Chernyshevsky’s belief that
earthly happiness could be achieved through an ethics of utility, a system he develops in The
Anthropological Principle in Philosophy (1860). Chernyshevsky affirms a scientistic view of
man and argues that society could function perfectly once individuals began acting in accordance
with “enlightened self-interest,” i.e., their egoistic impulse.42 This belief is Chernyshevsky’s
Rational Egoism—a belief he propagated but never explicitly named in his works. At the heart of
Chernyshevsky’s thought is that Russian society should eschew traditional Orthodox conceptions
of sin, and instead, move towards enlightened self-interest—founded on the core presuppositions
of utility.43 Contra the Russian Orthodox view of man’s sinful human nature and need for
redemption, the young radical wrote, “It is not human nature that must be changed, but social
relations must be so altered as to correspond to the requirements of human nature” (qtd. in Turin
32). For man to flourish, he need not change; rather, society should impose a rational, scientific
ideology on his behavior—a scientific method that will serve as a self-correcting guide for man’s
behavior.
By viewing man strictly in terms of matter and reason, Chernyshevsky believes that man
can be predicted, calculated, and moved toward specific, benevolent action. Like the predictable
flow and pressure of river water, man’s behavior could be guided by the dam of Rational
Egoism. Chernyshevsky finds man’s predictability in terms of function but also virtue: He
believes that “[g]oodness will spread through history culminating in universal rationality when
the ultimate and enduring positive stage has been achieved” (Barstow 26). Once the new man
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Once again, a blend of Bentham’s and Mill’s ethics of utility—egoism for the ‘Greater Happiness’ of society.
Here, we must note the difference between egoism, which argues that man should maximize self-interest, and
utilitarianism which maximizes overall utility. Chernyshevsky seems to conflate both—by acting according to one’s
rational egoistic impulse, he or she will create a utopian society.
43
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begins living in accordance with his rational egoistic impulse, society could reach the threshold
of utopia and eventually enter the lush, green hills of such a place. In contrast to Dostoevsky,
who believes that human nature is inherently flawed, Chernyshevsky believes that man is
inherently good when he acts according to his rational egoistic impulse. Humanity, and therefore
society, does not need Christ or Christian community; rather, man need only follow his ego. 44
Clearly, then, God has no place in this new society; the New Jerusalem, or hope for a
Christian community, must be set aside to make way for an earthly utopia—a divide Alyosha
clearly recognizes in The Brothers Karamazov. Alyosha explains that the new scientific
socialism—which is causally related to the vision of founding an earthly utopia—is not only the
question of how man will work, eat, and live, but is also “the question of the modern
embodiment of atheism, the question of the Tower of Babel built precisely without God, not to
go from earth to heaven but to bring heaven down to earth” (Dostoevsky 26). The new society
will not only feed man but will also meet his deepest existential needs. These concerns were also
discussed in Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons. With a distorted, religious zeal, Turgenev’s
protagonist, Bazarov, believes that the emerging scientist will correct the ills of Russian society.
He says, “A good chemist is twenty times as useful as any poet” (7). His language is particular
here, as he recognizes the pragmatic nature of utility—it is geared towards a specific social use.
Bazarov presupposes a naturalistic philosophy of science, and as such, his “scientism delimits
experiences to ‘sensations’” (Frank 345). Since man is thoroughly material, his experiences are
merely sensations fixed toward survival value. Hence, Bazarov tries to act only on what is
“useful or attractive” since this is the only means he can justify in scientism (348). Bazarov is a
clear reaction to “the beautiful and the lofty” romantic 1840s ideals, and his belief in “chemistry”
44

Dostoevsky’s affirmation of man’s human nature—as both beautiful and fundamentally flawed—must be kept in
mind. For Dostoevsky, man is incapable of saving or correcting his own nature. He must dialogue with others and
God and ultimately accept and embrace suffering, like Christ.
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coheres with the rational egoistic impulse; if the new man is only material, then he can be
fulfilled as long as he behaves in accordance with rational egoism.
Dostoevsky recognized that the new society, as embodied in the Crystal Palace, is
monolithic—all-encompassing.45 When he visited the Crystal Palace in the summer of 1862 he
recognized that the Crystal Palace was the scientific attempt to organize society rationally, to
unite all of humanity as one under scientism—reuniting the linguistic divide of the Tower of
Babel:
You feel a terrifying force which has joined here all these numberless people
who have come from all over the world into the one fold; you’re aware of
a gigantic thought, you feel that something here has already been achieved,
that here is a victory, a triumph. You even, as it were, begin to be afraid of
something. However independent you may be, for some reason you become
frightened. Is not this really the achieved ideal? . . . Is not the end here? Is
not this in fact the ‘one fold’? Won’t you really have to accept this for the
complete truth and fall silent once and for all? It’s all so triumphant, victorious
and proud . . . It’s a kind of biblical picture, something like Babylon, some
kind of prophecy from the Apocalypse being fulfilled before your eyes.
(“Winter Notes on Summer Impressions” 98)
In the Crystal Palace, Dostoevsky recognizes the revolutionary aim to unite man into “one fold.”
He alludes to Christ, the Shepherd, who will one day unite the body into one: “And other sheep I
45

This was reinforced by Russia’s industrialization in the late, nineteenth century, which presented a new way of
life. Primarily an agrarian society for a majority of the nineteenth century, Russia’s social reforms did not propel the
country into industrialization until the Crimean War defeat showed Alexander II Russia’s inability to defend itself;
its factories were incapable of producing sufficient weaponry for proper defense. After facing major defeat,
Alexander II enacted the “Emancipation of the Serfs” in order to create the kulak class—a protocapitalist class that
would allow a greater distribution of resources. However, it was not until Sergei Witte’s reforms in the late
nineteenth-century that Russia began noteworthy industrialization (“Russian Industrialization” Jennifer Llewellyn,
John Rae and Steve Thompson n. pag.).
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have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there
shall be one fold, and one shepherd” (John 10.16). When Dostoevsky viewed the Crystal Palace,
he recognized that the Crystal Palace, like the Tower of Babel, symbolized man’s attempt to
reach divinity within the realm of immanence; the Palace, a symbol of scientific power, would
try to unite man as one. As Dostoevsky walked the dirty and bustling streets of London, he was
terrified by the Crystal Palace’s grandeur. Its technological prowess, its expression of Western
individualism, and its overtness in a city overwhelmingly lacking moral vitality46 caused
Dostoevsky to fear what the West had become and how the materialistic ideologies bolstering the
Crystal Palace would shape Russia.47

Dostoevsky: The Necessity of Dialogue
Dostoevsky believes that in order for man to fully exist, he needs to dialogue, which is
why the UG Man’s communication parallels Dostoevsky’s dialogic view of truth. Dostoevsky’s
view of truth is founded in the Person of Christ and the members of the body. Consequently, his
understanding of truth is essentially a reflection of Logos—the Word that both spoke the world
into existence and became embodied to openly dialogue with humanity (John 1.1) and by way of
the indwelling Holy Spirit.48 Truth is not an elusive or abstract theorem; rather, it is tangible and
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In “Winter Notes,” he explains that the Russian man knows morals but doesn’t follow them; the European has lost
the complete sense of the good, true, and beautiful.
47
Yevgeny Zamyatin feared the scientism the Crystal Palace symbolized as well in his novel We. The parallels
between the Crystal Palace and One State (a scientific state enclosed in ‘glass’), the Inquisitor and Zamyatin’s
Benefactor, the complete mathematization of One State and the symbols of ‘2x2=4,’ the ‘stone wall,’ and the ‘ant
hill,’ all show a close connection between these two novels. Unfortunately, censorship laws prevented We’s
publication in Russia until 1988 because of the radical connection Zamyatin makes between Dostoevsky and
emerging totalitarian regimes in the U.S.S.R.
48
Once again, Dostoevsk’s view of dialogical truth is twofold: Man epistemologically knows truth through dialogue
and truth itself is ontologically dialogical.
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personal.49 In Dostoevsky’s view of truth, man is dependent on the Word for his very existence
and dependent on others for his self-consciousness. Dialogue is of upmost importance for
Dostoevsky because he is more interested in the individual’s relationship with the community
rather than with the individual himself. Since the UG Man is a self-admitting “paradoxilist,”
Dostoevsky recognizes the paradox of the individual’s relationship to a community: “The highest
aim of Dostoevsky’s Christianity is not personal salvation, though, but the fusion of the
individual ego with the community in a symbiosis of love, and the only sin that Dostoevsky
appears to recognize is the failure to fulfill this law of love” (Frank 410). Paradoxically,
Dostoevsky believes that by sacrificially dialoguing with community—not focusing on the self—
man becomes more human, more himself. In contrast, without authentic dialogue, man becomes
individualistic—an important distinction in Dostoevsky’s aesthetic.50 As such, the highest form
of truth, for Dostoevsky, is the sacrificial body working together in open dialogue, just as Christ
intercedes for us before God and the Holy Spirit and scriptures help us commune with God.
Dostoevsky brilliantly weaves in his dialogic view of truth with his literary aesthetic. In
the Problem of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Mikhail Bakhtin explains that Dostoevsky’s novels are
infused with “the relative freedom and independence enjoyed by the hero and his voice under the
conditions of polyphonic design…and the special placement of the idea in such a design; and,
49

However, it is important to recognize the Word both as incarnate and transfigured. As Ellul explains, language
preserves the mystery of the Other while allowing us to get as close as possible to this realm. In the Humiliation of
the Word, Ellul explains, “Myth is born of the revealed Word of God, but because it is figurative, it has no visible
image. As the highest expression of the word, it reaches the edge and very limit of the expressible, the ineffable, and
the unspeakable” (106). The Other is both immanent and transcendent—evasive to a graven image. Language,
especially figurative, allows one to get close without making a graven image. Dialogue, a verbal form of language,
is effectively the same.
50
Dostoevsky viewed the rise of scientism and Western individualism as corollaries. He writes: “the personal
principle, the principle of isolation, of intense self-preservation, of self-solicitousness, of the self-determination of
the I, of opposing this I to all nature and all other people as a separate, autonomous principle entirely equal and
equivalent to everything that exists outside itself” (“Winter Notes on Summer Impressions” 98). This blatant egoism
has its underpinnings in scientific materialism. By precluding the spiritual, and necessarily the transcendent, a
naturalistic philosophy of science grounds man in the sphere of immanence. Science replaces the sacred; the
material replaces the spiritual. Man occupies the space that a transcendent being used to occupy. It comes as no
surprise that this switch parallels the Western effusive affirmation of individualism.
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finally, on those new principles of linkage shaping the novel into a whole” (8). All of the novel’s
elements—voices being the most important—contribute to the whole. Bakhtin recognizes the
sheer power of Dostoevsky’s aesthetic as a polyphonic approach to narration: “A plurality of
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid
voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels” (6). Bakhtin’s analysis applies
not only to the diversity of characters within Dostoevsky’s individual works, but also to the
diversity of individual characters—especially the UG Man, which is why “[i]n the confession of
the Underground Man what strikes us first of all is its extreme and acute dialogization: there is
literally not a single, monologically firm, undissociated word” (152). Dostoevsky’s view of
truth—as the communicative, personal, Incarnate Word—is reflected in his polyphonic aesthetic;
the richness of his aesthetic comes from a diversity of voices interacting and contributing to the
whole. These voices are dialoguing so they can encounter the great Dialoguer.
Therefore, writing an abstract criticism of scientism would not fit within Dostoevsky’s
dialogical aesthetic, founded in Christ.51 Hence, he creates characters who display the
repercussions of residing within the walls of the Palace’s scientism. Frank compares
Dostoevsky’s writing to the eighteenth-century “Conte Philosophique, whose characters were
also largely embodiments of ideas; but instead of remaining bloodless abstractions like Candide
or Zadig, they will be fleshed out with all of the verisimilitude and psychological density of the
19th century novel of Social Realism…” (440). Dostoevsky’s “psychological realism,” as Frank
has explained, infused with ideology; his characters operate through “idea-feelings” (477)—
Dostoevsky’s remarkable synthesis of ideology and human psychology.52 As such, Dostoevsky’s
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As shown by Mikhail Bakhtin and which I will explain in further detail in the forthcoming pages.
Frank’s definition is focused on the painstaking detail Dostoevsky uses in describing his characters’ inner
psychological desires: “Dostoevsky gives us a strikingly artistic depiction of Russian society, but with him this
52
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characters are often studied for their depth of feeling and human curiosity, longing, and spiritual
confusion. Although analyzing Dostoevsky’s characters in this manner may lead to a
satisfactory literary analysis, such an approach pursued with blinders on is liable to overlook
Dostoevsky’s primary motivation for writing, which was “[c]ountering the moral-spiritual
authority of the ideology of the radical Russian intelligentsia” (Frank 440). Dostoevsky wanted
to combat scientism—“science-as-ideology,” and he believed literature was the most effective
medium to do so. This is why the UG Man, in reference to the 1860s scientists, says, “I have in
my life carried to an extreme what you have not dared to carry halfway” (Dostoevsky 115). For,
Dostoevsky believed that “an idea is always somebody’s idea” (Thompson 193). Dostoevsky
uses the UG Man as an embodied critique of scientism.
In order to properly understand the relationship between the second half of Notes and the
first half, one must see Dostoevsky’s “single, sustained effort” (Matlaw 164) to unite both
sections via dialogical interaction. In the second half of Notes, the anti-hero’s need for dialogue
sends him out into the snow, where he eventually finds himself with Liza—a Russian archetypal
prostitute. After sleeping with Liza, the anti-hero wakes in anguish, as if he were waking in an
“underground cellar, damp and musty” (81). Though the anti-hero desires for dialogue, his
dialectic of vanity prevents him meaningfully engaging with Liza; as a result, the anti-hero will
become the UG Man, one who is isolated and without the ability to dialogue with others. Waking
up in Liza’s room is the beginning of the anti-hero’s descent underground. His vanity has driven
him into the arms of Liza. However, he is incapable of authentically empathizing with her in a
dialogical act of suffering. As a result he continues in his dialectic, never reaching dialogue.
When Liza visits the anti-hero in his own home, he admits that he wanted to “unload offense”

provides only the background of the picture, and is….completely swallowed up by the importance of the
psychological interest” (131).
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(111) on her. Instead of paying for his offense and accepting her love and pity, he offends Liza
and foregoes his redemptive moment. In contrast, “Liza’s self-sacrificial love, her ability to
empathize with the UG man’s troubles, frees her from the dialectic of vanity” (Frank 439). Frank
makes clear that Liza’s suffering is a “negative reversal of egoism” (438). Though the anti-hero
claims he has love, it is a romantic gesture, an ideal: “There was so much of it, this love, that
afterwards, in reality, I never even felt any need to apply it” (54). This is why the UG Man—
driven to the underground after interacting with the deism and romanticism of the 1840s men—
dialogues with and against the 1860s underground movement.
For this reason, though the first half of Notes is a monologue, it is still dialogical. Matlaw
argues that the psychological interactions of the second half drive the UG Man into his
philosophical “underground” in the first (175). If this is true, then his philosophical musings are
in clear contradiction to the Russian intelligentsia’s “underground” movements, which were
heavily influenced by Western scientism.53 As Matlaw further shows, Dostoevsky is working
with a tinge of irony since the UG Man is the true revolutionary, not the 60s underground men.
Hence, though the first half takes the form of a monologue, the narrator addresses “gentlemen”
with notes of dialogue: “you say,” “you laugh,” “this is all that you say,” “yes, gentlemen” (qtd.
in 164). As Thompson explains, “the UG Man’s internal dialogue is divided into two voices: his
own and various scientific interlocutors who defend ‘our negative age’” (194). Throughout his
monologue, the narrator switches between his voice and the voices of those advocating
scientism, making his communication appear at times schizophrenic or simply confused. He
constantly switches between voices of science-as-ideology, but then, in the next instant, returns
to an imaginative character with emotion, wit, exaggeration and even irrationality, such as his
comical expression that “2 x 2 = 5.” Dostoevsky’s genius is his ability to merge his satirical
53

Since, the Russian intelligentsia primarily shared their revolutionary ideas in “underground” circles.
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form—paradox and exaggeration—with the content of his satire, scientism.

The Crystal Palace: A Monolith, a Monologue
Highly concerned with dialogue, Dostoevsky recognizes that the scientism of the Crystal
Palace inhibits man from authentic communicative relationships with God and others. Once
again, the Crystal Palace offers man a conceptual framework for human existence. However,
aimed toward an objective, totalizing materialistic conception of man, the Palace’s naturalistic
philosophy of science admits no dialogue; it views man in terms of mathematical predictability,
and these terms are incommensurable with personalities. The UG Man satirizes this position
when he says that in the Crystal Palace “all human actions will…be tabulated according to these
laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to 108,000 and entered in a table” (25). Here,
the UG Man is satirizing satirizing Fourier, who conceived a model of man where all of his
pleasures are calculated with mathematical precision—in terms of aggregates (Frank 228).54
Hence, “Dostoevsky thus combines Fourier’s table of passions with Chernyshevsky’s material
determinism in his attack on the ideal of the Crystal Palace as involving the total elimination of
the personality” (229). Thompson agrees, arguing that the Crystal Palace is the embodiment of
scientism and that “[s]cience and math are context-free object systems, devoid of subjects”
(Thompson 198). Thompson continues to explain that science’s investigation can only deal with
“objects, units, aggregates, whereas Dostoevsky’s characters are pre-eminently subjects,
personalities” (198). Accordingly, science operates on naturalistic methodology, and “it cannot
54

Once again Zamyatin recognizes Dostoevsky’s critique and presents his own satire of Fourier’s belief in his
depiction of the dystopian One State as a place where mathematical happiness completely depersonalizes every
individual: “But in reality the Tablet of Hours transforms each and every one of us into the six-wheeled hero of a
great epic poem. Every morning, with six-wheeled precision, at one and the same hour, at one and the same minute,
we, millions of us, wake up as one person. At one and same hour we begin work…and at one and the same
second…we raise our spoons…we go for our stroll, go to the hall to do our Taylor exercises, and then go to bed”
(We 136).
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assuage the heart, it cannot offer a word of love or hate” (198). It is a faceless, person-less
inquiry that leads to de-personalization when it does not allow for other ontological possibilities.
By reducing man to his material conditions, the Palace’s scientism effectively strips him
of the ability for dialogue. By viewing man in terms of rationalistic utility, Chernyshevsky offers
a complete rationalization of man, which is possibly only if man is solely a material being. In
Dostoevsky’s view of man, the soul stands outside, apart from a complete utilitarian
rationalization. Hence, “Total rationality for Chernyshevsky may lead to self-affirmation, action,
and progress; but, for Dostoevsky it means self-annihilation, inertia, and stagnation” (Barstow
25). If man is only material, then physical laws are responsible for his make-up, albeit, random
and impersonal laws, which, if true, lead to the destruction of the self as a free, communicative
being with moral agency. In contrast, Dostoevsky’s discourse deals with layers, voices rather,
that all dialogically arrive at truth, who, we must remember, is a dialogical being—Logos; 1860s
scientism deals with one layer, the material. Nonetheless, by arguing that man is only his head,
Chernyshevsky robs man of his voice. This is why Dostoevsky’s poetics cannot include science
because he is dealing with personalities (Thompson 198). In a scientistic system, the
subjective—the personal—cannot be dealt with; the human soul, man’s ability to reason, stands
outside a naturalistic framework.
The UG Man calls attention to the imprisoning nature of the Palace’s conceptual
framework by satirizing it as a giant stone wall. He writes, “What stone wall? Well, of course,
the laws of nature, the conclusions of natural science, mathematics. Once it’s proved to you, for
example, that you descended from an ape, there’s no use making a wry face, just take it for what
it is” (Dostoevsky 13). The UG Man, here, is exemplifying a double satire:
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In feeling that one had reached the ultimate wall; that, this is all there is, that it cannot be
otherwise; that there is no way out for you, that you will never change into a different person;
that even if you had enough time and faith left to change yourself into something different, you
probably would not wish to change; and even if you did wish it, you would still not do anything,
because in fact there is nothing to change into. (9)
If at the core of man’s existential being is the ability to freely become, then he has lost
this potential within the Palace. The stone wall metaphor is a composite of the fixed, natural laws
that determine reality. If man is only a material being, then he cannot escape the natural laws that
have brought forth his existence. 55 When the UG Man says, “there is no way out for you,” he is
discussing the same critique Lewis brings to naturalism with his discussion of the Total System;
man is trapped within the sphere of immanence. Acting against natural law, then, is useless: “For
goodness sake, it’s impossible to protest: it’s two times two makes four! Nature doesn’t ask for
your opinion; it doesn’t care about your desires or whether you like or dislike its laws. You’re
obliged to accept it as it is, and consequently, all its conclusions” (10). Chernyshevsky accepts
this system and believes that man can be corrected and guided according to empirical and
mathematical precision. However, the UG Man quickly responds that if this is true “[t]hen the
final result, gentlemen, is that it’s better to do nothing! Conscious inertia is better! And so, long
live the underground!” (27). The UG Man is faced with the deterministic framework of scientism
and realizes that everything that happens within this framework is inevitable and equally
meaningful or meaningless. Wasting energy is useless, the UG Man realizes, if entropy is
55

First, it is important to delineate what Dostoevsky means when he explains natural law since there is a clear
difference between acknowledging the existence of natural laws and maintaining that these laws are all that exist.
The former is necessary to the scientific method, which presupposes the basic laws of logic, i.e., the laws of noncontradiction, modus ponens or tollens, causal and nomological laws, etc.; it must assume the general unity within
nature, namely that it is predictable so that experiments can be reproduced; moreover, though no scientific system
can fully explain natural laws, it must assume these laws will stay in place. Before beginning an experiment, one
must assume that, say, gravity will stay consistent. However, the latter is metaphysical naturalism, i.e., scientism.
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inevitable; action is inconsequential.
The UG Man’s satire of the stone wall centers on Dostoevsky’s affirmation that free will
is necessary for dialogical interaction. Within a naturalistic framework, however, free will—an
ontological possibility if man is a spiritual being who can make decisions outside his material
conditions—loses its credence. This logical consequence has been the case since Dostoevsky’s
time, and Daniel Dennett, contemporary naturalist, reveals that this is still the case:
Our widespread tradition has it that we human beings are responsible agents,
captains of our fate, because what we really are are souls, immaterial and
immortal clumps of Godstuff that inhabit and control our material bodies rather
like spectral puppeteers. It is our souls that are the source of meaning, and the
locus of all our suffering, our joy, our glory, and our shame. But this idea of
immaterial souls, capable of defying the laws of physics, has outlived its
credibility thanks to the advance of the natural sciences. (qtd. in Rozema 173)
Contemporary naturalists have verified Dostoevsky’s fear of naturalistic philosophy. Dennett
ultimately accepts that man is pre-determined, though he offers a compatabilistic compromise
(Mckenna “Compatibilism” n.pag.) As Dennett asserts, the discoveries of the natural sciences are
incompatible with the traditional conception of the soul. For Dostoevsky, it is man’s soul that
allows him to freely act. Without the ability to step outside the Total System, man is stuck within
the evolutionary natural laws that determine his behavior—a monologue.
Dennett’s language regarding the “soul” as a tradition—a thing of the past—is quite
accurate. Under a regnant naturalism, the “soul” is meaningless and must be replaced with
“progressive” material conditions—physical laws, energy, motion, etc. Dennett’s postulation is
nothing new; the soul irrevocably collapses under a scientistic system. Dostoevsky recognized

Smalt 47
this radical redefinition of man when he stood terrified in front of the Crystal Palace. In “Winter
Notes on Summer Impressions,” Dostoevsky explains the breakdown of personhood and the soul
under the precepts of scientism: 56 There is no such thing as a native soil, as a people.
Nationality?—only a certain system of paying taxes! The soul?—a tabula rasa, a bit of wax, out
of which you can paste together on the spot of a real man, a universal general man, a
homunculi—all that’s necessary is to apply the fruits of European Civilization, and read two or
three books (qtd. in Frank 375). When Dostoevsky viewed the Crystal Palace in the summer of
1862, he knew that the rise of technology and science would mean the destruction of
“traditional” views of man. Though the Palace offers man a conceptual residence, this residence
closes its doors to the elements of man that Dostoevsky sought most to defend; if man is only
matter, he is a tabula rasa which may or may not be valuable in an instrumental sense,
depending on what is inserted on the slate. Moreover, he is not separate from his naturalistic
causality, and thus, is not innately valuable as a being higher than molecular amalgamation.
Dostoevsky’s critique is twofold; when we lose the personal conception of the soul, the “soul” of
Russia—its nationality steeped in the tradition of Christian Orthodoxy—will be lost as well. The
Christian conception of the soul, however, affirms that, contra Feuerbach, man is an image of the
Creator, made from dust, yes, but spoken into existence by Logos and endowed with the ability
to speak, and by these very facts connected intimately with both God and the earth. This is man’s
soul, as language (dialogue) undoubtedly separates man from animals. Though we cannot fully
predict or observe how the spiritual interacts with the physical, Dostoevsky does not see this as a
case against Christianity; rather, it is an affirmation of the miracle and mystery of humanity and
of dialogue.
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As does Zamyatin when the One State describes the soul as a state of “madness” and tries to completely remove
this irrational, mathematically resistant aspect of man.
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The UG Man’s satire of the Palace’s scientistic conceptual framework centers on its
uninhabitability for man as a free, existential being. The residency of the Palace offers a
monolithic, utopian happiness. Whereas Chernyshevsky sees the rise of this scientific utopia
positively, the UG Man views his time as the “Negative Age” (7). He illustrates that his society’s
“conditions” have necessarily created the UG Man type, or, at the very least, the conditions have
made possible his existence: The author of the diary and the diary itself are, of course,
imaginary. Nevertheless it is clear that such persons as the writer of these notes not only may,
but positively must, exist in our society, when we consider the circumstances in the midst of
which our society is formed (1).The conditions to which Dostoevsky refers are those spreading
through the Palace’s conceptual framework. His irony is clear. Though the UG man must exist in
his Russian milieu—as a product of his times—his existence as a human being is impossible; no
human can fully exist within the Palace’s monological design; these conditions have created a
divided, fractured consciousness.
By both embodying and satirizing the Palace’s scientistic beliefs, the UG Man stands as
both subject and object. This paradox is his “hyper-consciousness.” He is a subject, i.e., a person,
but he embodies object beliefs, or, beliefs that come under objective scrutiny through satire.
Though Thompson is correct in noting that “[h]yperconsciousness is an illness,” (193) we must
also recognize that his spiritual illness attests to movement and to the potential for healing. And
although scholars disagree over the nature of his hyper-consciousness, they are united by the fact
that he is divided, and therefore, able to be healed.57 The dialectic taking place in the UG Man
testifies to his inner dialogue, albeit a fractured one.
Though the UG Man’s “hyper-consciousness” has spawned much disagreement between
literary critics, critics agree that his fractured state attests to his existence in a framework that is
57

Most notably, Frank and Scanlan disagree over the emotional / philosophical nature of his “hyper-consciousness.”
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ultimately uninhabitable. Frank argues that the UG Man “is an intellectual disciple but an
emotional critic of Rational Egoism” (qtd. in Scanlan 1). Frank views the UG Man as one who
has intellectually embodied the rational egoism of the 1860’s intelligentsia but whose subjective
emotional and intuitive beliefs contradict his intellectual commitments. In contrast, James P.
Scanlan argues that the UG man does not accept Rational Egoism intellectually as Frank argues.
Instead, Scanlan believes that the UG man forms a rational argument, as well as an emotional
response, against Rational Egoism (3). Alina Wyman agrees with Frank’s diagnosis, viewing the
UG Man’s intellectual commitment thwarted by his subjective beliefs. She further highlights
how the UG Man is trapped between the grandiose egoism of the 1840’s liberals and the
deterministic materialism of the 1860’s: “The UG man’s conflict may then be described as that
between the lofty conception of freedom, cultivated by the social idealists of the 1840s, and the
negation of individual will, expressed as the empirical impossibility of freedom in the materialist
doctrines of the 1860s” (124). Instead of conforming to either ideological stance, Wyman argues
that “[t]he UG Man takes a third option…accepting natural law on the rational level but rejecting
it on the belief level…taking a leap” (124). Though it is unclear from the text that the UG Man
takes the ultimate positive leap—censorship laws required Dostoevsky to remove the overtly
Christian response in chapter, which was Dostoevsky’s primary response to the scientism of the
1860s —Wyman believes that his very resistance to an intellectual commitment is his leap. He
does not leap far, but he still is willing to move.58
Flowing from his “hyper-conscious” state, the UG man illustrates extreme paradox to
reveal the incompatibility of his existence within the monologic walls of the Palace. Since Notes
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In a letter to his brother Mikhail, Dostoevsky writes, “I am also bewailing my Notes. Terrible misprints, and it
would have been better not to print the penultimate chapter (of Pt. 1) at all (that chapter where the idea is stated),
than to print it in that form, that is, with sentences left out and contradicting itself. But what can be done? Those
swine of censors left in the passages where I railed at everything and pretended to blaspheme; but they deleted the
passage where I deduced from all this the necessity of belief and Christ” (qtd in Katz 96).

Smalt 50
is a literary work, it should be no surprise that the UG Man’s opening lines reveal his
psychological paradox. If Dostoevsky were to write a treatise, his argument would need to
follow the contours of rhetoric, but by presenting ideologies as an extension and facet of a
character’s thoughts and deeds, Dostoevsky has the freedom to develop complex satire. Hence,
we see Dostoevsky’s aesthetic approach from the opening lines:
I am a sick man…I am a wicked mad. An unattractive man. I think my liver hurts.
However, I don’t know a fig about my sickness, and am not sure what it is that
hurts me. I am not being treated and never have been, though I respect medicine
and doctors. What’s more, I am also superstitious in the extreme; well, at least
enough to respect medicine. (I’m sufficiently educated not to be superstitious, but
I am.) No, sir, I refuse to be treated out of wickedness. (Dostoevsky 5)
Like any good work of literature, we are able to see a majority of the work’s themes within the
opening lines. In this passage, the narrator paradoxically claims that he is a “wicked man” who
knows nothing about his sickness. He knows he is sick but he cannot explain the origin or reason
for his sickness. Though he should have the ability to “know” or “reason” through his
wickedness, and act in his self-interest in the face of this wickedness, he, as a hyper-conscious
agent, recognizes that his intellectual beliefs in scientism are undermined, even contradicted by
his emotional beliefs. Hence, though he is “sufficiently educated not to be superstitious” (5), he
is still superstitious, even irrational, regarding medicine, a practical science.
Education holds an important place in the UG Man’s satire, as Dostoevsky uses man’s
incapability with scientistic education to show its flaws. Education should have as its purpose the
reform of wayward or incorrect thinking—an “enlightenment” from dark or misguided ideas into
the light of truth. For Chernyshevsky, those who hold the “old” or primitive views of man—as a
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desiring being with a soul—must be re-educated in the new scientific utopia so that they “will
then voluntarily refrain from erring…More than that, science itself will [teach] man…that he
does not really have either will or caprice…that he himself is nothing more than some sort of
piano key” (24). The UG Man is recognizing the goal of Chernyshevsky’s education, which is
the complete reformation of man’s unpredictable and irrational parts that exist outside the
monologue, the Total System. This reform coheres with Mill’s view of hierarchical pleasures—
that man can be educated towards “higher” pleasures. Dostoevsky saw that the implication of a
scientific education for his Russian folk was that these commoners were “superstitious” and
needed reform.59 The UG Man’s education is that of a 40s man who is now aware of 60s ideas,
which explains his egoism and his scientific awareness.
However, though the UG Man has been educated towards “higher” knowledge, i.e.,
scientific discourse, his “superstition,” still remains intact. In the opening lines, he discusses his
wickedness, but then immediately admits that he has lied about his wickedness because he has
“lied out of wickedness” (6). He is faced with Chernyshevsky’s notion of what is right—but he
contradicts it at a whim since the whimsical is an irrational equation: 2 x 2 = 5. Hence, he
commits evil simply because he wants to; because he can; because he is free to do so. The
paradox continues. After lying “out of wickedness,” he is immediately aware of his guilt and is
“conscious every moment of so very many elements in myself most opposite to that” (6). These
opposing elements are indeed paradoxical and point to the complexity of human make-up that
Dostoevsky saw as impossible to support in the Palace’s framework. He is satirizing the false
hope in a scientific system to purge man of his “base,” superstitious, beliefs and present him with
“higher”—more objective—ones. Even if science could objectify his sickness, the UG Man
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would choose his sickness, ironically, in order to maintain his free will, which is necessary for
spiritual health and existential wholeness.

The Palace: A Monologic Moral Morass
Dostoevsky’s primary critique of the Palace is that it prevents man from authentically
dialoguing with others. When man cannot enter meaningful dialogue, he is faced with
considerable moral dangers. If scientism’s monologue is true, then the UG Man would fittingly
act in accordance with his self-interests. Chernyshevsky’s ethic of utility maintains that man can
be definitively known and calculated according to his self-interest. As Scanlan explains,
Chernyshevsky’s “[r]ational [e]goism is a mixture of descriptive and prescriptive elements—
‘psychological egoism’ states that humans are not free and that they act according to determined
causes and that benefiting others is really a way to benefit oneself” (557). This belief reduces
altruism to personal benefit, one’s survival value—egoism. Most notably, “Psychological
Egoism” forms the supposedly ‘scientific’ foundation of Rational Egoism” because it expresses
the “natural law” that people invariably act in accordance with what they think are their own
“best interests” (557). Chernyshevsky’s utilitarian ethics grounds “moral” decisions in a rational,
egoistic impulse. However, this grounding defies Dostoevsky’s concern with dialogical
interaction. If man is operating with others according to his ego alone, he is not meaningfully
dialoguing with others. Moreover, he is not able to dialogue; he is trapped within himself, within
a monologue and within a moral morass.
However, the UG man satirizes this conceptual framework through irrational action; he
acts in order to preserve his moral freedom and not to benefit himself. He specifically addresses
Chernyshevsky’s egoism when he explains that man will indeed act against his self-interest in
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order to preserve his free will: “Because profit for you is prosperity, wealth, freedom, peace, and
so on and so forth; so that a man who, for example, openly and knowingly went against this
whole inventory would, in your opinion…be a complete obscurantist or a complete madman”
(21). Undoubtedly, the UG Man’s hyper-consciousness makes him a clear madman, but there is a
method to his madness. Through his paradox and caprice, the UG Man shows that man will
inevitably act against what is rational, calculated, or scientific to preserve his freedom: Man “has
always and everywhere liked to act as he wants, and not at all as reason and profit dictate” (25).
Higher than scientific rationalism is existential desire: “Man needs only independent wanting,
whatever this independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (25). Nonetheless, his ability to
desire is only possible if he is a free agent. Hence, his deepest existential desires point to his
freedom. He writes, “Destroy my desires, wipe out my ideals, show me something better, and I
will follow you…But so long as I live and desire—let my hand wither” (34). Maintenance of
life—self-interest—is not as high of an existential need as freedom. The UG Man is willing to
relinquish his health, his left hand, so long as he can desire—even irrationally against his own
interest.
Necessarily, then, the UG Man’s paradox is a testament to his personhood, a moral
category. The Christian understanding of the human involves a complex relationship between the
matter, the dust that composes man’s body, and the spirit, the part of man that stands separate or
outside his material conditions and in relation to the eternal. This dualism has been explored
since the time of Plato’s Phaedo, through the Neo-Platonists, by Christians Platonic and
Aristotelian alike, and still exists as a fundamental tenet of Christian orthodoxy.60 In
Dostoevsky’s view, a person is distinct from a hominoid or biological species via his “soul.”
Without the spiritual element, man is necessarily his chemistry alone. Dmitri’s claim, in The
60
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Brothers Karamazov, that the “old” views of man, as a being with human nature and a soul, must
“move over for chemistry…” (589) reduces man to “[l]ittle fish tails in the brain” (589). In this
passage Dmitri explains that motivations for murder can be expunged if man is not morally
responsible for his actions. Hence, Dmitri is parodying Rakitin, his foil and an embodiment of
1860s scientism. When Dmitri follows Rakitin’s ideology to its logical conclusion, he says,
“Without God and the future life? It means everything is permitted now, one can do anything?”
(589). If man is chemistry alone, who can keep him accountable for his moral responsibilities?
He is simply acting in accordance with his physiognomy and within his environmental
conditions; he is determined to behave according to these conditions. However, this reduction is
essentially dehumanizing; robbing man of his moral agency places him into a monologic morass;
he cannot meaningfully interact with others or even with himself.
This reality is why Dostoevsky affirms the Orthodox conception of the soul. Dialogue is
only possible between persons who desire and converse, and persons cannot exist within a
scientistic view of reality.61 After finding a “document” that ostensibly condemns Dmitri of
murdering the brothers’ father, Ivan exonerates himself of his involvement in the situation—an
irony, no doubt, as it is Ivan’s atheism that prompts the actual murderer, Smerdyakov, to kill the
father. Dostoevsky writes, “This letter suddenly assumed a mathematical significance in his
eyes” (619). Ivan views his moral decisions in terms of mathematical precision; since he did not
commit the actual murder, he justifies his involvement with the affair. However, it is clear that
his mathematical rationality is misguided; he is the variable X that allows the murder equation to
work; his father’s death was only possible under his rational influence over Smerdyakov. Thus,
though Ivan exonerates himself mathematically, he cannot escape his pangs of conscience: “Is it
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because in my soul I’m just as much a murderer?” (620). Ivan’s rationalization of the murder is
thwarted by the irrational X that stands outside his physical conditions. Though he can deny his
responsibility for the murder with his head, he is faced with his existential guilt and need for
redemption.
For this reason, Dostoevsky recognizes the absolute necessity of defending the existence
of the “soul,” even if this view is “old” and outdated. Without the soul—the spiritual sphere
outside his material conditions—man loses his ability to make free, moral decisions. However,
Dostoevsky recognizes that within scientism, the agent has lost the ability to freely act; thus, he
is devoid of his subjectivity and becomes his own biological function. Even if he were to engage
in a moral act, he would not be acting by his own volition.62 The UG Man sees this reduction
symbolically as an organ stop: “Moreover: then, you say, science itself will teach man (though
this is really a luxury in my opinion) that in fact he is neither will nor caprice, and never did
have any, and that he himself is nothing but a sort of piano key or a sprig in an organ”
(Dostoevsky 24). Here, the narrator directly discusses the French materialist philosopher, Denis
Diderot’s claim that “[o]ur senses are piano keys upon which surrounding nature plays, and
which often play upon themselves” (qtd. in Notes 123). Diderot’s presuppositions require him to
follow through with his naturalism; within a naturalistic framework, a man is a causal product of
his environment. In his Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky explains the implications for man if he is
an organ peg: “In making the individual dependent on every flaw in the social structure,
however, the doctrine of environment reduces him to an absolute nonentity, exempts him totally
from every personal moral duty and from all independence, reduces him to the lowest form of
slavery imaginable” (14). An organ stop is a servant to its function. Likewise, if man is akin to
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an organ stop, he is not capable of existing outside the conditions of his milieu, and his moral
actions are simply serving to fulfill survival or pragmatic functions.
Few are willing to follow through with a deterministic framework, recognizing its
inconsistency with our existential needs; we believe and act as if we are free agents. Hence, some
ground morality in the evolutionary process—keeping it in the sphere of immanence and moving
toward humanistic naturalism.63 To assume that there are objective moral duties, one must step
outside the Total System and affirm that there are ontological realities that transcend mere
utility—that certain values and moral beliefs exist absolutely, regardless of man’s physical
conditions. A conceptual framework that affirms this possibility allows man to step out of
monologue and into a dialogical view of truth.64 Nonetheless, one is hard-pressed to defend
objective moral duties within a scientistic conceptual framework since behaviors in this system
can only have survival value, utility, or contribute to the evolutionary process.
When Dostoevsky beheld the Crystal Palace, he prophesied the rise of naturalistic ethics,
and we see today how insightful he was. Contemporary naturalist philosophers of science solve
the moral questions by giving credence to moral facts as intrinsic to biological makeup. Frans De
Waal, for instance, in his book, The Bonobo and the Atheist (2013) argues that the bonobos have
basic moral intuitions within their herd, which he argues corroborates a naturalistic view of
ethics. If primates have basic moral intuitions, then man’s moral intuitions are evolutionarily
defensible; they can be accounted for according to natural evolutionary law. E.O. Wilson argues
for the same basic premise in “The Biological Basis of Morality” (1998), where he interestingly
enough argues that the debate of morality is “the coming century‘s version of the struggle for
men‘s souls” (qtd. in Baggett, Walls Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality 8). And
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Richard Dawkins points to our pity, or moral intuitions, as “misfires” when he argues that our
feelings of pity for those less fortunate are comparable to our feelings of sexual desire for
someone who is sexually infertile: “Both are misfirings, Darwinian mistakes: blessed, precious
mistakes” (The God Delusion 253). Dawkins solution to stepping outside of the Total System—
grounding morality in transcendence—is his “four good Darwinian reasons”—including kinship,
reciprocity, reputation, and social dominance (251). His Darwinian reasons are remarkably
similar to Chernyshevsky’s rational egoism, and this contemporary stance mirrors
Chernyshevsky’s own view. Both naturalistic philosophies of science maintain that man behaves
according to his self-interests in order to increase his chance of survival.
However, though the naturalist may possibly defend moral facts, he cannot defend moral
obligations among them. Recognizing the existence of moral intuitions—even those grounded in
herd mentality and survival value—is much different from recognizing moral imperative or
binding moral law. Even if we grant de Waal’s bonobos basic moral intuitions, the logical leap
from existence of these moral intuitions to moral obligations is by no means justifiable.65 Baggett
and Walls explain, “An evolutionary account of feelings of or beliefs in, say, moral obligation is
certainly possible, but how would naturalism explain obligation itself? How collections of atoms
could generate and issue genuinely binding moral commands is altogether mysterious, if not
absurd” (20). The naturalistic attempt to ground morality in physical law and mathematical
certainty is, thus, ironic; its logical foundation is the furthest we have from demonstrative
certainty.
The UG Man recognizes a further cardinal difficulty in the naturalist’s dilemma; even if a
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person acknowledges moral facts, he would by no means willingly act according to these facts.
As Baggett and Walls make clear, “Moral facts have no purchase unless we have moral freedom”
(18). In order for an action to hold any moral weight, the agent must be free to choose that
action. If not, then moral facts are just a product of natural laws and man is determined to behave
this way—he had no other choice. The UG Man is aware of the necessity of freedom in making
substantive moral decisions. In fact, the UG Man’s recognition that moral facts exist makes him
resistant to them:
Oh, tell me, who first announced, who was the first to proclaim that man does
dirty only because he doesn’t know his real interests; and that were he to be
enlightened, were his eyes to be opened to his real, normal interests, man would
immediately stop doing dirty, would immediately become good and noble,
because, being enlightened and understanding his real profit, he would see his real
profit precisely in the good. (20)
The UG Man’s sardonic question in the beginning of this passage is a direct allusion to
Cherynshevsky’s belief that if man recognized what was best for him then he would act in
accordance with this knowledge. The UG Man, however, finds this claim absurd:
“What is to be done with the millions of facts testifying to how people knowingly, that is, fully
understanding their real profit, would put in second place and throw themselves onto another
path, a risk, a perchance, not compelled by anyone or anything” (20). The UG Man is showing
that man will always preserve his freedom to act, even if his action takes him outside the
rational, the natural, or the moral. For the UG Man, a system that permits man to freely choose
evil is of higher value then a deterministic system where man must choose the good; without
freedom there is no ontological difference between “right” or “wrong”—choosing the good is
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counterfactuals since it is impossible. One could speak in terms of utility or pragmatism, but not
moral correctness. Once again, the UG Man’s early admission that he “lied out of wickedness”
affirms his undeniable commitment to free will.66

The Crystal Palace: A Monologic Society:
Not only does the UG Man satirize the implications of scientism for the individual, but he
also plays out the dangers for man’s relationship to others. In the second half of Notes, we
encounter a younger, twenty-four-year narrator who is a clear anti-hero. He ironically refers to
himself as a “hero” (Dostoevsky 53) but then quickly admits that he is in dialectic: “Either hero
or mud, there was no in between” (54). This either or distinction is no more than the anti-hero’s
“dialectic of vanity” (438), as Frank highlights.67 By concerning himself with “everything
beautiful and the lofty” (Dostoevsky 53), the anti-hero is essentially only concerned with his own
egoism—how the high, bookish ideals of the 1840s will help promote his own ego.
Consequently, as any vain person is wont to do, he constantly vacillates between self-deprecation
and self-aggrandizement:
I hated my face, for example, found it odious, and even suspected that there was
some mean expression in it, and therefore every time I came to work I made a
painful effort to carry myself as independently as possible, so as not to be
suspected of meanness, and to express as much nobility as possible with my face:
“Let it not be beautiful,” I thought, “but, to make up for that, let it be a noble, an
expressive, and, above, all, an extremely intelligent one.” (42)
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His dialectic of vanity is crippling, and so he removes himself existentially from society,
disengaging from others and occupying an empty space where he feels “at home” and where he
will retreat into his philosophical underground for the first half of the novel. He overemphasizes
his individuality and uses it as an excuse to disengage with others: “One other circumstance
tormented me then: namely, that no one else was like me, and I was like no one else” (42). He is
one who wants to “understand everything…not to be reconciled with anyone…” (44). And his
vanity is only reinforced by his intellectual arrogance. He believes, “I have an explanation for
everything” (48), which will play into his “hyper-consciousness” later in Notes when he accepts
the budding philosophies of scientism.
At any rate, the UG Man still desires to be “on the inside.” Though he has distanced
himself from others, he cannot contain his desire for dialogue. As his dialectic continues, he
admits, “Towards the end I myself could not stand it: as I grew older, a need for people, for
friends, developed. I tried to start getting closer with some; but the attempt always came out
unnaturally and would simply end of itself. I also once had a friend. But I was already a despot in
my soul” (64). The anti-hero longs for dialogue, but his dialectic of vanity prevents him from
authentic interaction with others. The anti-hero’s dialectic is a satire of the egoism of 40s that
would be mixed with the materialism of the 60s—rational egoism—and then become
monological (or, in a way, monist).
The UG Man, for this reason, is a clear precursor to Dostoevsky’s other famous anti-hero,
Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment. In order to get a full grasp of Dostoevsky’s satire in
Notes from Underground, it is necessary to look at the UG Man in light of Raskolnikov; the two
stand as ideological counterparts. They are both sullen, removed from society, and relatively
young bachelors who have been exposed to the scientism of the 1860s. Like the UG Man, when
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we first encounter Raskolnikov, we quickly see that Dostoevsky develops him according to his
dialogic aesthetic. An original Russian reader would immediately identify the intention in
Raskolnikov’s name, which symbolizes his spiritual dialectic. Raskol, meaning “schism” in
Russian, is the etymological root for Raskolnikov, a character of paradox, trapped between his
intellectual commitments and his subjective beliefs. Naturally, then, Raskolnikov’s first
thoughts, like the UG Man’s, are paradoxical and revealing of his inner schism: “I want to
attempt such a thing, and at the same time I’m afraid of such trifles” (Crime and Punishment 4).
In reference to his “new man” theory, Raskolnikov makes paradoxical leaps—from intellectual
commitment back to desire for community, from murder to Christian charity. He follows suit
with the UG Man in his ideological divide; he embodies a scientistic ideology, but his existential
desires undermine his intellectual assurance, especially in the “punishment” section of the novel.
As such, he stands as a mirror to the UG Man.
Raskolnikov and the UG Man share paradoxical satire and also complex potential of
being; as persons, they have the potential to actualize in an infinite number of ways. Frank
highlights the complexity of Raskolnikov’s dialogical discourse: “Bakhtin aptly remarks that
each character Raskolnikov encounters becomes ‘for him instantly an embodied solution to his
own personal question, a solution different from the one at which he himself had arrived;
therefore every person touches a sore spot in him and assumes a firm role in his inner speech’”
(qtd. in Frank 484). Raskolnikov moves through St. Petersburg almost as if in a house of mirrors;
he sees in others a mirror for his own potential. He has the potential to be selfless like Sonya or
selfish like Svidrigailov. The UG Man, however, addresses an imaginary audience of scientific
interlocutors. When he says, “Dear gentleman,” he is addressing an ideological counterpart
whom he can embody or eschew. As Wyman notes, the UG Man uses squinting vision
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(Nietzsche’s “sideward glances” to see the value of oneself in the other’s eyes) towards these
imaginary interlocutors in the first chapter and to his three Russian service friends in the second
half; this “‘squinting vision’” is a characteristic of his relationship with others” (134). He and
Raskolnikov look to others as mirrors for themselves, but they do so from a distance that
prevents actual dialogue with others—until, for Raskolnikov, Sonya comes on the scene. The UG
Man, on the other hand, has his opportunity for authentic dialogue with Liza.
Further, both the UG Man and Raskolnikov reveal Dostoevsky’s fear that the Palace’s
motivation is to unite all of society under the authority of scientism. The UG Man speaks of
Chernyshevky’s utilitarianism as an anthill:
With the anthill, the respectable race of ants began and with the anthill they will
probably end, which does the greatest credit to their perseverance and staidness.
But man is a frivolous and incongruous creature, and perhaps, like the
chessplayer, loves only the process of the game, not the end of it. And who knows
(one cannot swear to it), perhaps the only goal on earth to which mankind is
striving lies in this incessant process of attaining, or in other words, in life itself,
and not particularly in the goal which of course must always be two times two
makes four, that is a formula, and after all, two times two makes four is no longer
life, gentlemen, but is the beginning of death. (31, 32)
Whereas the UG Man’s is only hyper-conscious of the anthill ideology, Raskolnikov acts on
behalf of this system. His “new man” theory clearly reflects Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach’s
man-god prototype. He hopes to enact a better society through utility since killing the
pawnbroker will bring about the “greatest” amount of pleasure for the greatest amount of people.
He argues that there exist extraordinary men in society who can overcome moral boundaries and
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act according to their own maxims and principles—such as Napoleon and Muhammad (Crime
and Punishment 265). These men—the elite—whom Raskolnikov develops as extraordinary
archetypes in his philosophical article, “On Crime,” would have complete and total freedom over
any moral boundaries; they are free to shed blood for their own socio-political purposes, and they
often do.
Hence, he asserts himself as an “extraordinary” man, one for whom the anthill functions.
Raskolnikov’s “new man” theory is grounded in the belief that society can be structured
according to enlightened self-interest and the “greatest happiness principle.” The new,
extraordinary man has the means to overstep all boundaries for the greater good. Dostoevsky
wants to establish that the conceptual framework of the Palace could be used to justify all actions
according to utility. Outside of utility, who can determine what man should or should not do?
The parallels between the Chernyshevsky’s “enlightened self-interest” and Raskolnikov’s own
theory are remarkably clear. He finalizes and justifies his theory to kill Alyona Ivanova, a local
pawnbroker who financially exploits him and his neighbors, when he overhears a group of young
60s intellectuals discussing Ivanovna’s nefarious pawn business: "Kill her and take her money,
so that afterwards with its help you can devote yourself to the service of all mankind and the
common cause: what do you think, wouldn't thousands of good deeds make up for one tiny little
crime?" (65). To which one young officer agrees, “Nature has to be corrected and guided" (65).
And though the narrator discusses these remarks as "youthful and common" (66), the narrator is
quick to explain, in an omniscient fashion, "But why precisely now did he have to hear precisely
such talk and thinking, when...exactly the same thoughts had just been conceived in his own
head?” (66). In this passage, Raskolnikov wishes to assert himself as removed from the Palace’s
scientism, but he is trapped within it. Though he is schismatic in this section, vacillating between
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Christian charity and his intellectual commitment to scientific utility, his intellectual
commitment eventually motivates him to logical action, to murder.
Though Raskolnikov purports his “new man” theory as a reflection of his desire to do
good for the greatest amount of people, Dostoevsky quickly shows how illogical his venture is.
The narrator in Crime and Punishment is non-intrusive for the most part. However, Gary
Rosenshield explains how the narrator cannot resist undercutting his Napoleonic venture by
showing how clumsy he is in the moment right before he goes to kill the Pawnbroker. In his
“extraordinary” moment, Raskolnikov is psychologically tormented by this own theory and can
barely act. As a result, his clumsiness prevents him from ever stealing the money that he
intended to redistribute for his theory; he is too psychologically distraught to finish his exploit. In
Raskolnikov’s greatest moment, his “step” is more of a circus act. His “extraordinary man” is
essentially a joke (Rosenshield 403). Dostoevsky is showing that without an objective grounding
for moral behavior, actions that purport to do good will actually undercut themselves. Though
the Palace’s ethics of utility purports to have man’s best interests in mind, without a dialogical
moral grounding, man is free to behave however he sees fit. This descent should not be seen as
slippery slope; without an objective moral referent, man can only speak of morality in terms of
pragmatic value; hence, a decision can be useful at one point and useless at another.
Accordingly, Raskolnikov uses the Palace’s logic to justify murder.
Dostoevsky is showing that the Palace’s conceptual goal to bring about the “one fold”
through scientific utility is ultimately dangerous and counterproductive. The death of the sisters
is a forecast for the death that will take place to the individual’s personhood and to the society as
a whole. Like the individual who has lost the ability for dialogue under the precepts of scientism,
society, according to Dostoevsky, will lose its personality and the ability to interact with one
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another in meaningful ways. Though this transformation sought to “benefit” mankind, it led to
death. The Palace’s conceptual framework would replace authentic unity, only offered through
dialogue with Christ and with others through suffering, with a false unity, offered through
scientism. The Palace’s residency is the false utopia Chernyshevsky and Mill sought to create:
Instead of man’s need to change his nature through suffering and salvation, man would be
“corrected and guided” according to scientific method.68 This is the Crystal Palace’s grandeur, a
perverse replacement of the sacred with the profane, transcendence with immanence, the spiritual
with the material.
Dostoevsky’s prophecy of the rise of scientism made itself known in the twentieth
century when Lewis wrote his Space Trilogy. Chernyshevsky’s utilitarianism, the belief that
society, not human nature, could be “corrected and guided” replaced the Christian doctrine that
man is innately fallen and his nature can only be corrected through Christ’s salvific act.
Moreover, Chernyshevsky’s ethic of utility succinctly merged with the Victorian belief in the
interconnectivity of scientific knowledge and social progress (Parrinder 20). As such, these
modern beliefs affirmed the utilitarian belief that society could be corrected so long as it
conformed to a method—“enlightened self-interest.” If everyone behaved according to natural
law —and at the heart of this law is the rational egoistic impulse—then society would become a
benevolent utopia. Hence a clear parallel exists between the scientistic view of man—as innately
ego—and the rise of Western individualism, of which Dostoevsky believed the Crystal Palace
symbolized. Dostoevsky’s vision of the Crystal Palace was further realized in the Pan-Slavic and
socialist attempts for an earthly utopia. Further, the “New Man” figure, found in Raskolnikov’s
theory, became embodied in Stalin, Lenin, Hitler, and Mao—all grand, god-like figures who
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Once again, we must remember the importance of Christ for man’s flawed human nature in Dostoevsky’s
Christian conception of existence.
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united their countries under this scientific planning. It is after these socialistic attempts that
Lewis begins writing his Space Trilogy, where man will divinize science and project it into the
cosmos.
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Chapter 3: The N.I.C.E.: A New Myth
Like the Crystal Palace, the N.I.C.E. offers a conceptual framework for human residency.
However, in contrast to Dostoevsky’s “psychological realism” and polyphonic aesthetic
approach, Lewis’s fictional approach should be understood according to his decision to write a
“Modern Fairy Tale for Grown-Ups” in the science fiction genre. Similar to early mid twentiethcentury science fiction, That Hideous Strength explores the possibility of interplanetary travel
and man’s relationship to science and technology. What we gain in the final installment of the
trilogy is the influence of the spheres—medieval cosmology and astronomy / astrology, all
Christianized. Lewis, a purveyor of myth, infuses his fictional universe with mythology, creating
an atmosphere where High Eldils, Fallen Angels, spirits, and magic all interplay with science.
However, unlike the first two installments of the Trilogy, the general atmosphere of the work can
be characterized by a dark, spiritual energy when the action takes place within the confines of the
N.I.C.E.—a dystopian residency.69 As the final installment of the trilogy, That Hideous Strength,
which takes place on Tellus—Earth—is more dark than the earlier books because Lewis is
showing the devolution of scientism into meaninglessness. Instead of exploring medieval
cosmology on Malacandra and Perelandra, Lewis establishes the action on Earth, mostly at St.
Anne’s and the confines of the N.I.C.E., where the Institute seeks total control over Edgestow.
Lewis proposes two opposing forces in the novel—the N.I.C.E as a force of evil, and St. Anne’s
as a force of good.
Since the action of the novel primarily surrounds the N.I.C.E and its rise to power, I will
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Though I have characterized the N.I.C.E. as a dystopian framework, I do not mean to imply that the novel is a
dystopian work of literature. Lewis presents the N.I.C.E. as a force of evil in clear contrast to St. Anne’s, which I
will explore and develop in the final chapter. Without the light of St. Anne’s, the work would be a dystopian novel.
However, Lewis shows that, under God’s providence, the earth will not succumb to evil forces; Lewis’s
eschatological views can be seen in his examination of the opposing forces at play for men’s’ hearts. Moreover, the
existence of two opposing forces flows out of Lewis’s Christian mythological vision where evil and good combat,
with good eventually rising victorious. St. Anne’s represents the good, and I will explore St. Anne’s in Chapter
Four.
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focus in this chapter on the Institute as a place of human residency and the way of life it offers
man—a “home” that is ultimately uninhabitable. Like Dostoevsky’s vision of the Crystal Palace
as an all-encompassing symbol of science, Lewis’s vision of the Institute is a totalizing scientific
establishment directed to run men’s lives. In order to understand Lewis’s primary motivation for
writing the work, which was to “remythologize a demythologized world” from modern scientism
(Guite), it is necessary to do a close reading of the work alongside its philosophical counterpart,
The Abolition of Man, where Lewis reveals the poisonous outcomes of a scientistic system for
man; it destroys his tripartite soul, locking him in a subjectivist framework. Like Dostoevsky,
Lewis takes philosophical ideas and embodies them in characters in order to show the absurdity
of their beliefs when lived out. Under the Institute’s scientism, the Christian understanding of
man is abolished and with it his ability to meaningfully communicate, reason, and make moral
decisions.
Before beginning a discussion of the N.I.C.E., we must recognize Lewis’s allusion to Sir
David Lyndsay’s poem, Ane Dialog, wherein he describes the Tower of Babel as a perverted
symbol of power: “The shadow of that hyddeous strength / sax myle and more it is of length”
(qtd. in Lewis). No doubt a feat of human strength, the Tower of Babel symbolizes the
humanistic aim to create a veritable golden calf—a replacement of God with an earthly idol to
scale the heavens. Since Lewis maintains that scientism is modernity’s golden calf, he draws
upon this allusion to show that N.I.C.E. is the contemporary manifestation of the Tower.70 Thus,
Dostoevsky’s eschatological vision of the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. have clear parallels
when we look at the narrator’s description of the Institute’s towering influence over the novel’s
fictional world:
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Once again, Lewis explains that “[u]nder modern conditions an effective invitation to Hell will certainly appear in
the guise of scientific planning” (“A Reply to Professor Haldane” 74).
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However far you went you would find the machines, the crowded cities, the
empty thrones, the false writings, the barren beds; men maddened with false
promises and soured with true miseries, worshipping the iron works of their own
hands, cut off from the Earth their mother and from the Father in heaven…The
shadow of one dark wing is over all Tellus. (Lewis That Hideous Strength 290)
The shadow is cast by N.I.C.E’s appropriation of nature and its attempt to establish a scientific
utopia without God.71 Mark first hears of the Institute’s intentions when he converses with Curry
and Feverstone. As the narrator explains, “The N.I.C.E was the first-fruits of that construction
fusion between the state and the laboratory on which so many thoughtful people base their hopes
of a better world” (23). The hope is founded in the prospect of scientific advancement; its
foundations are in Western individualism, and the belief in science-as-progress, much like that of
the nineteenth-century’s Crystal Palace.
As we can see, then, the Crystal Palace and the Institute are united by their modern
creation of the Tower of Babel, but the residence of the Institute is dystopian even though the
leaders of the Institute, perverted by evil, purport to create an earthly utopia.72 As James Busby,
the Bursar of Bracton explains, the Institute will bring scientism into the realm of political
ideology:
It's the first attempt to take applied science seriously from the national point of
view. The difference in scale between it and anything we've had before amounts
to a difference in kind. The buildings alone, the apparatus alone—! Think what it
has done already for industry. Think how it is going to mobilise all the talent of
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Since the N.I.C.E. is a force of evil, the leaders believe that any state of affairs without God will be utopian; they
find scientism the means by which they can bring about this utopia.
72
And, therefore, a substantial contrast to Vera Pavlovna’s utopian dream of the “New” Russian utopia, though it is
important to note that the Institute believes that its conceptual framework will be a utopia as well.
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the country; and not only scientific talent in the narrower sense. Fifteen
departmental directors at fifteen thousand a year each! Its own legal staff! Its own
police, I'm told! Its own permanent staff of architects, surveyors, engineers! The
thing's stupendous! (36)
Busby lays out the Institute’s “utopian” political goals. In order to create this totalitarian
Institute, the leaders have a full political force, a police force without a court system (a
significant sign of the emphasis on power rather than justice), technologies (Pragmatometer, an
extraordinary sanitation system, vivisection tools), and control over media (propaganda). The
Institute takes the all-encompassing scientific vision of the Crystal Palace to the hegemonic
level; thus, Lewis shows that any organization built on the hope of scientific progress alone will
inevitably be uninhabitable for man. Instead of a utopia as its directors imagine, the Institute is a
clear dystopia.
The Institute’s goals are only possible if they provide a “new” myth for man; however,
before tracing the implications of this myth it is necessary to understand the significance of myth
for Lewis. As Jeffrey J. Folks writes, “With Western culture, narrative literature has always
been the means by which people have understood the nature of the human condition and the
shape of their lives” (107). Narrative provides the framework for the true, the good, and the
beautiful—telos. Twentieth-century scientism and the vestiges of it that insinuate their way into
the current century break down the traditional narrative and present a new materialistic myth for
man.73 Undoubtedly, Lewis, lover of myth, was cognizant of scientism and sought to battle this
new myth. Lewis was primarily attracted to myth in his literary studies, since, before his
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This breakdown stretches far and wide in modernity: Nietzche’s Transvaluation of values, Sartre’s existentialism,
Delueze and Guattari’s deconstruction of the Other. The modern myth is clear; man is alone.
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conversion, he discovered Norse mythology and the state of sehnsucht 74 along with it. The
beauty of this world and the beauty of myth pointed him to the beauty of transcendence—the
origin of beauty. After many discussions with Tolkien, Lewis came to accept the truths of
Christianity by recognizing that the early, pagan myths prefaced the Incarnation of Christ (“Myth
Became Fact”). In other words, Lewis believed that every myth before the Incarnation pointed to
but never reached the full picture of truth until Christ revealed himself. Lewis, for this reason,
sees the early pagans closer to Christian dogma than modern materialists; pagan myths affirm the
existence of a spiritual realm, whereas the new myth of science rejects the supernatural reality
out right.
By rejecting a spiritual reality, the Institute’s scientism provides man with a new,
monologic myth. Lewis adroitly highlights that this new scientific myth is religious in nature; it
simply replaces one metanarrative for another.75 As Downing explains, Lewis created the Space
Trilogy as a critique of the scientism that projects “Darwinism into the metaphysical sphere,
speculating that humankind may eventually evolve into its own species of divinity, jumping from
planet to planet and star to star” (38). In addition to Stapledon and Haldane, H.G Wells
propagated this view through his science fiction. This new myth provided man the means to
become a god-like character, Raskolnikov’s “New Man,” the Nietzchean Übermensch. Lewis,
aware of this new myth, sought to counter this form of scientism. He, however, was not alone, as
Parrinder explains: “The Neo-Christians (G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, T.S. Eliot, Lewis,
74

In Surprised by Joy, Lewis develops his understanding of sehnsucht in relation to joy. In Pilgrim’s Regress, he
explains sehnsucht as a state of “intense longing. It is distinguished from other longings by two things. In the first
place, though the sense of want is acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight…In
the second place, there is a peculiar mystery about the object of this Desire…every one of those supposed objects for
the Desire is inadequate to it: (qtd. in Kreeft 22)
75
As Parrinder explains, J.G. Frazer’s, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1890) paralleled
Causabon’s “Key to all Mythologies.” Frazer delineates three stages of man—the magical, the religious, and in the
modern age, the scientific. He lambasts the religious stage and sees the development into the scientific as good (16).
Frazer’s work makes clear that the breakdown of a metanarrative / myth leads to a different myth. Lewis saw
scientism as a new “myth” that would replace old Western myths.
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Tolkien) typically sought to expose the ‘scientism’ of their opponents as a form of quasireligious (and necessarily heretical) dogma” (23). Like Dostoevsky and other Christian writers
aware of this new myth, Lewis knew the implications of this new myth are monological and
followed with religious fervor.
Lewis recognized that the Institute’s new myth would motivate men to action—that the
twentieth century advancements in technology would merge with this new “myth” and would
drive man to act on this new understanding of the cosmos. As Downing explains, Lewis was
motivated to write after reading Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men (1930), and J.B.S.
Haldane’s Possible Worlds (1927) (38). In the opening of That Hideous Strength, Lewis explains
that he was motivated to write after conversations with a scientific colleague who suggested he
read Stapledon, which he did (7).76 In Last and First Men, Stapledon creates a fictional world
where humanity eventually leaves earth and establishes itself on a different planet. Following
Hegelian dialectical thought, the people conduct mass genocide in order to “progress” into space.
They operate according to this new myth—that science could help man better the earth and reach
out into the cosmos— which parallels J.B.S. Haldane’s postulation in “Man’s Destiny” of man
“taking his own evolution in hand” (qtd. in Downing 38). In this essay, Haldane inverts
Chernyshevsky’s utilitarian belief that human nature cannot be corrected; instead, Haldane
argues that man can scientifically engineer human nature and guide the evolutionary process
towards divinity:
In the improbable event of man taking his own evolution in hand—in other words,
of improving human nature, as opposed to environment—I can see no bounds at
all to his progress. Less than a million years hence the average man or woman
76

After reviewing The Space Trilogy, Haldane charged Lewis as being "anti-scientific ("Auld Hornie, F.R.S.").
Lewis responded to Haldane and clarified that his issue was not with science but with scientism (“Reply to Professor
Haldane”).
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will realise all the possibilities that human life has so far shown. He or she will
never know a minute's illness. He will be able to think like Newton, to write like
Racine, to paint like Fra Angelico, to compose like Bach. He will be as incapable
of hatred as St. Francis, and when death comes at the end of a life probably
measured in thousands of years he will meet it with as little fear as Captain Oates
or Arnold Von Winkelried. And every minute of his life will be lived with all the
passion of a lover or a discoverer. We can form no idea whatever of the
exceptional men of such a future. Men will certainly attempt to leave the earth.
The first voyagers into interstellar space will die. . . . There is no reason why
their successors should not succeed in colonising some, at least, of the other
planets of our system, and ultimately the planets, if such exist, revolving around
other stars than our sun. There is no theoretical limit to man's material progress
but the subjection to complete conscious control of every atom and every
quantum of radiation in the universe. There is, perhaps, no limit at all to his
intellectual and spiritual progress. (“Man’s Destiny” 304-5)
Haldane affirmed the scientistic hope in the nineteenth-century that man could progress himself,
that through science and technology, man could reach an almost divine status.77 As Downing
quickly points out, “This goes directly back to the Fall, ‘Ye shall be Gods’” (39). Haldane’s
scientific goal to reach divinity also harkens back to Vera’s self-divinization through the
destruction of the gods; however, Haldane’s vision is coupled with the belief in the evolutionary
growth of scientific technologies that could enable man power over nature, man, and the cosmos.
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Lewis caricatures Haldane in the character of Weston in Out of the Silent Planet and Perelandra. As Downing
explains, Weston, and those like him, “set aside ordinary morality in favor of utility or in favor of some lofty,
abstract goals for humanity; they disregard the sanctity of life, whether human or animal; they are ‘progressive’ and
find little value in history, tradition, or the classics; they prefer the scientific, artificial, and industrial over the simple
and the natural; they use language to conceal and distort reality, rather than to reveal it” (84).
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Haldane’s vision, then, is clearly reflected in the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual framework, which
is aimed at taking control over nature, man, and eventually the cosmos. When Mark inquires
about the Institute’s aims, Curry says, “The N.I.C.E marks the beginning of a new era—the
really scientific era…This is going to put science itself on a scientific basis” (38). The Institute
equalizes all of nature into a monistic, monologic system—everything is of equal material
(instrumental) value, i.e., how it can serve the Institute. By diminishing its spiritual value, the
Institute desacralizes nature (and necessarily man and the cosmos).78 Lewis traces this
philosophical shift in The Abolition of Man where he explains that “[w]e reduce things to mere
Nature in order that we may ‘conquer’ them. We are always conquering Nature, because
‘Nature’ is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered” (The Abolition of Man 43).
Under the Institute’s scientistic framework, all of reality is conquerable, which is evidently
espoused by the Institute’s control over animals in the story; their vivisectionist practices are a
grotesque picture of dominion over nature offered by God to man in the Garden; they abuse
animals for experimental purposes.
Necessarily, the Institute’s control over nature applies to man as well. In order to
foundationally support their new conceptual framework, the Institute creates the “new man.”
Curry appeals to Mark’s vanity by explaining the Institute’s motivation to unite science and
sociology with the support of “the whole state, just as war has been backed by the whole force of
the state” (38). With the power of the state, science can now be applied to sociology and toward
creating a technocracy with the goal of “the scientific reconstruction of the human race in the
direction of increased efficiency—the elimination of war and poverty and other forms of waste—
a fuller of exploitation of Nature—the preservation and extension of our species, in fact” (258).
78

In The New Demons, Ellul notes that the sacred engenders both fear and hope—fear because it stands as
something sublime, much larger and more powerful than us, but also hope as it offers man salvation and freedom
from his smallness. Through scientific technology man has desacralized nature.
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Once science is applied to sociology (the study of man), the Institute can transfer their power
over nature to man. Feverstone quickly concurs, arguing that science can now have the force it
needs to finally correct and guide the evolutionary development of humanity toward complete
divination: “If Science is really given a free hand it can now take over the human race and recondition it: make man a really efficient animal. If it doesn’t—well, we’re done” (41). When
Mark, curious and skeptical, asks Feverstone, “What is the first practical step?” (42)79 Feverstone
replies: “Man has got to take charge of Man. That means, remember, that some men have got to
take charge of the rest—which is another reason for cashing in on it as soon as one can. You and
I want to be the people who do the taking charge, not the ones who are taken charge of” (42).80
In order for the Institute to actualize its plans, new, extraordinary men must rise and take control
of others; they must stand outside and above others and nature. The Institute intends to use this
power toward the conditioning of man toward an earthly utopia.81
However, like the UG Man—whose existence in a scientistic society is “necessary and
impossible”—Mark will eventually discover that Institute’s conceptual framework is not a place
where people can meaningfully exist; even the “new man” cannot inhabit the Institute’s
residency. Mark, in fact, has clear parallels to the UG Man. When we meet Jane and Mark
Studdock, we are immediately aware of the brokenness of their marriage. Jane, a modern
woman, is bitter from her relationship with Mark since living with him is close to “solitary
confinement” (13). He is “always either sleepy or intellectually preoccupied” (13). When Mark
is home—a sacred place where two people should share “mutual society, help, and comfort”
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Reminiscent of Raskolnikov’s quip, “A new step, a new word, that’s what they’re most afraid of” (4), before he
enacts his “New-Man” theory. Raskolnikov follows the same logic after hearing the 1860s scientific intelligentsia—
arguing that nature must be “corrected and guided.”
80
Precisely the dynamics underlying the serpent’s enticement to Eve.
81
Lewis develops the same idea in The Abolition of Man: “From this point of view, what we call Man’s power over
Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument” (55).
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(13)—he “hardly ever talk[s]” (13). Instead, he is driven by a vanity to be on “the inside”
(Rozema 177) of the Progressive Element at Edgestow. A sociologist, Mark values the
acceptance of his intellectual and scientific peers over his commitment to wedding vows. Like
the UG Man, Mark is driven by vanity to be accepted by his colleagues and the prospect of a
“progressive” group of scientists. Yet it also shows a desire for others; he cannot exist alone.
When Mark finally gets on the inside, he finds the Institute’s dark, spiritual connection.
As Lewis writes, That Hideous Strength is “A Modern Fairy-Tale for Grown-Ups.” Hence,
Lewis brilliantly blends the scientism of his day with fantastical spiritual elements, no doubt
challenging the materialist’s position that reality is only matter and dually exposing the religious
fervor of those who follow scientism. He wants readers to see that, even in a scientistic dystopia,
there is a spiritual battle at play for men’s hearts (Rozema 183). In contrast to Ransom’s
adventures in the beautiful worlds of Malacandria and Perelanda (in Out of the Silent Planet and
Perelandra) where he interacts with Eldils, the Institute is a dystopia—a force of evil that
opposes the light of St. Anne’s. Professor Frost and the Institute’s leaders refer to the Dark Eldils
as “Macrobes,” masking their nature with a scientific label, whereas Ransom and the community
of St. Anne’s refer to them as Fallen Angels. The Institute’s leaders employ the help of Dark
Eldils (demons) to help grow their Institute.82 These fallen angels join with the Institute in their
plot against nature and man.83

82

In Out of the Silent Planet, Ransom asks a Malacandrian to describe an eldil to him: “To us the eldil is a thin, halfreal body that can go through walls and rocks: to himself he goes through them because he is solid and firm and they
are like clouds. And what is true light to him and fills the heaven, so that he will plunge into the rays of the sun to
refresh himself from it, is to us the black nothing in the sky at night” (95).The Eldils involved with the Institute are,
however, fallen and dark.
83
Once again, we see a connection to Dostoevsky. As Rozema brilliantly explains, “It seems that in Frost's ‘progress
towards objectivity’ he opens the door for anything—anything at all—to become a cause of his behavior” (186).
And here, once again, we see a connection to Dostoevsky. In Demons, Nikolai Stavrogin and Peter Verkhovensky
relinquish traditional moral values and bring destruction to their community through murder, rape, and hatred. Their
abandonment of traditional moral conscience brings a demonic darkness over their community as well.
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N.I.C.E and Language: A Linguistic Dystopia
With a residency founded on the myth of scientism, the N.I.C.E. is united by a new
language. The Institute offers the false hope of unifying man through a universal scientific
language on “its own scientific basis” (43). In a discussion among Curry, Feverstone, Mark and
James Busby, he remarks that they have “different languages” (37) regarding the nature of
progress, but that they “all really mean the same thing” (37). Without a unifying language—a
discourse community—the Institute would not be able to build its empire. Upon examining the
Institute’s new language, it appears that the N.I.C.E seeks to reverse the linguistic division
enacted by God after the Tower of Babel. Now, within the walls of the Institute man can speak a
shared language of scientism and operate under the same philosophical assumptions. This new
language, though, is one of power, exploitation, and technique.84
Like the Tower of Babel, a symbol of man’s power, the Institute is a system of power and
effectively uses language as a tool to enact its power. As such, the Institute exploits language in
order take control over Edgestow, London, and the eventually the cosmos. Since the Institute is
grounded in a naturalistic philosophy of science, it can only deal adequately with modes of
power, utility, and function, since language, a set of symbols, has an adaptive evolutionary
advantage for those who recognize its usefulness.85 For the Institute, writing is necessary as a
language of power. Feverstone appeals, once again, to Mark’s vanity by saying, “You are what
we need…a sociologist who can write” (42). Bewildered, Mark asks Feverstone exactly what he
84

Technique could be described as an ultra-rational mentality that accompanies human interaction with technology,
but isn't reducible to it. 'Efficiency' approximates it; a closer approximation would be the drive toward the 'one best
way' of doing things. Donald Phillip Verene has said that Ellul's work on technique produces something like "a
phenomenology of the technical state of mind." Some of its many characteristics are the prevalence of means over
ends, increasing speed, geometric progression (where each change is the logical outgrowth of the preceding ones),
and the inability to question what is presented as fact. Critical for Ellul's work is how this creates a milieu in which
the human simply doesn't fit, physically or otherwise.
85
This plays out into post-structural analysis as well. Downing shows the relationship between post-structuralism’s
tendency to “despair objective truth” and have a “concentration upon mere power” as seen in the writings of Thomas
Kuhn (55).
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will write, and Feverstone replies, “We want you to write it down—to camouflage it. Only for
the present, of course. Once the thing gets going we shan’t have to bother about the great heart of
the British public” (43). Feverstone is referring to their Institute’s directive to create the “new
man”—a new view of humanity where man finally can create the man-god without the need of a
god-man. The “new man” forgets all “old” views of language as beautiful, good, or true and
instead focuses on the usefulness of language.
To camouflage their intentions, the Institute adopts propaganda—a language of power—
in order to take control over the masses. Thus, Mark’s role as a propagandist parallels Winston’s
revisionist work for Big Brother in Nineteen Eighty-Four; both use propaganda as a way to dilute
the truth.86 Big Brother uses the decrepit and withering language of Newspeak, and the N.I.C.E.
uses the misleading and ambiguous language of propaganda. Feverstone, aware of propaganda’s
intentions, shrewdly explains to Mark that “it does make a difference how things are put” (43).
Feverstone, an opportunist, has a perverted psychological awareness that successful propaganda
falsely validates the subject through using abstract and misleading information.87 Propaganda
assumes a control over the subject it comes in contact with. Hence, it functions like any other
technology used to control men by those in power. In The Abolition of Man, Lewis likens the
propagandist’s discourse to war, an environment operated through power and domination of the
weak by the strong: “Man is as much the patient or subject as the possessor, since he is the target
both for bombs and propaganda” (55). As the Institute’s writer, Mark immediately begins writing
down and camouflaging their dystopian plans, ignorant of the full implications of his association
with the Institute.
86

In his article, “That Hideous Strength in Lewis and Orwell: A Comparison and Contrast,” Peter Schakel shows the
relationship between N.I.C.E. and Big Brother—both are totalitarian powers that use language ultimately to
dehumanize those they have control over.
87
The connection between propaganda cannot be overlooked, as made clear by Stalin’s use or propaganda. Stalin
used propaganda to engender loyalty through fear and love; he falsely affirmed the Russian peasant.
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In addition to power, Feverstone’s language here reflects the Institute’s adoption of
technique. Feverstone says, “If it were whispered that the N.I.C.E wanted powers to experiment
on criminals, you’d have all the old women of both sexes up in arms about yapping about
humanity. Call it re-education of the mal-adjusted, and you have them all slobbering with
delight” (43). Feverstone’s move here is intentional; instead of speaking of criminals (persons
with moral agency who are guilty of violating a moral code), Feverstone speaks of the “maladjusted”—an inhuman category fit to deal more aptly with material objects than moral persons.
This movement from the personal to the abstract, in Lewis’s aesthetic, is highly depersonalizing.
Using “Mal-adjusted” is not only a denotative trick, but also this phrase has a connotatively
emptied meaning; it is no longer discussing persons, only abstract, removed, singularities.
Statistics, a measurement of data using technique and often used for propaganda, present
the same linguistic problem, which can be seen when Mark walks around with Cosser through an
English village gathering sociological information on the farmers.88 The more Mark views
humanity in terms of statistics, the less in touch with persons he becomes: “His education had
had the curious effect of making things that he read and wrote more real to him than things he
saw. Statistics about agricultural labourers were the substance; any real ditcher, ploughman, or
farmer’s boy, was the shadow” (87).89 Both propaganda and statistics—Mark’s primary
contribution to the N.I.C.E—are reflections of the Institute’s conceptual framework built on
power and technique. Lewis satire reveals that any conceptual framework that operates according
to technique will invariably devalue human life.
88

In Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Ellul explains that propaganda is not interested in viewing
people as individuals; they are only valuable of they are reduced to an average (7). Thus, propaganda both affirms
the individual—by making him or her connected ideologically to society—and strips him of his individuality.
89 Dostoevsky makes clear that this depersonalization leads to literal and figurative death. After murdering the
Pawnbroker, Raskolnikov says, “It wasn’t a human being I killed, it was a principle” (274). Raskolnikov embraces
the 60s mentality; the pawnbroker is not just a principle; she is a statistic, an abstraction, far removed from humanity
and stripped of her humanity.
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Further, a language built on technique coheres with the scientistic aim of arriving at allencompassing empirical objectivity. The Institute creates a new language because it aims to
discuss people with as much technical efficiency as possible. Lewis’s satire of the movement to
the technical is not in vacuo—the positivist tradition of the nineteenth-century marks the same
movement. The materialism of Dostoevsky’s time heavily influenced the positivism of the
twentieth.90 As Parrinder explains, positivism is “a collection of prohibitions concerning human
knowledge, intended to confine the name ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ to the results of those
operations that are observable in the evolution of the modern sciences of nature” (20). The
positivist movement viewed truth as a closed, materialistic system. Accordingly, “truth”
statements were boiled down to analytic tautologies. Positivists, like the Institute leaders,
attempted to create a new mechanical language.
This trend can be seen most clearly in Quine’s Word and Object (1960), which takes the
scientistic aim for technical language to its logical conclusion. Quine maintains that each
individual speaker’s “stimulation” of the external world is isolated and removed from others, and
thus, his epistemological uncertainty is followed up with a movement toward a completely
analytic system of language that allows for communication:
It would seem that this matching of observation sentences hinges on sameness of
stimulation of both parties, the linguist and the informant. But an event of
stimulation, as I use the term, is the activation of some subset of the subject’s
sensory receptors. Since the linguist and his informant share no receptors, how
can they be said to share a stimulation? We might rather say that they undergo
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As C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis make clear, Comte—a clear forerunner to Quine—believed that “[a]s
science matures, such explanations (theological) are replaced by mechanistic ones involving natural regularities”
(qtd in. Philosophy of Religion 144).
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similar stimulation, but that would assume still an approximate homology of
nerve endings from one individual to another. (370)
Since individual speakers experience separate stimulations, Quine argues that they cannot
meaningfully—in the classical sense—discuss the thing-in-itself. We are isolated in a world of
phenomena and signifiers and cannot interact with the noumena or the signified. This view of
language aligns with Quine’s metaphysical belief that there is no absolute meaning of “tree”
because there is no “tree” in objective reality, at least not in the sense that we can adequately
discuss the tree outside of our “stimulation.”91 Hence an individual’s understanding of tree will
always be different from another’s because there is no objective tree that we can reach through
mutual engagement—only our subjective stimulations of that tree. As such, Quine follows suit
with the “myth” of matter and offers a non-fictive account of this belief. Not only is Quine’s
technical jargon dull and uninteresting, but it also fails to point to any metaphysical realities
outside language itself.
In this way, a scientistic language of technique linguistically strips words of their
metaphysical significance, grounding them in the sphere of immanence. However, words
themselves resist this secularization. In “How Literature Resists Secularity,” Graham Ward
offers a Lewisian critique of a scientistic use of language. He shows that literature—a collection
of individual words—has resonances that are highly infused with Judeo-Christian universals:
words such as “love,” “compassion,” “honor,” “man,” etc., carry with them meanings that resist
a completely secular framework; they speak to a universal and transcendent significance. 92
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Quine stood as a reverberating voice for this sort of scientism. He further argues in Word and Object “that mental
notions like belief or sensation could simply be abandoned in favor of a more accurate physiological account” (qtd.
in Ramsey “Eliminative Materialism” n. pag.). Quine grounds man’s mental states completely in his physiology. He
writes, “[t]he bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?” (qtd. in Ramsey n.pag.).
92
In Amusing Ourselves to Death, Postman has a helpful summary of Northrop Frye’s theory of resonances:
“Through resonances a particular statement in a particular context acquires a universal significance” (qtd. in 17).
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Ward’s theory of language and literature recalls Lewis’s since both writers recognize the innate
characteristic of language as a pointer to the spiritual realm that stands outside the material. The
moment one begins speaking of universals, like love, compassion, and justice, one has stepped
outside metaphysical naturalism; these ideas, these universal beliefs stand outside materialistic
conditions; either these resonances are merely illusion, or, perhaps, they resonate from a Voice
outside the Total System.
John Wither, the Deputy Director of the Institute, most aptly embodies a scientistic view
of language. Like Dostoevsky, Lewis uses characters, such as Wither, to embody different
scientific beliefs.93 As Rozema explains, Wither is a “consummate manifestation of Newspeak”
(178)—a distorted and fractured lump of empty linguistic signifiers. His aim for technicality in
speech renders his speech indecipherable. Thus, Lewis fittingly names him: Wither’s
communication “withers the mind and spirit” (178) of those with whom he communicates. For
instance, when Mark asks the Deputy Director how he will serve the Institute, he replies, “We do
not really think, among ourselves, in terms of strictly demarcated functions…Everyone in the
Institute feels that his own work is not so much a departmental contribution to an end already
defined as a moment or grade in the progressive self-definition of an organic whole” (Lewis 54).
Wither’s explanation of the Institute, here, is meaningless. He ironically says that they do not see
themselves in terms of “function,” but this is exactly how they view their roles in the Institute.
Moreover, he offers phrases like “self-definition” and “organic whole” without a conceptual
framework, a residency, that can sustain the “self” or the “organic.” Hence, Wither’s technical
language is self-contradictory since it seeks to understand man according to technical efficiency.
93

Lewis defends his characterizations in the science fiction genre, which make some of his characters appear more
like philosophical beliefs than actual characters: “It is absurd to condemn them [science fiction novels] because they
do not often display any deep or sensitive characterization. They oughtn’t to. It is a fault if they do…Every good
writer knows that the more unusual the scenes and events of his story are, the slighter, the more ordinary, the more
typical his persons should be” (“On Science Fiction”).
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A language built on technique is dangerously inaccurate; man cannot inhabit a conceptual
framework built on the pillars of such a mode of discourse.
As Dennett makes clear in his book Freedom Evolves, the scientistic movement toward a
language of technique continues in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of science. Dennett
describes humanity in as technical and “accurate” terms as possible. He writes, “A person is a
hominid with an infected brain, host to millions of cultural symbionts, and the chief enablers of
these are the symbiont systems known as language” (qtd. in Rozema 173). Here, Dennett
eschews the use of metaphorical language typically used to understand humanity; he believes
that “technical” words are more accurate than metaphorical or vernacular ones. As Rozema
makes clear, Dennett’s linguistic move allows him to categorize persons and language in a
naturalistic framework: “‘Euprimates’ and ‘symbiont systems’ are ‘technical terms,’ and
therefore supposedly more accurate than their ‘vernacular’ counterparts, ‘persons’ and
‘languages’” (173). However, Dennett’s linguistic move fails to see the connection between
connotation and denotation and form and content. As Wright explains in “Generic Man; An
Endangered Species? Some Reflections on The Abolition of Man,” the positivist’s abolition of
man primarily attacks “man,” a signifier that has different connotations than more technically
“accurate” signifiers, including “male,” or “hominid.” In fact, Wright explains that the language
of the Bible (for instance, Jesus as the “Son of Man”), the poetry of John Donne, Shakespeare,
and other significant English writers before the rise of positivism, all use poetic language that
resists positivism’s breakdown of connotation and denotation (167-169). The positivist view,
and thus the Institute’s view, fails to see that how something is said is intrinsically connected to
what it means and what it means to what it is. By using language that is more scientifically
accurate, the scientist becomes absurdly inaccurate; he no longer discusses persons, only
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things—non-persons.
Lewis confronts the Institute’s discourse “by using the power of poetic language in verse
and prose to effect a ‘felt change of con-sciousness’, to heighten and deepen our awareness by
re-enchanting the disenchanted, by remythologizing a demythologized world” (306). Lewis
especially recognized the need for myth that could communicate truth—synthesizing reason and
imagination to its fullest. For Lewis, poetic language, with robust resonances that point to a
meaningful universe, cleave reason and imagination and allows the communication of
transcendent truths.94 When That Hideous Strength is viewed contextually in the Space Trilogy,
we see how concerned Lewis is with using poetic language and myth. As Kreeft explains,
“Lewis explanation, in Perelandra, is itself mystical. Ransom finds that what is myth in one
world is fact in another; that on pre-fallen Perelandra the distinction between myth and fact has
not occurred” (51).95 Imaginative language is the solution to the Institute’s linguistic breakdown.
Lewis, influenced by Chesterton’s view of language, very much agrees with Feverstone’s
quip “that it matters how a thing is put,” though for different reasons. In Orthodoxy (1908),
Chesterton recognizes the absurdity of this scientistic approach to language and argues that we
must distinguish mathematical (technical) language from poetic (metaphoric) language:
To say, ‘The social utility of the indeterminate sentence is recognized by all
criminologists as a part of our sociological evolution towards a more human and
scientific view of punishment,’ you can go on talking like that for hours with
hardly a movement of the gray matter inside your skull. But if you begin ‘I wish
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In response to Sister Penelope’s inquiry about the Space Trilogy, Lewis writes, “Any amount of theology can now
be smuggled into people's minds under cover of romance without their knowing it" (The Collected Letters of C. S.
Lewis n. pag.).
95
Lewis’s brilliant and imaginative descriptions of setting of Malacandra and Perelandra are enough to support his
view of the importance of poetic language to arriving at truth.
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Jones to go to gaol and Brown to say when Jones shall come out,’ you will
discover, with a thrill of horror, that you are obliged to think. (231)
Chesterton’s view of language, and his simple, honesty profoundly impacted Lewis’s own view
of language and style (Kreeft 30). Here, Chesterton shows that when language works on the
technical level alone, it cannot speak of the personal, the aesthetic, or even the divine. Thus,
naturalists’ attempt to make technically truthful statements ironically defeats itself. Without a
view of language that allows for persons, man is incapable of speaking or thinking.
As we can see, not all naturalists are as linguistically ambitious as Dennett and Quine and
try to have the best of both conceptual frameworks—a naturalistic philosophy of science (that
cannot justifiably account for rich, teleological experiences) with a rich, robust philosophy of
language (which still includes universal, Judeo-Christian resonances). In his highly popular PBS
series, Cosmos, Carl Sagan, popular physicist, maintains the poetic and robust tradition of poetic
device even though he professes the modern view of the universe that Lewis critiques: “The
Cosmos is all that is, or ever was, or ever will be” (Sagan). Sagan’s opening line is a clear satire
of Revelation 1:8, “I am the Alpha and the Omega,” says the Lord God, “who is and who was
and who is to come, the Almighty.” Though Sagan aligns with a naturalistic framework, he
linguistically paints the universe with poetic and Biblical language:
I believe our future depends, powerfully, on how well we understand this Cosmos
in which we float like a mote of dust in the morning sky…it’s a story about us …
how the Cosmos has shaped our evolution and our culture and what our fate may
be. We wish to pursue the truth no matter where it leads.... The Cosmos is full
beyond measure of elegant truths, of exquisite interrelationships, of the awesome
machinery of nature. Some part of our being knows this is where we came from
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[the stars], we long to return. And we can because the Cosmos is also within us;
we are made of 'star stuff’—we are a way for the Cosmos to know itself. (Sagan
n.pag.)
Interestingly, Sagan views the Cosmos as a “story” with, no doubt, parallels to the new myth of
scientism. Sagan implies that the Cosmos is “calling” us to “pursue the truth” and discover the
“elegant truths” and “awesome machinery” of the universe. Moreover, he discusses the Cosmos
as a universal agent—much like the Christian God—who “is also within us” and can “know
itself.” Sagan’s naturalism is exactly the scientism Lewis wishes to expose—a fervent, religious
belief in the power of science to improve and advance our lives. Sagan wishes to re-introduce a
neo-pagan, Averroistic view of the soul, which is not individual but general. His language is
attempting to unite all of man into a collective human consciousness based on scientific progress.
However, Sagan employs a rhetorical trick; the universe, an amalgamation of molecules, energy,
and laws, cannot really “know itself,” nor can it call us to itself. Sagan maintains the robust,
poetic language of metaphor, but what does his language point to besides an irrational,
misguided universe (one of many if multi-verse theory is correct) where death is the only
constant? His language is like a fresh coat of paint on an automobile headed for the junkyard
about which he wants us to get excited.96 As Dilorenzo explains of Sagan, “It’s a bit naïve to get
rhapsodic about pure materialism.” The moment one gets rhapsodic about this conceptual
framework, it is no longer an issue of pure materialism, at least not justifiably so.
As Lewis wants us to be aware, scientism has serious implications for language—
whether or not naturalists are willing to admit these implications. By employing a language of
power and technique, the N.I.C.E. reveals its hostility both to language and alienation to human
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I do not mean to imply that the universe, in itself, is not full of beauty; rather, Sagan’s naturalism disallows him
from using the poetic and rhetorical language he uses.
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community. As such, the Institute’s new, shared language becomes increasingly isolating and
chaotic, leading to the climax when the leaders’ discourse is ruptured in a modern Tower-ofBabel scene. Merlin, who can speak the pure language of the Eldils, thwarts the Institute’s
dystopian plans by confusing their language through the casting of a linguistic spell (229).
Though his interruption is a classical deus ex machina, he simply expedites the linguistic
deterioration already in process. After his spell, the leaders lose the ability to understand one
another and mass confusion ensues; animals break free from their prison and storm the meeting
room, revealing that the Institute’s control over nature is indeed illusory. Just as their new
language is chaotic, so is their entire motivation for control over nature and man.
Some critics, including Orwell, find the deus ex machina ending an artistic downfall of
the novel; Orwell believes that the novel loses its autonomy and becomes polemical because of
Lewis’s intrusion (Schakel 38). However one criticizes Lewis’s use of Merlin, one must
recognize Lewis’s intention; in Orwell’s worldview, Big Brother inevitably resumes power
because Orwell’s eschatological vision is ominous; the processes that allow men to rise to
totalitarian control will never come to an end; man will always be in a power struggle over other
men. Lewis’s eschatological vision, however, affirms that a New Jerusalem will come and bring
peace and restore language. However, since That Hideous Strength does not explicitly deal with
end times, it appears that Lewis is postulating another noteworthy idea: God will not permit the
triumph of scientism in His world. Orwells fails to grasp that the two preceding novels in the
Trilogy pave the way for the degeneration of the N.I.C.E into meaninglessness. For this reason,
Merlin’s linguistic intrusion is not necessary, per se, since he only expedites the collapse of a
language built on ambiguity, misfiring, and exploitation. However, the deus ex machina ending
fulfills Lewis’s artistic purpose to depict the Modern Tower of Babel. Built on these foundations,
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the N.I.C.E cannot offer a “home” or a welcoming conceptual residency for man.
Here, we can stop and recognize Lewis’s own prophetic insight. His critique in The
Abolition of Man no doubt centers on how scientism affects language and our ability to speak. If
we grant scientism merit, then, like Turgenev’s Bazarov, we will be reduced to “sensations.” Our
ability to engage the Other will be futile as we are locked in our own perceptions.97 Hence, we
see a clear connection between the scientism of the nineteenth century and the post-modern
condition of the twentieth-century. When Nietzsche’s Zarathustra claimed, “God is dead,” he
essentially followed through with the Enlightenment’s distinction between noumena and the
phenomena, the thing in itself, and our perception of that thing.98 Nietzsche continued the
nineteenth-century materialistic trajectory toward the post-modern deconstruction of the Wholly
Other, as exemplified by post-structuralist theory. In this system the signifier is stripped of its
metaphysical property, and man lives in the world of infinite signs.99 Engagement with the Other
is both impossible and meaningless.100 Lewis, for this reason, was prophetic like Dostoevsky. On
the edge of the rise of post-structuralism, Lewis defends robust classical-Christian belief that
language is intrinsically meaningful, points to an objective reality, and allows man to step
outside of himself.101
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In this context, I mean the “Other” to be that which stands outside oneself; it approximates the “noumena,” the
thing-in-itself, which existets independently of the phenomena. However, in this context I am specifically referring
to the idea of a transcendent being who stands outside time, space, matter but who is still possible to interact with.
As I will show in footnote 30 below, post-structuralists find the Other a wholly oppressive idea and deconstruct it.
98
Roger Lundin traces this development as it applies to Christian aesthetics in his essay, “The Beauty of Belief.”
99
In Baudrillard’s “The Ecstasy of Communication,” as well as in his Simulacra and Simulation, he maintains that
objects have evaporated. We can only experience simulated otherness (145).
100
Gilles Deleuze’ and Felix Guatarri’s Anti-Oedipus aims at the radical deconstruction of the Other: “Christianity
taught us to see the eye of the lord looking down upon us. Such forms of knowledge project an image of reality at
the expense of reality itself” (xxii).
101
In fact, Lewis finds the act of reading one of the most transcendent experiences one can have. Reading good
literature allows one to transcend and interact with the Other: “But in reading great literature I become a thousand
men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see.
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The N.I.C.E.’s Attack on Reason
Bearing in mind Lewis’s critique of the Institute’s exploitation of language, I will attempt
to go “deeper”—into the mind and man’s ability to reason. Lewis sees language and reason as
inextricably connected, and because they are, I will follow my discussion of the N.I.C.E’s
debasement of language with an examination of the Institute’s implications for reason. The new
“language” of scientism attacks classical reason, mounting its attack in a self-contradictory
strategy that lacks epistemological grounding and the means to use its own weapons, that is,
language itself. The Tower of Babel is a fitting symbol for N.I.C.E because the Institute’s new
language is self-referentially incoherent; these are not men (rational persons) talking; these are
beasts—progenitors and products of the systems of power at play in the Institute. The Institute’s
framework shows us that without a transcendent referent, language can only serve pragmatic
uses—power, utility, function. In a theistic system, however, language has both function and
telos and is grounded in Logos. Since the Institute’s scientistic language is grounded in power
structures, it radically shapes man’s ability to reason. In this new myth, man is only
“stimulations”—a product of evolutionary processes and neurological cause and effect.102 If this
is true, then, like language, there are serious implications for man’s reasoning capabilities.103
Though a majority of the Institute’s leaders launch an attack on reason, Professor Frost is
perhaps the most aggressive. Like Wither, Frost is named in accordance with the angle of
scientism he embodies. As a pure materialist, Frost eschews traditional reason and traditional
values, and through his characterization, Lewis highlights the connection between man’s ability
to properly reason and his ability to arrive at the good, the true, and the beautiful. First, before

Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more myself than
when I do” (An Experiment in Criticism 141).
102 Once again, similar to Bazarov’s “sensations.”
103
Lewis develops this in his argument from reason in chapter 3 of Miracles.
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exploring the collapse of the good, it is necessary to view Frost’s view of reason. In a
conversation with Mark about the proper way to understand the “tendency of events”—
causality—Frost argues that he must abandon classical reason in favor of modern pragmatism:
Of course, if you insist on formulating the problem in those terms. In reality the
question is meaningless. It presupposes a means-and-end pattern of thought which
descends from Aristotle, who in his turn, was merely hypostatizing elements in
the experience of an iron-age agricultural community. Motives are not the causes
of action but its by-products. You are merely wasting your time by considering
them. When you have attained real objectivity you will recognize, not some
motives, but all motives as merely animal, subjective epiphenomena. You will
then have no motives and you will find that you do not need them. Their place
will be supplied by something else which you will presently understand better
than you do now. So far from being impoverished your action will become much
more efficient. (296)
Frost’s scientism has three major implications for reason: First, the classical understanding of
reason is meaningless and should be done away with. Second, reason is a byproduct of one’s
space-time context; hence, Aristotle’s “means-and-end” system of physics only works in his
agricultural time. Thirdly, all actions, behaviors, and thoughts are evolutionarily caused and
should be viewed in terms of pragmatic efficiency—maximizing the most efficient means to
ensure survival value.
Lewis heatedly contends with Professor Frost’s “chronological snobbery” about the
irrelevance of classical reason (Surprised by Joy 167). In addition to finding this modern view
extremely arrogant, Lewis shows that it collapses on itself. In the chapter “The Cardinal
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Difficulty of Naturalism” of Miracles, Lewis, similar to his fictional approach, takes the
naturalists’ claims to their logical extreme. He examines, premise by premise, how this system
plays itself out. The opening lines state, “If Naturalism is true, every finite thing or event must be
(in principle) explicable in terms of the Total System…If any one thing exists which is of such a
kind that we see in advance the impossibility of ever giving it that kind of explanation, then
Naturalism would be in ruins” (311). If Naturalism is true, then all phenomena must be
explainable according to Nature. No event, action, or state exists outside of nature or can be
explained outside of natural events. Further, under a Total System, man’s evolutionary
development is a result of a determined series of random causes. The causes are random because
they are without intention; they are determined because man cannot step outside of this Total
System. Contemporary naturalist, George Gaylor Simpson, agrees: “Man is the result of a
purposeless and natural process that did not have him in mind” (qtd. in Plantiga). Contra the
Christian understanding of God as a personal Creator and Nature as a reflection of the Creator, a
naturalistic philosophy of science maintains that the universe evolved out of mindless causes.
Frost embodies this cold philosophy of science, which is why Lewis names him in accordance to
this system; his view of the universe is enclosed, purposeless, and cold.
If Frost’s belief is correct, then man acts in accordance with pragmatic considerations—
with what is useful not with what is true. Lewis shows that in naturalistic science, man is
concerned with the usefulness of a belief not necessarily its truthfulness: “You may, if you like,
give up all claim to truth. You may say simply ‘Our way of thinking is useful’—without adding,
even under your breath, ‘and therefore true’…The old, high pretensions of reason must be given
up. It is a behavior evolved entirely as an aid to practice” (The Abolition of Man 32). And this is
exactly what Frost seeks to do when he disparages Aristotle’s belief in means-end pattern of
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thinking. Frost wants to convince Mark that he should make decisions according to pragmatic
efficiency, and Frost’s beliefs are not a straw man, but mirror naturalists of Lewis’s time and
many today.104 Patricia Churchland, contemporary eliminative materialist, argues in the same
vein:
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in
the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of
nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the
organism may survive… Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an
evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as
it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of
survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost. (qtd in. Plantiga
315)
Churchland’s “essentials” are merely pragmatic considerations. She agrees with Frost that we
should abandon the traditional understanding of the “good” and begin to understand man in
terms of four basic biological impulses. Truth is irrelevant.105 Survival is vital.
However, Churchland’s materialism is non-sense. If truth is irrelevant or secondary, she
has provided little grounding for the very claims she is making. Churchland uses “reason,” which
should have at its base the approximation of truth. However, she states that truth takes the
“hindmost,” and in doing so, she is making a truth claim—one which, under further examination,
is highly unlikely to be true. This dilemma is naturalism’s “cardinal difficulty.” If we follow
104
105

Including Quine, et al.
In fact, Churchland seeks to completely rid modern science of words such as “belief” and “desire” when
discussing man. She believes we need a “new” language founded on the technical language of neurological science.
Thus, Churchland, an Eliminative Materialist, has continued in the positivist tradition and posits that all of man’s
experiences can be understood in terms of neurological frameworks. She and her husband, Paul Churchland, argue
that traditional “folk psychology,” which understands man in terms of “belief” and “desire” (directly related to the
Platonic conception of desire) will eventually be obsolete as we discover more about neurological processes
(William Ramsey “Eliminative Materialism” n.pag. Stanford).
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through with Churchland’s logic, then, according to naturalists we have true beliefs that are
pragmatically non-valuable and false beliefs that are pragmatically valuable (religion, for
example).106 Naturalists, such as Dawkins, argue that belief in a higher power is an adaptive
feature, a coping mechanism, which allows us to increase our chance of survival: “It gives us
consolation and comfort. It fosters togetherness in groups. It satisfies our yearning to understand
why we exist” (Dawkins 190). If this is true, then religious beliefs provide one with a selective
advantage over those who have not developed these neural pathways. But, obviously, since a
naturalistic philosophy of science does not maintain that religious beliefs are true beliefs, it is
stuck in a bind; how can one differentiate between falsehood and truth?
Plantiga recognizes this dilemma and argues that naturalism is actually in contradiction to
scientific thought because it prevents man from differentiating truthful beliefs from false beliefs.
He shows that we must make a distinction between Neural Pathway properties (physical states in
the brain) and content (beliefs that are either true or false) that fills these states. NP properties
determine the content of a property:
But as long as the NP properties are adaptive, it doesn’t matter, for survival and
reproduction, what content is determined by those NP properties. It could be true
content; it could be false content; it doesn’t matter. The fact that these creatures
have survived and evolved, that their cognitive equipment was good enough to
enable their ancestors to survive and reproduce—that fact would tell us nothing at
all about the truth of their beliefs or the reliability of their cognitive faculties. It
would tell something about the neurophysiological properties of a given belief; it
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That said, even if it turns out that all truths are pragmatically valuable, it does not follow that pragmatic value
thereby entails truth. Consider the difference between these two syllogisms: If x is true, then x is pragmatically
valuable vs. If x is pragmatically valuable, then x is true. Obviously, these are very different and necessary
distinctions. However, some crass pragmatist theories of truth may try to conflate these axioms.
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would tell us that by virtue of these properties, that belief has played a role in the
production of adaptive behavior. But it would tell us nothing about the truth of the
content of that belief: its content might be true, but might with equal probability
be false. (33)
As Plantiga argues, the error in logic here is that the pure naturalist has no grounding to
determine the veracity of a belief—only the pragmatic value. Lewis agrees, and postulates the
necessity of forming a reliable system for rationality: “All possible knowledge, then, depends on
the validity of reasoning…Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true” (Miracles
313). However, under the Total System of the Institute, man’s reason and his belief-forming
mechanisms are not reliable: If man has descended from an unguided evolutionary process, filled
with an indeterminate set of non-rational causes, then man’s belief-forming mechanisms are
themselves non-rational.107 Even Professor Haldane, whom Lewis critiques, recognizes this
cardinal difficulty: “If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in
my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true…and hence I have no reason for
supposing my brain to be composed of atoms” (314). In contrast to a theistic view of evolution, a
naturalistic philosophy of science cannot justifiably maintain a materialistic evolutionary process
is rational because this would assume the existence of a mind. Even if the evolutionary account
is true, the development of sentient beings with rational minds would have taken place far into
the process; the microbes leading up to the development of a human mind would not follow a
rational set of causes. Instead, these cells would propagate according to favorable environmental
conditions that maximize chances of survival. In other words, species would operate according to
pragmatic considerations, not truthful considerations.

107

The issue here is between materialism and immaterialism, not evolution and non-evolution. Lewis’s critique
targets a materialistic philosophy of evolution, not necessarily an immaterial or divine theory of evolution.
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Thus, in order to determine the veracity of a belief, we must step outside the Total
System. To argue for the veracity of human reason, one cannot do so within the Total System
because this is circular—using reason to support reason. Therefore, Lewis harkens man back to a
medieval conception of reason, not because he thinks the Ptolemaic account is accurate, but
because he recognizes that this account provides a conceptual framework for reason to exist:
Perhaps the safest way of putting it is this: that we must give up talking about
‘human reason’…where thought is strictly rational it must be, in some odd sense,
not ours, but cosmic or super-cosmic. It must be something not shut up inside our
heads but already ‘out there’—in the universe or behind the universe: either as
objective as material Nature or more objective still. Unless all that we take to be
knowledge is an illusion, we must hold that in thinking we are not reading
rationality into an irrational universe but responding to a rationality with which
the universe has always been saturated…We must, then, grant logic to reality. (De
Futilate)
From this statement it is clear that Lewis believes that an objective world must really exist and
independent rationality—outside of the Total System—is requisite to forming true, justifiable
beliefs. For Lewis, objective, transcendent reality is God, the “cosmic logos…the great I AM,
that ‘eternal, self-existent, rational Being” (Ward 217). In a scientific community where truth is
only what can be seen, tasted, and heard, Lewis antagonistically proclaims that this view of truth
is puny, unreliable, and a reflection of “chronological snobbery” (Surprised By Joy 201), an idea
that man naturally believes what is current and modern. Lewis affirms that “[i]f anything is to
exist at all, then the Original Thing must be, not a principle or a generality, much less an ‘ideal or
a ‘value,’ but an utterly concrete fact” (Miracles 87). In the Incarnation, the Word—Logos—
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became the highest known Fact; He stands both within and outside the universe, allowing man to
reason and dialogue.
Lewis, therefore, infuses his literature with a return to medieval Neoplatonic views of
truth, which see truth as “incognito,” waiting to be discovered (Ward 19). As Ward explains,
Lewis’s view of truth is heavily influenced by the medieval notion that truth is hidden. Lewis
argues in Spenser’s Images of Life that Spenser drew on “neo-platonic thought which deemed it
proper that ‘all great truths should be veiled’” (qtd. in 19). Undoubtedly, Lewis here is referring
to a theistic, Platonic understanding of the cosmos, where truth—perfection of form—exists in
the transcendent reality of ideas and forms. Lewis seems to be synthesizing several aspects of
Augustine’s and Plato’s cosmological beliefs when he argues that truth exists both in nature and
in the world of transcendence—the higher form. Though truth is both present in nature and
transcendence, nature only provides us with a glimpse, an image of truth. Lewis attests to this
view of the cosmos when he writes, “I think that all things, in their way, reflect heavenly truth,
the imagination not least. ‘Reflect’ is the important word. This lower life of the imagination is
not a beginning of, nor a step toward, the higher life of the spirit, merely an image” (Surprised by
Joy 171). Continuing in a dualistic, NeoPlatonic view, Lewis maintains that truth exists in a
higher form, and we are provided analogical images of that truth within nature. Lewis starkly
contradicts Professor Frost, who tries to objectify truth claims through naturalistic methodology.
Lewis makes clear that Frost’s logic is ultimately illogical, and more importantly, dangerous.
In contrast with the Institute’s scientistic conception of truth, Lewis’s affirmation of
Logos provides him with the grounding that “rationality is at least potentially capable of giving
us a true picture of reality if we commit ourselves to consistency and non-contradiction”
(Aeschliman 75). Shippey explains that Lewis’s friendship with Charles Williams was especially
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enlightening to his view of truth within literature. Through this friendship Lewis learned that
“one could write a work inspired by recondite learning (in both cases essentially Neoplatonic
learning) but still use the style and method of popular fiction” (The Ransom Trilogy 238). At any
rate, Lewis’s concern is not just reaching truth but also synthesizing reason and imagination in a
fractured, scientific world.
As an establishment founded on scientism, the N.I.C.E. offers a view of reason that is
based on pragmatic value and not truthfulness. However, under further investigation, this system
collapses on itself. A naturalistic philosophy of science cannot provide a substantive framework
for truthful beliefs or for reliable belief-forming mechanisms. Hence, Lewis harkens back to
earlier conceptions of the universe, specifically to the Aristotelian understanding of truth and the
universe. By abandoning belief in Logos, the Institute’s own language and reasoning capabilities
break down. Hence, Lewis makes it clear that with the new language of the N.I.C.E., man’s view
of reason will demonstrably change, and when that happens, he opens the door for moral morass.

A New Man: A New Morality
With a new language and new view of reason, the N.I.C.E’s conceptual framework leads
man to a moral morass. As Michael D. Aeschliman explains, “Modern scientistic doctrine holds
all fact to be objective and all values to be subjective” (74). The modern tendency is to disparage
the subjective since it cannot be quantified108 and affirm the objective—facts and statistics,
which are quantifiable.109 As a consequence, the naturalist’s belief that values are a result of
accidental change (evolutionary process) permits values to be guided by intentional change—
108

As Rozema notes, this is a categorical mistake. An “outside in” scientistic study of man presupposes the ability
for the social scientist to objectively remove himself from humanity in order to look back at itself. (183). But, if man
is trapped in a Total System, how can he objectively remove himself?
109
Certainly, Lewis would see this as a modern “myth of facts”—the dogmatic belief in the power of scientific facts
to alone provide man with truths.
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man “taking over man” and creating the “new man.” If values are accidental, rather than
objective, then they are social conventions that can be used or abandoned based on pragmatic
need. Also, if they are only accidental, then man can direct them however he sees fit. Once again,
let us revisit Feverstone’s belief that “man has to take charge of man” through “[s]terilization of
the unfit, liquidation of backward races (we don’t want any dead weights), selective breeding”
(42). As the Eugenics of the early twentieth century reveal, Feverstone’s belief paralleled real
scientific intentions to “correct and guide nature” toward maximum efficiency.
Hence, the “new man,” a reflection of Nietzsche’s “Transvaluation of Values,” is only
possible with the breakdown of objective moral values. Without the existence of a transcendent
moral code, moral values are really just an illusion, as Nietzsche recognizes:
It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God's credibility frivolous. Indeed,
only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the search for
truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This God left
aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the
conditions of life. (qtd. in Plantiga 314)
With God a discarded image, man is existentially free to create his own values—everything is
permissible, as Dostoevsky and Nietzsche understand. For Nietzsche, then, “life is an aesthetic
phenomenon ‘beyond good and evil.’ The only ‘goods’ are subjective and hedonistic—the
maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain by individuals for themselves” (Aeschliman
74).110 Nietzsche’s recreation of values places values in the subjective.111
110

In the Postmodern or late Modern period, Nietzsche’s aesthetic is still influential. Our goal for the maximization
of pleasure (in clear contrast with Dostoevsky’s notion of suffering) is increasingly supported by new, personal
technologies. With the rise of the personal computer and iPhone, we have devices that seek to maximize our
pleasure and diminish pain, or at the very least, our social discomfort. Our technologies offer the false hope that we
can overcome our pain (existential loneliness, which is ironically supported by the distance created through our
constant use of technologies in lieu of embodied, human interaction). The prominence of pornography and its
general acceptance in America attests to this growth. Moreover, American obsession with entertainment and the
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Lewis recognized this belief creeping into the English educational system of his day. In
The Abolition of Man, the philosophical counterpart to That Hideous Strength, Lewis subtitled
the work, “Reflections on education with special reference to the teaching of English in the upper
forms of schools.” In this work, Lewis combats the highly “progressive” positivist aim to reduce
truth statements to the analytic and moral/value judgments to the subjective. Lewis begins by
critiquing The Control of Language: A Critical Approach to Reading and Writing by Alec King
and Martin Ketley wherein the two authors argue that statements of value are merely subjective
reactions to external stimuli and do not hold objective merit. Under King and Metley’s
subjectivism, English education will establish “firstly, that all sentences containing a predicate of
value are statements about the emotional state of the speaker, and secondly, that all such
statements are unimportant” (4). Lewis, here, shows the breakdown of the subjectivist
framework; if all value statements are subjective akin to Quine’s “stimulations,” then they are all
of equal, and thus, unimportant value; one cannot be better than another. King and Martin
abandon the category of ought in favor of is. If one accepts that man is just a neurological /
material being then there is no correct way one should look at a text, only the way one feels.
Though “Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he
ought” (13), King and Metley find this educational goal obsolete and favor more relativistic
educational aims.
Highly concerned with aesthetic value, Lewis finds this materialistic and naturalistic

technologies that constantly entertain us—the smartphone, for one—reveals that our personal technologies have
assumed the place of the sacred. Instead of looking to transcendence to find our self-consciousness, we stare into the
fantasy frames in our smartphones to find our identity. For confirmation of this influence in America one need only
look to the Black Friday trampling scandal in 2008 when a Wal-Mart employee was trampled to death by an overzealous crowd of shoppers looking to buy the latest computer. With increasingly personal technologies, postmodern
society takes subjectivism to the level of the sacred; self-creation is a pleasure grounded in our technological use.
111
Not only in the subjective, but as Lewis recognizes, Nietzsche’s new values are effectively connected to the will
to power: “For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men
to make other men what they please” (The Abolition of Man 59).
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position absurdly reductionistic. How can one begin any sort of aesthetic evaluation without the
existence of objective standards? 112 If one can only speak of how Homer’s Iliad makes one feel,
then what is the aim of literary evaluation? Further, what is the point of education, in teaching
the student to make evaluations? 113 Discovering the objective qualities—the good, the true, and
the beautiful—of a text or of a work of art would be futile if man can only emotionally respond
to the outside world.
It should be no surprise, then, that the N.I.C.E. seeks power over education; Feverstone
seeks to enact the Institute’s new myth through re-educating the masses to adopt its new
scientistic framework. Feverstone writes, “Then real education, including pre-natal education. A
real education makes the patient what it wants infallibly; whatever he or his parents try to do
about it. Of course, it’ll have to be mainly psychological at first. But we’ll get on to biochemical
conditioning in the end and direct the manipulation of the brain” (42). For the Institute to
successfully re-educate man under this new extreme subjectivism, it must begin from an early
age. The “old” has to be abandoned for the “new,” and it must begin with a complete reeducation.114 Lewis harshly critiques the highly subjectivist tendency of scientism in part
because he recognizes its implications for English education.
Nonetheless, Lewis’ fear of subjectivism has larger implications for man than in
aesthetics alone; subjectivism renders man incapable of living the “good” life or making morally
112

Lewis’ view of authorship is extremely important to note. He does not believe that authors can create “original”
work in the modern sense; rather, he believes the creative act mirrors the originality of the Creator. Therefore,
authors should view themselves as windows intended to be viewed through rather than studied and looked at (The
Personal Heresy 23). The author is a window to the objective world; with this view of authorship, Lewis lays the
groundwork for evaluative literary criticism; we can make objective literary evaluations only if an objective world
and objective standards exist.
113
As Lothar Bredella makes clear, literary theory (post Lewis) continued in the subjectivist trajectory: David Bleich
views the meaning of the text as completely dependent on the subject; Stanley Fish sees the text dependent on an
interpretive community; and, Richard Rorty abandons all epistemological claims, arguing that the text seeks to aid
“self-creation” (Pragmatism and Literary Studies)
114
It should come as no surprise that Chernyshevsky proposes the same thing in the 1860s, as I discussed in the
previous chapter.
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virtuous actions. Feverstone recognizes this when he argues that Mark must begin to relinquish
the idea of the good life in order to see “how much of what you mistook for your thought was
merely a by-product of your blood and nervous tissues” (258). With that idea as his premise,
Feverstone argues that “[f]riendship is a chemical phenomenon; so is hatred” (258). If all of our
values are subjective “epiphenomena” then we are stuck in an ethics of utility, pragmatism, or
relativism. We can arrange organisms of the particular man and society to produce the optimum
results, no doubt a reflection of Bentham’s “Greatest Happiness” principle. By giving into his
scientism, Professor Frost disparages man’s ability to reason, and thus, his moral purpose. By
applying his new “education” to himself, he strips himself of objective value. After the Institute’s
plans are thwarted, Frost, in perhaps the darkest moment of the novel, follows his scientism to its
logical extreme:
He did not know where he was going or what he was about to do. For many years
he had theoretically believed that all which appears in the mind as motive or
intention is merely a by-product of what the body is doing. But for the last year or
so—since he had been initiated—he had begun to taste as fact what he had held in
theory. Increasingly, his actions had been without motive. (357)
Frost views himself according to his own scientism and consequentially experiences an
existential contradiction akin to the UG Man’s “hyper-consciousness.” He views himself as
subject and object—becoming removed from his body:
Thus the Frost whose existence Frost denied watched his body go into the anteroom…Still not asking what he would do or why, Frost went to the garage. The
whole place was silent and empty; the snow was thick on the ground by this. He
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piled up all the inflammables he could think of together in the Objective Room.
Then he locked himself in by locking the outer door of the ante-room. (358)
In a state of divided consciousness, Frost enters the dark Objective Room—an underground
chamber he created to purge man of all subjective feelings—with “that tiresome illusion, his
consciousness, screaming in protest” (358). He pours gasoline into the Objective Room and
lights a match, and not until this moment does he realize that “death itself might not after all cure
the illusion of being a soul…He became able to know that he had been wrong from the
beginning; that souls and personal responsibility existed. He half saw: he wholly hated” (358). In
his final moments, Frost is ironically filled with the hate he perceived as chemical phenomena
and which he denigrated throughout the novel (Rozema 184). As we can see, Lewis uses Frost to
show the devolution of man when he is educated to believe that his entire existence is “epiphenomenon.” The Objective Room is a place of death; only material objects, not men, can exist
here.
Once again, Dostoevsky deals with the same recreation of values. In Demons, Kirillov
follows through with a proto-Nietzschean recreation of values. He says, “If there is no God, then
I am God…Man has done nothing but invent God, so as to live without killing himself” (618).
Without God, man is existentially alone. Objective values do not exist. Fear of this recognition,
according to Kirillov, keeps man from admitting the truth that God does not exist. Without the
existence of God, man will be faced with the absurd—his existential loneliness in the face of a
dark cosmos. Hence, Kirillov views himself as a man-god who can overcome his fear of death
and the death of God: “Fear is man’s curse…But I will proclaim self-will, it is my duty to
believe that I do not believe” (619). Instead of aligning with Camus’ absurd tragic figure—
Sisyphus, who metaphorically “pushes the rock” against the reality of the absurd, i.e., lives in the
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awareness of his existential absurdity—Kirillov gives into the absurdity of suicide and kills
himself in a perverted man-god self-sacrifice. He convinces himself that his suicide will provide
humanity with the freedom to renounce Christ and become “like gods.” However, in his final
moments, Kirillov’s suicide is meaningless. He screams, “Now, now, now, now” (Dostoevsky
625) and behaves in a way that can be described as bestial until he finally pulls the trigger. His
perverted suicide, like Frost’s, is strangely isolated and entirely ineffectual in creating a
significant “new man.”
Frost’s dark suicide is the consummation of the death lurking throughout the Institute’s
claim on man; his suicide in the Objective Room—a place of his own creation intended to
destroy the subjective parts of his being—is ironic. When man fundamentally reshapes values
according to his own scientistic maxims, his enterprise collapses on itself. Frost’s view of the
universe is fixed on destruction and death. In contrast, Lewis, a traditional rational theist, argues
that society must return to the Tao—“the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain
attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of things the universe is and the kind
of things we are” (That Abolition of Man 18). The doctrine of the Tao is universal, uniting the
“Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental” beliefs alike. Unlike the N.I.C.E.’s
conceptual framework, these “traditional” systems all affirm an objective reality and objective
moral values. Further, Lewis shows that under the Tao, “Emotions and sentiments are alogical.
But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform” (19).
Lewis recognizes that without a transcendent referent, man would be locked in his own head; he
would not be able to make objective aesthetic or value evaluations, and thus his education would
be futile.
For this reason, Lewis, like Aristotle, grounds his view of education in “first principles”
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since every philosophy of truth requires an epistemological grounding (Scruton 4-6). Aristotle
begins his Physics by explaining that the primary rational inquiry is to begin at the beginning, the
first, most foundational causes—the origin (n.pag.). Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover provides the
foundational grounding for his Physics. Lewis, following Aristotle’s first principles, grounds his
foundation in Logos. Man is able to make rational, non-relativistic claims because his logic is
grounded in Logos and it points to Logos—ultimate reality. This reality, if really true, defies the
positivist belief that all non-analytic statements are merely feelings and cannot be grounded in
objectivity. Thus, the positivists’ aim to get as close to empirical certainty renders their own
logic absurd. By using only their eyes, they lose a different kind of sight: “You can’t go on
‘seeing through’ things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see
something through it. To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see” (The Abolition of
Man).
In contrast to the Institute’s scientistic vision, Lewis urges man to see with a different kind
of vision. In “Meditations in a Toolshed,” Lewis recounts a day when he stood in a dark tool
shed with the sunlight shining through a crack above the door. Observing the beam of light,
Lewis realized that he could approach the beam in two different ways—by “looking at” the
beam and “looking along” the beam. If he chose to look directly at the beam, he could see a
myriad of dust particles floating and moving within the light’s cylindrical beam. He could
contemplate the particles, even try to count and compare them as an objective viewer.
Accordingly, “contemplation” of the thing is impersonal, analytical, evaluative, and removed; it
is “uninvolved knowledge” (Ward 17). However, if he chose to, he could bend his knee, dirtying
his pants, and look along the beam; the dust particles would be overshadowed as his eyes
glanced through the hole and viewed the sun. This looking along is personal and “committed
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knowledge” (17). A boy who meets a beautiful girl and falls in love with her after seeing her
warm and delicate smile is enjoying her presence—“looking along the sexual impulse” (212). A
scientist who watches the entire scene unfold and analyzes how the boy is experiencing chemical
and biological reactions is contemplating the scene—“looking at the sexual impulse” (212).
Though the Institute’s framework allows only the latter vision, Lewis urges his readers to
develop the first vision, one that looks along the beam of St. Anne’s-on-the-hill, the light of the
earth.
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Solution
I have argued that the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. offer conceptual frameworks for
human residency which are ultimately uninhabitable. These conceptual frameworks continue the
post-Enlightenment rise of mechanical philosophy and the consequential breakdown of Christian
conceptions of residency. Following the rise of nineteenth-century Western scientism, the
Russian intelligentsia recognized the need to replace Christian authority with the new authority
of science. Aware of this change, Dostoevsky prophesied that “new” Western science presented
revolutionary views of nature, truth, and ultimately man. His prophesy was correct, as time
shows; while Russia hoped for political revolution, the intelligentsia embodied this hope in the
“new man.” However, Dostoevsky finds this new view of man ultimately destructive. By
building a conceptual framework on a naturalistic philosophy of science, these new men would
create residencies, most notably the Crystal Palace, that are uninhabitable, inhuman, and as
Dostoevsky reveals, absurd. Though this residency’s new scientistic view of man had sincere
motivations to improve society for the “greater good,” Dostoevsky foresaw that, within this
framework, the greater good was trivial, even dangerous because it robs man of his soul, and as
Lewis argues, creates “men without chests” (The Abolition of Man 32)—men who are brains and
viscera but who do not possess the tripartite soul or the ability to meaningfully communicate.
Moreover, these residencies, symbolized by the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E, stand as
modern Towers of Babel; they reflect the attempt to bring heaven down to earth. In Notes from
Underground, Dostoevsky, writing according to his dialogical aesthetic, shows that a scientistic
residency ironically does not allow for dialogue; it is monologic, in that it reduces man to
physical laws, mathematics, and an ethics of utility. Since Dostoevsky is primarily concerned
with how people dialogue within communities, he satirizes the Palace’s monologue because it
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inhibits man from entering authentic community. The UG Man, through paradox and “hyperconsciousness,” shows that man cannot reside within the walls of the Palace. As such,
Dostoevsky’s vision and terror of the Palace was prophetic. In Notes from Underground,
Dostoevsky prophecies that the Crystal Palace will attempt to unite man into “one fold” under
the guise of scientific progress. With the turn of the century, we see through the Pan-Slavic
socialist attempts that Dostoevsky’s terror of the Palace was startlingly accurate.115
Writing nearly a century later, Lewis expresses a similar fear. In That Hideous Strength,
the N.I.C.E. mirrors the Crystal Palace’s goal to found a utopian society. Like the Palace, the
Institute offers a new scientific myth that includes a radical “new man” theory, complete with a
utilitarian ethical system. However, though the Institute’s leaders believe their scientific society
will be a utopia, it is a clear dystopia, a force of evil in the Orwellian sense. For this reason, both
Dostoevsky and Lewis believe that man’s attempt to bring heaven to down to earth is ultimately
destructive for man and earth—especially destructive to those who attempt it. Lewis shows that
the N.I.C.E.’s conceptual framework replaces the Christian mythological picture with a
naturalistic one; it deconstructs the medieval hierarchical picture and constructs a man-made
Tower in its place based on a curious combination of science and devil worship. As the N.I.C.E.
grows exponentially, it towers over Edgestow as a residency of perverted power. Though the
Institute offers an alternative conceptual framework to the Western Christian conception, this
framework cannot existentially support man; language, reason, and morality break down under
this system, leaving man in complete darkness, a mirror to the modern view of the cosmos. Thus,
to the degree that the novels show this new scientific framework, they try to present an optimistic
vision. However, the Tower and its optimistic vision crumble down and men are scattered and
isolated.
115

As mentioned earlier, the socialism of Lenin and Stalin gives credence to Dostoevsky’s prophetic terror.
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Comparing the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E. side-by-side reveals a substantive critique
of these residencies’ scientistic conceptual framework. However, Dostoevsky and Lewis do not
only satirize these frameworks. They also offer alternative conceptual frameworks for habitable
human existence. They offer residencies that parallel their Trinitarian view of God, who
communicates with man through three different Persons but as One; this communicative
relationship is a picture of a conceptual residency where man can exist—where all parts exist in
harmony. Dostoevsky shows that the Palace’s Rational Egoism is deterministic and therefore
monological; it does not allow for such a dialogue. Free will, which he believes is foundational
for a meaningful dialogue, is not sustainable in the Palace. Therefore, Dostoevsky proposes
suffering—the prison—as an alternative to the Palace. The prison is paradoxically a place of
liberation; accepting suffering liberates one to develop dialogue and an anagogical vision of
reality. The prison, therefore, is in direct contradiction to the utopian happiness of rational
egoism since it mandates a free choice to accept one’s guilt and to live in community—to affirm
the needs of others before self and to become one with man. The Palace offers physical
nourishment. The Prison offers spiritual pain, but this pain, according to Dostoevsky, brings
about deeper, existential nourishment, one for the soul and for all mankind, one that brings true
life.
Though the N.I.C.E.’s darkness is heavy throughout That Hideous Strength, it cannot out
power the light of St. Anne’s, which Lewis offers as an alternative conceptual framework. Lewis
doubly critiques the determinism of a naturalistic philosophy of science and recognizes the need
for sacrificial ceremony. Without sacrifice—suffering—one cannot find his place in a welcoming
residency. In light of this belief, Lewis maintains that man must realign himself within a
Christian mythological hierarchy; he must find his place between nature and God in sacrificial
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obedience, which is the relinquishing of one’s will to power in order to serve the All-Powerful,
others, and nature. Through the Tao, Lewis shows that there exists an objective world with
objective values by which man can live. He believes that the body of Christ operates according
to these principles to the fullest capacity. St. Anne’s, a symbol of the body of Christ and of
Christian mythological design, offers a residency where man fully exist, where language and
reason have a purpose, and where Christ illuminates these activities. St. Anne’s-on-the-hill
shines over the darkness of the Institute, but in order for man to enter this community, he must
bend his knee, and “look along” St. Anne’s mythological hierarchy towards Christ, who is the
center and source of light. When looking at St. Anne’s, we can still see its light shining into this
century and beyond.

Dostoevsky: A Place of Suffering vs. A Palace of Science
Dostoevsky satirizes the Crystal Palace according to his dialogical aesthetic, which, at its
core, unites all voices in a critique of the Palace’s conceptual framework. By presupposing a
monologic view of man—that is, man understood as a completely material agent—the Palace is
not a place where man can dialogue. Without the ability to dialogue, man is completely isolated
from others and from God who, in Dostoevsky’s view, is dialogical. The Crystal Palace, a place
of human residence, offers man progress, but, built on the premise of scientism, admits no
dialogue, and thus becomes absurdly regressive. Dostoevsky was highly aware of the Palace’s
claims on man. By reducing man to chemistry and physics—liquids, solids, and gases in
motion—the Palace’s conceptual framework abandons man’s soul, and thus his ability to interact
meaningfully and honestly with others.
The UG Man highlights the connection between dialogue and health and monologue and
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death. Without dialogue man, like stagnant water, becomes motionless and eventually lifeless. In
contrast, the running waters of dialogue can move man, and “whatever moves may rise” (Pevear
xi). Dialogue is community. Community is built on love—an act of suffering —and suffering
brings life. For Dostoevsky, love is suffering because it requires one to painfully diminish the
ego and take on the sufferings of others. By entering Christian community, one chooses to put
others first, which requires that the individual ego suffer for the better of the whole. In contrast,
scientism is monologue. Monologue is pure ego, and ego leads to death.116 This distinction is
why the most sullen and isolated characters in Dostoevsky are those trapped in scientism—a
monologue—and are the most perturbed. In Crime and Punishment, for instance, Raskolnikov’s
“schisms” attest to his openness to the moving waters of dialogue; whereas Svidrigailov,
Raskolnikov’s foil, is unable to dialogue. Accordingly, Raskolnikov’s schisms contrast
Svidrigailov’s stasis; his schisms reveal that he is not static and has the ability to dialogue with
others. In contrast to Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov is trapped in monologue and his view of eternity
as a “village bathhouse, covered with soot, with spiders in all the corners,” (Dostoevsky 289)
testifies to his stasis; his monlogue is a place where humanity isn’t welcome.117 As such,
Dostoevsky wants us to see that dialogue allows man the ability to step outside of the Total
System of his material conditions and connect man with the source of dialogue, Logos.

116

Lewis agrees and recognizes that hell is choosing Self—a clear contrast to Sartre’s “Hell is other people.” In
The Screwtape Letters, the narrator writes, “We must picture hell as a state where everyone is perpetually concerned
about his own dignity and advancement, where everyone has a grievance, and where everyone lives with the deadly
serious passions of envy, self-importance, and resentment” (xi).
117
Svidrigailov is one of Dostoevsky’s most terrifying characters. He appears after Rodya’s fourth nightmare, and as
one critic has explained, “Svidrigailov is Rodya’s nightmare” (Shaw 138). Svidrigailov has lost his dynamism. He is
static and overcome by a 60s emphasis on order and calculation; though there is overwhelming speculation that he
physically abused his wife to death, he pardons himself based on the experts: “It was all performed in perfect order
and with complete precision…didn’t I contribute to this whole…misfortune, somehow morally, through irritation or
something like that? But I concluded that this, too, was positively impossible” (Dostoevsky 282). Since the medical
experts confirmed, with precision and order, that he was not to blame for her death, he believes that he is morally
free from abuse. Not only is his account of the situation unreliable, but also his tone evinces his own moral
depravity; he is exactly the kind of person who would do such a deed and walk away without guilt. Unlike Rodya,
Svidrigailov does not have the capability for both good and evil; his dialectic has reached an ending point.

Smalt 111
Since the Palace’s conceptual framework views man as a pure material being, it assumes
that man can be satisfied so long as he is physically nourished. Accordingly, the 1860s Russian
intelligentsia equates progress with earthly comfort. The Palace assumes that man will be
satisfied so long as he does not hunger, and so the Palace offers man the hope that it can acquire
food more effectively, that it can protect his cities, and that it can overcome the effects of the
Fall, including one if its most immediate and anarchic effects, the breakdown of language at the
Tower of Babel. The Palace, then, offers man unity so long as he conforms to his egoistic
impulse. In Chernyshevsky’s What is to Be Done?, Kirsanov embodies the rational egoistic
impulse. A benefactor, he visits an archetypal Russian harlot and alleviates her consumption and
pain out of his impulse for “brotherly love.” Although meeting one’s physical needs is an
imperative within a Christian framework, he overlooks her spiritual need, which, for Dostoevsky,
is of higher importance. He oversimplifies the prostitute to the 1860s view of man as a purely
material being, and thus, he mistakes the maximization of pleasure with true freedom. In Notes
From Underground, Dostoevsky uses the UG Man to satirize Kirsanov’s egoistic impulse for
“brotherly love.” In a parody scene, the UG Man gives Liza money to humiliate her, making us
realize that “[i]n this relationship, the UG Man is the diseased party; his inability to love is as
incurable Nasenka’s consumption” (Barstow 27) and no different from Kirsanov’s “love” since
neither is really love. Dostoevsky satirizes Kirsanov in order to show that an ethical system built
on ego is fractured; the UG Man could just as easily humiliate the prostitute as heal her.
Moreover, the UG Man shows man will act against the rational egoistic impulse for freedom.
In The Brothers Karamazov, the Inquisitor makes the same mistake as Kirsanov. The
“Authority” of scientism, according to Dostoevsky, confuses earthly pleasure for authentic
freedom. Ivan’s myth is similar to the myth of scientism, in that it mistakes bread for freedom. In
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this myth, Christ walks the streets, heals the blind, raises the dead, and as expected, causes a
commotion within the village. Soon after these events, the Inquisitor, a symbol of distorted
earthly authority, imprisons Jesus and faults him for affirming human freedom. The Inquisitor
recognizes the difficulty of freedom since “nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and
for human society than freedom! But do you see these stones in this bare, scorching desert? Turn
them into bread and mankind will run after you like sheep, grateful, and obedient” (Dostoevsky
252). Here, the Inquisitor faults Christ for not undoing the consequences of the Fall by satisfying
man’s physical needs. Christ could exert a will to power and demand man’s allegiance, “[b]ut
you did not want to deprive man of freedom and rejected the offer, for what sort of freedom is it,
you reasoned, if obedience is bought with loaves of bread” (252). Even though Christ has the
power to satisfy meet man’s physical needs he chooses to preserves man’s freedom to obey or
disobey.
Therefore, in Christ’s place stands the Inquisitor, a false Christ who offers earthly bread
without spiritual nourishment—a monologue instead of dialogue. Christ could have chosen to
take complete control over man and demand worship, but he resisted this temptation in the
wilderness. Instead of building an earthly kingdom, Christ chose the heavenly kingdom, which is
both immanent—through the Incarnation and the body of Christ—but also transcendent, a hope
to come in the New Jerusalem. The Inquisitor delights in Christ’s decision because it allows him
to create his own earthly kingdom: “In place of your temple a new edifice will be raised, the
terrible Tower of Babel will be raised again” (253), and the inhabitants of this place will cry,
“Feed us, for those who promised us fire from heave did not give it” (253). The Inquisitor,
therefore, stands as the grand figure of the Crystal Palace, a false Christ.
Dostoevsky, then, uses the UG Man to highlight the intrinsic flaw in the Palace’s bread
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offering. For Dostoevsky, the “Authority” of the Palace—a monologue—prevents man from true
redemption, which is only possible through an act of suffering on behalf of the individual for the
community. By becoming the flesh and blood of the people, Christ offers the freedom to choose
obedience and enter into the sacrificial ceremony with others. Dostoevsky establishes the
necessity of freedom for this ceremony through a contrast between the UG Man and
Raskolnikov. Like Kirsanov, the UG Man and Raskolnikov encounter Russian prostitutes who
offer them love, and both are presented with the choice to reciprocate or disparage that love. For
the UG Man, “[w]hen Liza comes to his house the tables are turned. She offers him love, not
‘fine sentiments’ but he is humiliated by the threat of her power over him and retreats into the
safety of his cynicism” (Barstow 27). Liza, an embodiment of self-sacrifice and grace, dialogues
with the UG Man, but he ultimately rejects it. He is not ready to embrace his need for suffering,
and so he humiliates her and rejects her love, exerting his will to power. Since the UG Man has
chosen the path to the underground, he is unable to dialogue with Liza, and without dialogue, he
is isolated and will become static. Unfortunately for the UG Man, a community, based on shared
sacrifice, requires a level of vulnerability by all of its members. The UG Man refuses to enter
dialogue with Liza, accepting instead the lofty ideals of the 1840s intelligentsia and the scientism
of the 1860s. He grounds his intellectual commitment in the idealism and hope of social utopia
instead of in the embodied Liza; his “love” is ultimately ego.
What the UG Man loses, redemption resulting from genuine dialogue within a sacrificial
community, Raskolnikov finds in dialogue with Sonya. Like Liza, Sonya offers Raskolnikov
authentic dialogue. Though he has been consumed with his “new man” theory, he shows the
potential for active, authentic love. Sonya embodies this alternative, and through dialogue offers
him the choice to embrace active love—a subversion of his “new man” theory. Raskolnikov’s
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theory is grounded in the will to power, whereas Christian love requires suffering and the
belittling of one’s ego. Once again, it is important to note that Dostoevsky establishes
Raskolnikov with the potential for sacrificial love; he is not a static character. However, though
his mother reminds him of his Christian heritage, and he admits that he believes in the story of
Lazarus and the Apocalyptic vision of the New Jerusalem (22, 236), he converts only when he
witnesses Sonya’s sacrificial love for her family and her willingness to suffer alongside him in
Siberia. Her constant dialogue, and his willingness to enter dialogue, builds a foundation for a
welcoming residency.
Sonya is able to offer dialogue to Raskolnikov only because she has first embodied
suffering in her own community. Since her father, Marmeladov, wastes her family’s money in
alcoholic bouts, Sonya prostitutes herself in order to feed her family. She embraces suffering—
the prison of prostitution—so her family can eat. And though her actions violate her Russian
universal ethic, she transcends the universal ethical code and enters the realm of the absolute.118
Sonya’s radical sacrifice defies the Palace’s conceptual framework because she acts out of
sacrificial love, not rational egoism. As such, the parallel between her name and sophia
(wisdom) is intentional. She is a complex Christian symbol, and “[i]t is possible to live the fullest
life only when in harmony with these symbols; wisdom is a return to them… Science and these
symbols are incommensurables” (Gibian 995). The wisdom of suffering is foolishness to the
scientistic framework that operates on pragmatic considerations, but for Dostoevsky, this
foolishness is the greatest wisdom.119
As an embodiment of sacrificial love, Sonya becomes the catalyst for Raskolnikov’s
118

She essentially becomes a Knight of Faith, as did Abraham by conforming to the Absolute over the universal.
Kierkegaard makes it clear that Abraham’s dialogue with and obedience to God is what propels him into the
Absolute.
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Here we can see a connection to St. Paul’s writing that “…the message of the cross is foolishness to those who
are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God” (1 Cor. 1.18)
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redemption. She begs him to run to the crossroads and kiss the earth so he can reconnect with a
proper view of the earth, humanity, and himself. And despite the fact that he responds to her
advice, Raskolnikov’s dialectic does not end here.120 Even in the Epilogue, he shows signs of his
former self. The change, though, is that his obedience to and dialogue with Sonya reconnects him
with earth; he is no longer living in the abstractions and principles of the 1860s conceptual
framework; he humbles himself and can see the humanity in those he previously disparaged.
Hence, Dostoevsky wants us to see that dialogue is foundational to a proper understanding of
man and the earth. Without dialogue, man is cut off from the “soil” and from other people. Once
again, it is important to remember that Liza offers the UG Man the same dialogue but that he
chooses to enter the underground instead. As such, Liza’s love for the UG Man parallels Sonya’s
because she offers sacrificial love. By reaching out to the UG Man, she shows a willingness to
suffer and dialogue with him.
Elder Zosima understands the necessity of dialogical truth, both ontologically and
epistemologically, and Dostoevsky uses him as a parallel to Liza as one who offers personal,
engaged dialogue. In The Brothers Karamazov, Zosima consistently communes with Alyosha
and those less fortunate. In a conversation with a young, Russian peasant boy, we see that his
dialogue with others and God gives him an appropriate anagogical vision of nature and man’s
relation to it:
We fell to talking about the beauty of God's world and about its great mystery.
Every blade of grass, every little beetle, every ant, every golden bee, everything
so amazingly knows its own course even though it has no mind: it witnesses
God's mystery and is itself continually fulfilling it. And I saw the heart of the dear
120

What I mean by this is that he continues to vacillate between selfishness and selflessness; as a complex character,
he is never fully converted until the final scene. However, even then, we see that Raskolnikov will always have the
freedom to choose self or God.
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youth was filled with enthusiasm; he confessed to me that he loved the forest and
the forest birds. He was a bird-catcher; he understood all their calls and could
bring to him any bird he wanted. “I know of nothing better than to be in the
forest,” he said, “everything is good.” “That is true,” he replied, “Everything is
good and wonderful, because everything is the truth.” And I said to him, “Look at
a horse, a great animal which is close to man, or at an ox which feeds man, and
works for him, an animal that is bowed down and pensive. Look at their faces:
what gentleness! What lack of malice there is in their faces! What trust and what
beauty! It is touching, even, to realise that they are without sin; for everything is
perfect; everything, apart from man, is sinless, and Christ was with them even
before he was with us.” “But surely,” asks the boy, “how can it be that Christ is
with them?” How can it be otherwise,” I tell him, “for the word is for all, for all
creation and for all creatures. Every little leaf strives towards the word, sings
praises to God, weeps to Christ unknown to itself, fulfills this by the mystery of
its sinless existence.” (16)
In this dialogical encounter, Zossima recognizes the beauty of nature and the sinfulness of man;
these two stand in tension with one another but both point to Christ—the source of all beauty and
redemption.121 Thus, Zossima is able to offer Alyosha authentic community just like Sonya
offers Raskolnikov community. Zossima and Sonya are important parallel characters to Liza
because both offer open dialogue and an anagogical vision to those with whom they commune.
Though Liza offers this dialogue to the UG Man, he ultimately refuses this dialogue. For
this reason, we must compare the UG Man with Raskolnikov to see Dostoevsky’s solution to the
121

Thus, Dostoevsky reestablishes the sacred in nature: “Dostoevsky's attitude to nature confronts us with a paradox:
on the one hand ideological ecstasy; on the other - terror, or at the very least descriptive awkwardness and reticence”
(Peace 71).
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Palace’s monologue. Raskolnikov’s and Sonya’s relationship has considerable parallels to the
UG Man’s and Liza’s, as Dostoevsky himself views their relationships similarly. Through Sonya
we see that Dostoevsky calls man to abandon the “new” scientistic view of man and return to the
“old” Christian conception. As George Gibian explains, Sonya is an embodiment of many of the
traditional Russian Christian and pagan symbols before the 1860s rise of scientism. As this
embodiment, she urges Raskolnikov to return to a pre-1960s conception of man: “Love for
Sophia is generalized ecstatic love for all creation, so that the images of flowers, greenness,
landscape, the river, air, the sun, and water can be subsumed in the concept of Sophia and
figuratively in the person of Sonya, the embodiment of the concept” (994). Love for all of
creation is not Razumikhin’s scientistic “love” founded on ego; rather, it is a dialogical love,
substantiated through suffering, and only realized in the context of sacrificial community. Hence,
Raskolnikov must “bow to the crossroads” (Dostoevsky 420) and take on suffering before he can
come to a complete view of nature and man. When he does so, he develops the proper anagogical
vision of nature and man, which stand as reflections of Christ.
Like Lewis, who establishes St. Anne’s as a clear contrast to the N.I.C.E., Dostoevsky
establishes the prison—a place of suffering—as the contrast to the Palace. The UG Man refuses
Liza’s life-giving dialogue because he does not want to enter the prison of suffering; he would
rather preserve his will to power than undergo the humbling act of suffering. As Frank reminds
us, the Crystal Palace—an earthly institution —is incapable of providing the redemption man
needs in order to live fully. Hence, all institutions, including the Palace, “must clash with
Christian love” (410). For this reason, Dostoevsky uses single characters as voices of dialogue.
For Raskolnikov, embracing prison—a place of suffering in direct contrast with the Palace—
leads to spiritual health. Freely entering suffering is key for the prison’s conceptual framework
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because it shows a penitence of heart and a willingness to accept responsibility one’s
transgressions. Though the prison’s framework may seem bleak, Dostoevsky uses Sonya as a
picture of grace. When we enter suffering, we will always have dialogue with those who have
done the same and who can support and empathize with us. As we see, Sonya willingly suffers in
Siberia alongside Raskolnikov and strengthens his will to accept the prison sentence; her
continual dialogue with him, even when he is behind prison walls, gives him a new anagogical
vision. From behind the prison bars, Raskolnikov envisions a field where “[t]here was freedom,
there a different people lived, quite unlike those here, there time itself seemed to stop, as if the
centuries of Abraham and his flocks had not passed” (Dostoevsky 549). Paradoxically, from
behind the prison of his suffering, he has a vision of freedom, where man and beast co-exist
through love, where his imagination is baptized with a vision of a New Earth.
This vision causes Raskolnikov to finally embrace his suffering. By suffering with him,
Sonya gives Raskolnikov the grace he needs to become aware of his own need for suffering; she
loves him so that he may love:
How it happened he himself did not know, but suddenly it was as if something
lifted him and flung him down at her feet. He wept and embraced her knees…But
all at once…she understood everything. Infinite happiness lit up in her eyes; she
understood, and for her there was no longer any doubt that he loved her, loved her
infinitely. (549)
Here, Dostoevsky makes clear the connection between humbly bowing and love; without the
embrace of another person, man cannot actually love. Without dialogue, man cannot escape his
ego. When Raskolnikov finally embraces his suffering, he becomes aware of her suffering: “He
was thinking of her. He remembered how he had constantly tormented her and torn her heart;
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remembered her poor, thin little face; but he was almost not even tormented by these memories:
he knew by what infinite love he would now redeem all her sufferings” (550). And the two
finally become one: “They were both pale and thin, but in those pale, sick faces there already
shone the dawn of a renewed future, of a complete resurrection into a new life. They were
resurrected by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of the other” (550).
Sonya’s dialogue catalyzes Raskolnikov’s departure from the Palace’s residency. In Sonya,
Raskolnikov finds authentic community, which man can freely enter through embracing
suffering. Sonya’s dialogue is impossible within the walls of the Palace. Man must step outside
and into the prison so that he may see the light.

St. Anne’s: A Light on a Hill
In contrast to the N.I.C.E., St. Anne’s offers a conceptual framework where man can be
home—a sacred place where grace, not power, provides the structural integrity. Immediately
apparent is Lewis’s allusion to St. Anne whose name in Hebrew means “grace” or “favor”
(Kevin Night “St. Anne”). Lewis establishes St. Anne’s as a fictional embodiment of grace and a
picture of the body of Christ. The body, the bride of Christ, is foundationally stable only when it
mirrors Christ’s sacrificial act, which is why one New Testament writer equates light—health,
stability—with love: “Anyone who loves their brother and sister lives in the light, and there is
nothing in them to make them stumble. But anyone who hates a brother or sister is in the
darkness and walks around in the darkness” (1 John 2.10-11). This mutual, shared love radiates
from St. Anne’s as the manor stands on a hill, a double allusion to Christ’s Sermon on the
Mount: “You are the light of the world. A city set upon a hill cannot be hidden” (Mat. 5.14). Set
upon a hill, St. Anne’s light shines over the darkness of the N.I.C.E. Hence, Lewis establishes St.
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Anne’s in opposition to the darkness of the N.I.C.E., showing that this conceptual residency, in
contrast the Institute, welcomes man to become existentially filled. The light of St. Anne’s can
be seen when Jane retreats here after her nightmare of Alcansan’s decapitation. She meets Mrs.
Dimble who directs her to Miss Ironwood, and though Jane is initially skeptical, she eventually
takes residence at St. Anne’s where grace slowly transforms her from a lonely and bitter wife to
a loving and welcoming member of the community.
Lewis shapes St. Anne’s embodiment of grace according to a medieval mythological
view of hierarchy. Although the Institute disparages the medieval conception of the universe and
replaces it with a new, monologic myth, St. Anne’s embraces the traditional view—not in
historical accuracy but in spiritual essence. The Director of the Manor, Elwin Ransom, is the
Trilogy’s early protagonist who travels to Malacandra and Perelandra in the first two
installments. In That Hideous Strength, he has become the Pendragon—King—of Logres and is
the direct descendent of King Arthur. As the Director of St. Anne’s, he is also in communication
with the Oyeresu — medieval angels, or Intelligences, who rotate in love for the Divine God
(Copleston 315). Accordingly, the community at St. Anne’s forms a hierarchical structure,
where Ransom and the Oyeresu are under direct spiritual authority of God and are the clear
spiritual authorities over the community. Like the celestial bodies of the medieval hierarchy,
every individual member of St. Anne’s has a fitting place; all members of the community,
animals and men alike, relate to one another, not in perverted power like the Institute’s members,
but in service.
The contrast between the Institute’s scientistic framework and St. Anne’s mythological
framework can be clearly seen by man’s relationship to nature, most notably, animals. In the
Institute’s scientistic framework, nature is determined by how useful it is; nature is only valuable
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to the Institute if it increases its power. For this reason, the Institute subjects animals to ruthless
experimentation because the leaders want to exercise a “man-god” authority over nature.
Contrastingly, St. Anne’s cherishes and relates to animals, symbolizing a prelapsarian harmony
where man, in dominion over nature, adds value to nature by tending to and naming the animals.
The distinction between dominion and power is its source; Christ bestows St. Anne’s with a
balanced and contingent dominion over nature; it is a gift that can be as easily taken as it was
given by the All-Powerful. In contrast, the man-god is built on the will to power over nature.
Lewis shows how the different frameworks shape man’s view of nature and his relationship to
animals. After Merlin liberates the animals from the Institute’s vivisectionist laboratory, a place
that cuts and devalues, the creatures begin ascending St. Anne’s in a picture of harmonious
alignment; elephants and animals of all kinds return to their proper place in relation to the human
residents and angels of St. Anne’s. The Director recognizes the profundity of this moment and
calls attention to the medieval hierarchy: “We are now as we ought to be—between the angels
who are our elder brothers and the beasts who are our jesters, servants and playfellows” (Lewis
378). With the Oyeresu in the attic above and the beasts outside, man stands in perfect relation to
others under God and in dominion over nature, an extension of the circumstances on Perelandra.
In order for this mythological picture to function, man must be willing and obedient to
find his place. Lewis recognizes that love requires obedience on part of the individual, and even
though the Institute’s framework disparages “obedience,” the Director explains, “But you see
obedience and rule are more like a dance than a drill” (149). When man and beast are in
obedience to God, they are fulfilling a picture of grace, equal sacrifice, and proportion like a
harmonious dance. As such, this dance reflects the medieval cosmological picture where
Intelligences dance in love for God in rotating circles (Copleston 315). In contrast to the
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N.I.C.E., which functions on power, the community at St. Anne’s operates according to
sacrificial love for God, humanity, and nature. As Wolfe explains, “Lewis maintains that all
relationships which are governed by love, and so transcend the allure of power for its own sake,
should embrace hierarchical order—especially friendships, familial relationships, learning
communities, and the church” (179). Lewis’s hierarchy of relationships is informed by medieval
hierarchy where all stars and planets align in relation to God, the center of the universe. Lewis
highlights the importance of sacrificial obedience before finding love; recognizing one’s place in
the universe—under God and in service to men—allows man to love.
Hence, man’s failure to love is effectively a failure to accept one’s position as a
creaturely being within the hierarchy. For this reason, the Director says, “You do not fail in
obedience through lack of love, but have lost love because you never attempted obedience”
(147). In order for man to fully love, he must act in obedience to God and in service to his fellow
man and nature. Though the modern man sees obedience restrictively, Lewis views obedience as
a greater freedom—not a freedom from action but a freedom to fulfillment. Here, we must
explore Lewis’s Neoplatonic conception of love and view it in relation to sehnsucht. As Caroline
J. Simon explains, “Lewis’s view of the nature of ‘Agape,’ or ‘Charity,’ is much closer
to…Augustine’s ‘caritas motif’” (154). For Augustine, love “is always longing; if longing
rightly ordered by our longing for God, it is caritas. If it is disordered or inordinate longing—
longing that treats creatures as more important than the Creator—it is concupiscence” (154).
Love, in Lewis’s system, necessitates longing since man is not in the immediate presence of
God. Accordingly, everything man does should be motivated out of love and pointed to God,
who is love, and who, in turn, enables him to fully love.
The unity of St. Anne’s forms a remarkable contrast to the N.I.C.E.’s fractured scientific
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unity. The N.I.C.E. replaces the medieval mythological picture with a “new” scientistic myth.
Like the group who tried to scale the heavens in the Genesis narrative, the Institute’s leaders try
to build a modern Tower of Babel instead of finding their place in the Christian mythological
picture. However, though the Institute’s new myth deconstructs this hierarchy, it does so without
constructing a foundationally stable replacement. The replacement it offers—a scientistic
myth—ultimately crumbles since its foundation has no structural integrity. This breakdown can
be seen by the way language, reason, and morality suffer within the Institute’s conceptual
framework; like the Crystal Palace, the N.I.C.E. is uninhabitable. However, in St. Anne’s
mythical framework, man’s language, reasoning, and moral capabilities have a foundation and
structural integrity. Once again, we must remember that Lewis does not factually support the
medieval hierarchical account. Rather, he affirms the account’s spiritual essence; it grounds
man’s language and reason in Logos—which stands outside the Total System; moreover, Logos
affirms the existence of objective values, which also stand outside the naturalistic system.
By embracing the Word, St. Anne’s conceptual framework offers a residency where man
is a complete being according to original earthly design, and thus can speak, reason, and exist in
a moral capacity. After rising from Bracton Wood, Merlin visits St. Anne’s, and it is here that the
community experiences pure language through the Oyeresu: “For this was the language spoken
before the Fall and beyond the Moon and the meanings were not given to the syllables by
chance, or skill, or long tradition, but truly inherent in them as the shape of the great Sun is
inherent in the little waterdrop” (229). The Oyeresu’s language, spoken by Merlin, is a complete,
symbiotic relationship of form and content, one that humanity has never seen. The sign and
signifier are not arbitrarily matched; they are purely connected. Ransom and Merlin’s interaction
with the Oyeresu sparks a language revival at St. Anne’s, full of dance imagery and excitement:
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Now of a sudden they all began talking loudly at once, each, not contentiously but
delightedly, interrupting the others. A stranger coming into the kitchen would
have thought they were drunk, not soddenly but gaily drunk: would have seen
heads bent close together, eyes dancing, an excited wealth of gesture. What they
said, none of the party could ever afterwards remember…If not plays upon words,
yet certainly plays upon thoughts, paradoxies, fances, anecdotes, theories
laughingly advanced yet (on consideration) well worth taking seriously, had
flowed from them and over them with dazzling prodigality…such eloquence, such
melody (song could have added nothing to it), such toppling structures of double
meaning, such skyrockets of metaphor and allusion. (321)
In a meeting of joy, the group engages one another, not as “stimulations,” but as purely
embodied beings who transcend positivistic subjectivism and authentically engage with one
another. As Lewis makes clear, this discourse of metaphor, wit, and poetic language is the
closest on earth man will ever come to pure language; it engages not only the head, but also
man’s chest—his tripartite soul. These moments, when man is under the angels and in
community with others, are the closest to fullness of joy and love man can experience on earth;
he has stepped outside of self and created a space for others to inhabit.122 Through this scene we
can see that stepping outside of self requires a forgetfulness of self. Thus, in this dance of
language, the group of participators cannot recall the particulars of the evening because they are
in ecstatic and selfless love for one another. Their forgetfulness of the night’s details attests to
their mindfulness for one another. Jane learns this lesson at St. Anne’s when she says, “We
weren’t meant to see ourselves” (362) in a comment about mirrors, which send back an image of
oneself. After spending time in St. Anne’s conceptual framework, Jane realizes that she is most
122

Here we see the glorious paradox of kenosis as exemplified in Philippians 2:7.
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herself when she is not herself; she is most herself when she is in obedience to God and in
service to men.123
Although Jane is fortunate enough to find her place in St Anne’s, Mark struggles to find
his place until he fully steps inside the Institute’s and sees the dark, uninhabitable residency. At
the climax of Mark’s involvement with the N.I.C.E. he is accused of murder and sent to the
Objective Room to be fully purged of all subjectivity. In the Objective Room, Mark is subjected
to a series of “petty obscenities” (Lewis 309) in a spotted room. With scientific “objectivity,”
Frost experiments on Mark as a test-subject for the Institute’s “new man” theory; if Mark can be
purged of his emotional make-up, he can be the progenitor for a new scientific man. However, as
the tests progress Mark detours from Frost’s plan. Staring into Frost’s bleak, cold conceptual
framework—a view of the universe in direct contradiction to St. Anne’s— Mark becomes aware
of the Tao and the existence of an objective world and values:
The idea of the Straight or Normal which had occurred to him during his visit to
this room, grew stronger and more solid in his mind till it became a kind of
mountain. He had never before known what an Idea meant; he had always thought
till now that they were things inside one’s own head. But now, when his head was
continually attacked and often completely filled with the clinging corruption of
the training, this Idea towered above him—something which obviously existed
quite independently of himself and had hard rock surfaces which would not give,
surfaces he could cling to. (310)
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Lewis connects the act of reading great literature (a composition of language) with other transcendent acts: “But
in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I
see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I
transcend myself; and am never more myself than when I do” (An Experiment in Criticism 141). Hence, we can see
that Lewis connects language, worship, morality, and experiential knowledge with transcendence; the emptying of
oneself allows one to be filled to a greater capacity—a paradox of human existence enacted by One who died
paradoxically so that He may live in glorious resurrection.
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In this moment, Mark’s beholds the Tao as the most real Idea; he is given an anagogical vision to
see beyond the Objective Room, outside his “stimulations,” and into the existence of objective
values.
With this new vision, Mark develops a more accurate vision of himself. Lewis, in this
way, connects the necessity of a correct view of nature with a correct view of oneself. He most
fully fleshes this idea out through his enjoyment and contemplation distinction. In “Meditations
from a Toolshed,” Lewis differentiates “looking at” and “looking along” a beam of light. The
first type of vision is contemplative, analytic, scientific, and monologic; the second type of
vision is experiential, personal, enjoyable and dialogical. The second type of vision allows one to
dialogue with another person and transcend oneself; it can be likened to the ecstasy one has when
in love. Accordingly, Lewis complements Dostoevsky’s view of dialogical truth because he
shows that scientific knowledge alone does not allow one to look along the beam, out of the
door, and into the light of the sun. Therefore, he finds anagogical vision—“looking along”—
necessary to properly seeing the mythological picture where Christ is the center and illuminates
the universe with love. Without this anagogical vision, which is incommensurable with
scientism, man cannot baptize his imagination with the Christian mythological picture.
By developing an anagogical vision, Mark identifies his own waywardness and
motivation for power and the contrast Jane and the community of St. Anne’s offers. As Wolfe
explains, St. Anne’s manor makes it clear that “the correct exercise of power requires a common
submission and directedness towards a shared good (and, ultimately, God)” (177). St. Anne’s
conceptual framework affirms the individual by placing him in the context of the community;
when the individual prioritizes a “shared good” with others, he is most fully human. However,
though the N.I.C.E. offers a “shared good” through utilitarian ethics, it excludes the necessity of
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sacrificial obedience. As a result, the Institute’s ethical system leads to a perverted view of man
and the drive to be “like God.” By entering the Institute’s framework, Mark grows in awareness
of the Institute’s darkness and the need for sacrificial obedience. As Wolfe explains, “Lewis
believes the essence of the Fall to be precisely the turning away from the directedness and a
turning away instead towards love of power for its own sake, i.e. towards the untruth that human
beings are self-sufficient, that they can be ‘like God’ in power, rather than like him in will selfabandonment” (177). Without sacrificial obedience to others and God, the Institute’s ethical
system offers ostensible hope; in reality, this conceptual framework leads to darkness and
destruction. After entering the Objective Room, Mark is able to see his own drive to be “like
God” and how destructive this drive is for man. “Looking at” the Objective Room gives Mark
the motivation to “look along” a different conceptual residency.
Lewis uses circle imagery to highlight Mark’s progression back into the mythological
hierarchy. For instance, it is his desire to be on the “inside” of the scientific circle at the Institute
that leads Mark to the Progressive Circle and eventually the Objective Room. While in the
Objective Room, Frost explains the purpose of the Room, which is to “…promote objectivity. A
circle bound together by subjective feelings of mutual confidence and liking would be useless”
(Lewis 255). The Institute’s intellectual circle is united by their shared, scientistic myth.
However, after they manipulate and accuse Mark of murder, he realizes that this circle is
perverted and incomplete: “For he now thought that with all his life-long eagerness to reach an
inner circle he had chosen the wrong circle. Jane was where she belonged. He was going to be
admitted only out of kindness” (358). After coming to an awareness of the Tao—“the Straight,
the Normal” (310), Mark has a referent by which he can judge the Institute’s circle.124 He

124

It is no surprise that Lewis uses circle imagery to describe man’s innate awareness of the Good in Mere
Christianity.
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realizes that Jane had chosen to the right circle at St. Anne’s—a place where kindness and love
form the structural integrity. As Lewis makes clear, the circle of St. Anne’s operates under the
medieval conception of love. Once again, Aristotle claimed that star and planet clusters exist in
sphere, all of which rotate in harmony with one another by love and desire for the First Mover
(Copleston, 315). What motivates the cyclical process are immaterial beings within each of the
spheres called Intelligences who strive to emulate the spirituality of the First Mover, but
incapable of true emulation, move in perfect circles—the closest idea to perfection in medieval
thought. Mark’s anagogical vision allows him to see that Institute is an incomplete and fractured
circle, that he needs to look along a different residency.
The circle at St. Anne’s illuminates over Edgestow and draws him back. As he gets
closer, “Everything became a mist; and then, as the lights in the west vanished, this mist grew
softly luminous in a different place—above him, as though the light rested on St. Anne’s” (Lewis
380). When he finally arrives to St. Anne’s, he is greeted by a large figure who is “…not
human…divinely tall, part naked, part wrapped in a flame-coloured robe” (382). This figure is
Venus, who has descended into St. Anne’s. As the goddess of love and fertility, Venus sets the
scene for Mark and Jane to meet with “sweet smells and bright fires, with food and wine and a
rich bed” (382). Mark is overwhelmed by the beauty as he enters the room, patiently awaiting
Jane who also experiences rich beauty when she descends from the Director’s room to meet
Mark. She walks “into the liquid light and supernatural warmth of the garden and across the wet
laws (birds were everywhere)…going down all the time, down to the lodge, descending the
ladder of humility” (382). Though Jane is surrounded by beauty, she is still aware of the
sacrificial reality of her duty: “Then she thought of her obedience and the setting of each foot
before the other became a kind of sacrificial ceremony” (382). Her obedience to God allows her
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to love Mark and become aware “of all his sufferings” (382). Here is Lewis’s picture of grace;
following Christ, Jane becomes aware of Mark’s sufferings and prepares to face them—to carry
a burden that Mark could not carry himself. Her obedience to God makes her aware of her need
to show grace to Mark in sacrificial ceremony.
As Mark enters the marriage bed with Jane, we can see the overarching purpose of St.
Anne’s, which is to mirror Christ’s marriage to the body. St. Anne’s conceptual residency is
important because it affirms the entire body, not just the head or the chest. In this framework,
members are not “men without chests” (Lewis 26). Rather, they are existentially whole
individuals and fully capable of communing with other members of the body. Here again, we see
the metaphysical oneness and plurality that reflects the One Trinity; the three parts of the trinity
exist separately but communicate and act as one. Lewis makes clear that the unity of the body is
only possible through sacrificial ceremony. Christ’s commitment to his bride is an act of grace
that reaches into earth but also extends into the final age to come. Thus, Jane graciously
welcomes Mark back even though he wanders into the Institute’s residency. Through St. Anne’s
Jane learns the necessity of grace, which itself incommensurable with scientism. Her sacrifice
defies both the Crystal Palace and the N.I.C.E’s ethics of utility, which views ethics in the
abstract: “You see, MacPhee, if one is thinking simply of goodness in the abstract, one soon
reaches the fatal idea of something standardized—some common kind of life to which all nations
out to progress” (370). Jane’s sacrificial welcoming embodies Christ’s sacrifice, and by
welcoming Mark into this residency, Jane allows Mark to dialogue, to step outside the monologic
scientistic myth and into dialogue with God.
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